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ABSTRACT
The Internet is afflicted by "unwelcome requests'" defined broadly as spurious claims
on scarce resources. For example, the CPU and other resources at a server are targets
of denial-of-service (DOS) attacks. Another example is spam (i.e., unsolicited bulk
email); here, the resource is human attention. Absent any defense, a very small number
of attackers can claim a very large fraction of the scarce resources.
Traditional responses identify "bad" requests based on content (for example, spam
filters analyze email text and embedded URLs). We argue that such approaches are in-
herently gameable because motivated attackers can make "bad" requests look "good".
Instead, defenses should aim to allocate resources proportionally (so if lo% of the re-
questers are "bad", they should be limited to lo% of the scarce resources).
To meet this goal, we present the design, implementation, analysis, and experi-
mental evaluation of two systems. The first, speak-up, defends servers against applica-
tion-level denial-of-service by encouraging all clients to automatically send more traf-
fic. The "good" clients can thereby compete equally with the "bad" ones. Experiments
with an implementation of speak-up indicate that it allocates a server's resources in
rough proportion to clients' upload bandwidths, which is the intended result.
The second system, DQE, controls spam with per-sender email quotas. Under
DQE, senders attach stamps to emails. Receivers communicate with a well-known, un-
trusted enforcer to verify that stamps are fresh and to cancel stamps to prevent reuse.
The enforcer is distributed over multiple hosts and is designed to tolerate arbitrary
faults in these hosts, resist various attacks, and handle hundreds of billions of mes-
sages daily (two or three million stamp checks per second). Our experimental results
suggest that our implementation can meet these goals with only a few thousand PCs.
The enforcer occupies a novel design point: a set of hosts implement a simple storage
abstraction but avoid neighbor maintenance, replica maintenance, and mutual trust.
One connection between these systems is that DQE needs a DoS defense-and
can use speak-up. We reflect on this connection, on why we apply speak-up to DoS
and DQE to spam, and, more generally, on what problems call for which solutions.
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Introduction
Spam, defined as unsolicited bulk email, had been a background annoy-
ance since the famous "DEC email" of 1978, the first known spam [156].
In the late 199os, however, the volume of spam increased sharply, flood-
ing inboxes and making email unusable for many recipients [37, 155]. In
response, email providers and individual recipients deployed spam filters,
which kept messages with certain words (e.g., "Viagra") out of inboxes.
Spammers must have thought that their problem was one simply of pre-
sentation, not underlying message, for they began to traffic in euphemism:
filter writers now had to block messages containing "encoded" words (e.g.,
"V!@gr@"). But spammers changed tactics again, and today their advertise-
ments appear inside excerpts from sources like The New York Times, Ham-
let, and "Seinfeld"-which are difficult for filters to recognize as spam-or
inside images and audio files that are difficult for a computer to interpret.
And there are anecdotal reports that spammers can respond within hours
to changes in popular spam filters [941].
In this environment, it is hard to get filters right. Yet, people still filter.
They have to: spam is roughly 75% of all email sent [o06, 107, 150]. The
result of filtering in this regime-a regime in which most email is spam, yet
much spam looks legitimate to a computer-is that legitimate email is some-
times kept from the recipient's inbox. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
rate of such "false positives" is 1% [30, 116], with some estimating their eco-
nomic damage at hundreds of millions of dollars annually [31, 48]. While
we have no way to verify these numbers, we can vouch for the personal
inconvenience caused by false positives. Email is no longer reliable.
Spam's increasing sophistication parallels developments in denial-of-service
(DOS), a phenomenon that has many incarnations and is defined at a high
level as consuming a scarce resource to prevent legitimate clients of the re-
source from doing so. (We discuss some of the motives for conducting DoS
attacks in the next chapter.) One of the original DoS attacks was to flood
network links with ICMP [1191 traffic. However, such attacks are easily fil-
tered by placing a module in front of the flooded link. Next, many attackers
turned to TCP SYN floods, which send a server spurious requests to es-
tablish TCP sessions. However, these floods can be heavily mitigated with
TCP SYN cookies [21], which push the burden of session setup to clients,
thereby preventing a small number of clients from overwhelming a server.
In response, attackers have moved to distributed denial-of-service (known
as DDoS), in which a large set of machines carries out the types of attacks
above.
Lately, a particularly noxious form of DDoS has emerged, namely ap-
plication-level attacks [73], in which the attackers mimic legitimate client
behavior by sending proper-looking requests. Examples include HTTP re-
quests for large files [129, 136], making queries of search engines [38], and
issuing computationally expensive requests (e.g., database queries or trans-
actions) [82]. For the savvy attacker, the appeal of this attack over a link
flood or TCP SYN flood is two-fold. First, far less bandwidth is required:
the victim's computational resources-disks, CPUs, memory, application
server licenses, etc.-can often be depleted by proper-looking requests long
before its access link is saturated. Second, because the attack traffic is "in-
band", it is harder to identify and thus more potent.
So where does such unwelcome traffic-spam, DDoS, and other unsavory
traffic, like viruses and worms-come from? The answer is: in many cases,
from a flourishing Internet underworld. The eco-system of this underworld
is well-developed, and we outline its structure in Chapter 2. For now, we
just highlight a few aspects. First, the inhabitants of this underworld-
organized criminals seeking profit and misguided middle-schoolers seek-
ing bragging rights-are motivated and adaptable. Second, they send much
of the unwelcome traffic from a low-cost attack platform-a collection of
other people's computers that they have compromised and now control re-
motely. Third, the traffic is often disguised not only in terms of content, as
with spam and DDoS that is difficult to detect (as described above), but
also in terms of location: because the commandeered computers can be all
over the world, it is hard to filter the traffic by looking at the network or
geographic origin of the traffic.
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FIGURE 1.1i-Two examples of the abstract problem. In the problem, the two populations'
requests are indistinguishable.
The state-of-affairs that has so far been described is vexing, and it high-
lights a fundamental, hard question. That question motivates this disserta-
tion, and it is best phrased by casting the above situation in abstract terms.
1.1 THE PROBLEM IN ABSTRACT TERMS
The situation that we are concerned with has the following characteristics:
Scarce resources; bad clients may issue far more requests than good ones.
There is a population of good and bad clients that make requests for some
scarce resource. The situation becomes problematic when the bad clients
individually issue far more requests than the good clients. For "resources"
and "requests'", we adopt broad notions. For example, requests could be
HTTP requests, with the scarce resources being the CPU, RAM, and disk of
a Web server, as in Figure 1.1 (a). But requests could also be email messages,
in which case the requested resource is human attention, as in Figure 1.1 (b).
bad~a 
-----
bad0
Open resources. By open, we mean that network protocols and social
mores permit any client to make a request of the resource. For example,
spam claims human attention by abusing the fact that anyone can, given
a recipient's address, send email to that recipient. The resources of search
engines (e.g., Google) and travel distribution sites (e.g., Orbitz) are another
example: these sites devote significant computational resources--seconds
of CPU time or more-to any client that sends them a request. (Request
latencies to Google are of course fractions of a second, but it is highly likely
that each request is concurrently handled by tens of CPUs or more.)
Can't differentiate good and bad reliably. First, we mean that good and
bad requests are not differentiable. By "differentiate", we mean with com-
putational means. (For example, a human can certainly detect spam, but
the human's attention is the very thing that we are trying to protect.) Sec-
ond, we mean that good and bad clients may not be differentiable: each bad
client could adopt multiple identities (e.g., by pretending to have 200 IP
addresses), meaning that an abusively heavy consumer of a resource might
not be identifiable as such.
Spam has the three characteristics just listed. Other examples with these
characteristics are HTTP floods of travel distribution sites, as discussed
above; floods of DNS (Domain Name System) requests to sites that expose
a database via a DNS front-end (e.g., the blacklist Spamhaus 1158]); and
floods of remote procedure calls (RPCs) (e.g., for exhausting the resources
of a service like OpenDHT [130], in which clients are invited to consume
storage anonymously, and make requests by RPC).
In these situations, classifying requests based on their contents amounts
to applying a heuristic. Yet such heuristics are inherently gameable' and,
when they err, may cause active harm by blocking valid requests (as in the
case of spam filters blocking legitimate email, described earlier). Trying to
identify and limit heavy users explicitly doesn't work either: a bad client
making too times as many requests as a good client can thwart such a de-
fense by adopting 1oo separate identities.
Thus, we have the following question: How can one defend against at-
tacks on open, scarce resources, in which the bad clients make many more
requests than the good ones, yet good and bad requests look alike?
This is the question that this dissertation is trying to answer.
'I thank Maxwell Krohn for the words "heuristic" and "gameable" in this context.
1.2 PHILOSOPHY
Because, in our problem statement, telling apart "good" and "bad" requests
and clients is difficult or impossible, our defenses will not even try to make
this distinction. Indeed, in contrast to the prevailing "detect and block"
ethos of current defenses, the defenses in this dissertation have an egali-
tarian ethos in that they treat all clients the same.
Specifically, our goal is to allocate resources proportionally to all clients.
If, for example, lo0% of the requesters of some scarce resource are "bad", then
those clients should be limited to 10% of the resources (though the defense
does not "know" that these clients are "bad"). To further specify the goal,
the allocation to clients ought to reflect their actual numbers (as opposed to
their virtual identities). Thus, any defense should be robust against a client
manufacturing multiple identities to try to increase its share.
But what if 90o% of the requesting clients are bad? In this case, meeting
our goal still accomplishes something, namely limiting the bad clients to
90o% of the resources. However, this "accomplishment" is likely insufficient:
unless the resources are appropriately over-provisioned, the lo% "slice" that
the good clients can claim will not meet their demand. While this fact is un-
fortunate, observe that if the bad clients look exactly like the good ones but
vastly outnumber them, then no defense works. (In this case, the only re-
course is a proportional allocation together with heavy over-provisioning.)
One might object that our philosophy "treats symptoms", rather than
removing the underlying problem. However, as argued in Chapter 2, elimi-
nating the root of the problem-compromised computers and underground
demand for their services-is a separate, long-term effort. Meanwhile, a re-
sponse to the symptoms is needed today.
1.3 CONTENTS OF THE DISSERTATION
Much of this dissertation focuses on the design, implementation, analysis,
and evaluation of two systems that seek the proportional allocation goal
stated above.
Speak-up. First, speak-up, the subject of Chapter 3, defends against ap-
plication-level DDoS (as defined above). With speak-up, a server so vic-
timized encourages its clients: it causes them, resources permitting, to send
higher volumes of traffic. (The resulting extra traffic is automatic; the hu-
man owner of the client does not act.) The key insight of this defense is
as follows: we suppose that bad clients are already using most of their up-
load bandwidth so cannot react to the encouragement, whereas good clients
have spare upload bandwidth so can send drastically higher volumes of traf-
fic. As a result, the traffic into the server inflates, but the good clients are
much better represented in the traffic mix than before and thus capture a
much larger fraction of the server's resources than before.
Another way to explain speak-up is to say that the server, when attacked,
charges clients bandwidth for access. Because the mechanism asks all clients
for payment and does not distinguish among them, speak-up upholds the
philosophy above. (In practice, speak-up can achieve only a roughly pro-
portional allocation because it allocates service to clients in proportion to
their bandwidths, which are not all equal. As we will argue in Chapter 3, a
fully proportional allocation does not appear possible, given the threat.)
Of course, speak-up's use of bandwidth as a computational currency
(i.e., a resource that the server asks clients to expend to get service) raises
questions. However, we aim to show throughout Chapter 3 that speak-up is
appropriate and viable under certain conditions. We also compare speak-
up to other defenses and, in particular, compare bandwidth to CPU and
memory cycles, which are the computational currencies that have previ-
ously been proposed [2, 1o, 11, 45, 46, 80o, 98, 170].
DQE. The second system in this dissertation, the subject of Chapter 4,
is Distributed Quota Enforcement (DQE), which controls spam by limiting
email volumes directly. Under DQE, each sender gets a quota of stamps and
attaches a stamp to each email. Receivers communicate with a well-known
quota enforcer to verify that the stamp on the email is fresh and to cancel
the stamp to prevent reuse. The receiving host delivers only messages with
fresh stamps to the human user; messages with used stamps are assumed to
be spam. The intent is that the quotas would be set such that, unlike today,
no one could send more than a tiny fraction of all email. Because spammers
need huge volumes to be profitable, such quota levels would probably drive
them out of business. However, the system does its job even if they remain
solvent.
This approach upholds the philosophy above: under DQE, an email-a
request for human attention-is valid if the sender has not exhausted its
quota; the contents of the email do not matter. Moreover, the quota alloca-
tion process does not try to determine which senders are spammers.
The focus of our work on DQE is the enforcer. Its design and imple-
mentation must meet several technical challenges: the enforcer must scale
to current and future email volumes (around 80 billion emails are sent per
day [77, 123], and we target 200 billion emails, which is roughly two million
messages per second), requiring distribution over many machines, perhaps
across several organizations; it must tolerate faults in its underlying ma-
chines without letting much spam through; it must resist attacks; it must
tolerate mutual distrust among its constituent hosts; and it should use as
few machines as possible (to simplify management and hardware costs).
In addition to the technical requirements above, DQE raises some pol-
icy, economic, and pragmatic questions, notably: Which entity (or enti-
ties) will allocate quotas? How will that entity set quotas? Does DQE admit
a plausible path to deployment and then widespread adoption? Although
these issues are challenging, we are optimistic that they have viable solu-
tions (as we discuss in Chapter 4). Moreover, even if they cannot be solved,
the technical components of DQE are still useful building blocks for other
systems.
Connections. This dissertation also considers the connections between
these two systems. For one thing, we will see that DQE's enforcer can use a
variant of speak-up to defend itselfl (See §4.4.5.) More broadly, Chapter 5
situates speak-up and DQE in a spectrum of possible solutions to the ab-
stract problem described in §1.1. We discuss what types of problems call
for which solutions, why we apply speak-up to DDoS and DQE to spam
(rather than vice-versa), and why DQE can defend itself with speak-up (but
not vice-versa).
Interactions. Of course, if speak-up and DQE are successful, adversaries
may shift to different tactics and attacks. In §4.7 and Chapter 6, we consider
the interaction between these defenses and attackers' strategies.
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS & RESULTS
We divide our contributions and results into three categories:
Articulation and philosophy. The contributions in this category are a
definition of the abstract problem, including a recognition that spam and
DDoS can be viewed as two incarnations of the same abstract problem; our
philosophy of defense to this attack, namely avoiding heuristics and instead
setting proportional allocation as the goal; and a comparison of several ab-
stract solutions in the same framework.
Bandwidth as a currency. Speak-up's first contribution is to introduce
bandwidth as a computational currency. One advantage of charging in this
resource is that it is most likely adversaries' actual constraint.
A second contribution is to give four methods of charging in this cur-
rency. All of the methods incorporate a front-end to the server that does
the following when the server is over-subscribed: (a) rate-limits requests to
the server; (b) encourages clients to send more traffic; and (c) allocates the
server in proportion to the bandwidth spent by clients. The method that we
implement and evaluate is a virtual auction: the front-end causes each client
to automatically send a congestion-controlled stream of dummy bytes on a
separate payment channel. When the server is ready to process a request,
the front-end admits the client that has sent the most bytes.
The collection of mechanisms for charging bandwidth is interesting for
several reasons. First, the mechanisms are conceptually and practically sim-
ple. Second, they resist gaming by adversaries. Third, they find the price
of service (in bits) automatically; the front-end and clients do not need to
guess the correct price or communicate about it. Last, the mechanisms ap-
ply to other currencies (and the existing literature on computational cur-
rencies has not proposed mechanisms that have all of the properties of
speak-up's mechanisms).
Beyond these methods, another contribution is to embody the idea in
a working system. We implemented the front-end for Web servers. When
the protected Web server is overloaded, the front-end gives JavaScript to
unmodified Web clients that makes them send large HTTP POSTs. These
POSTs are the "bandwidth payment". Our main experimental finding is that
this implementation meets our goal of allocating the protected server's re-
sources in rough proportion to clients' upload bandwidths.
Large-scale quota enforcement. DQE is in the family of email postage
systems (which we review in §4.10). This dissertation's contribution to that
literature is solving the many technical problems of large-scale, distributed
quota enforcement (listed above in §1.3) with a working system, namely the
enforcer. We show that the enforcer is practical: our experimental results
suggest that our implementation can handle 200 billion messages daily (a
multiple of the world's email volume) with a few thousand dedicated PCs.
Though we discuss the enforcer mostly in the context of spam control,
it is useful as a building block in other contexts, both for enforcing quotas
on resources other than human attention and for other applications.
Interesting aspects of the enforcer are as follows. The enforcer stores
billions of key-value pairs (canceled stamps) over a set of mutually untrust-
ing nodes. It relies on just one trust assumption, common in distributed
systems: that the constituent hosts are determined by a trusted entity. It tol-
erates Byzantine and crash faults in its nodes. It achieves this fault-tolerance
despite storing only one copy (roughly) of each canceled stamp, and it gives
tight guarantees on the average number of reuses per stamp. Each node uses
an optimized internal key-value map that balances storage and speed, and
nodes shed load to avoid "distributed livelock" (a problem that we conjec-
ture exists in many other distributed systems when they are overloaded).
Stepping back from these techniques, we observe that the enforcer oc-
cupies a novel point in the design space for distributed systems, a point
notable for simplicity. The enforcer implements a storage abstraction, yet
its constituent nodes need neither keep track of other nodes, nor perform
replica maintenance, nor use heavyweight cryptography, nor trust one an-
other. The enforcer gets away with this simplicity because we tailored its
design to the semantics of quota enforcement, specifically, that the effect of
lost data is only that adversaries' effective quotas increase.
1.5 CONFRONTING CONTROVERSY
The author has given over twenty audio-visual presentations that covered
the key ideas in this dissertation. These presentations have had at least five
incarnations, have adopted different perspectives, and have been delivered
to a range of audiences, from those familiar with the related work to general
computer science audiences. The reception was the same every time:
"What??"
We therefore conclude that there is an element of controversy in these
contents. For this reason, Appendices A and B answer common questions.
Readers with immediate questions are encouraged to turn to these appen-
dices now. And, while the main text tries to answer many of these questions,
consulting these appendices while reading that text may still be useful.
Finally, for explicit critiques of speak-up, DQE, and the work as a whole,
please see, respectively, §3.9, §4.11, and Chapter 6.
2Background
In this chapter, we describe the eco-system that launches spam, DDoS, and
other attacks; give a sense for the scale of the problem; and then high-
light several important aspects. The abstract problem in §1.1 has been dis-
tilled from this context and from the specifics of the attacks themselves (de-
scribed in later chapters).
2.1 AN INTERNET UNDERWORLD & ITS ECO-SYSTEM
The eco-system, in rough contours, works as follows. (For more detail, see
[16, 75, 76, 99, 163] and citations therein.) First, there are people who spe-
cialize in finding exploits, i.e., bugs in operating systems and applications
that allow a remote person or program to take control of a machine.
Next, the exploit-finders are compensated for their discoveries by virus
and worm authors, whose wares use exploits to spread from machine to ma-
chine. Like real diseases, these "software diseases", commonly called mal-
ware, can spread either automatically (each machine compromised by an
exploit searches for, and then compromises, other machines that are vul-
nerable to the same exploit) or as a result of ill-advised human behavior
(visiting sketchy Web sites can lead to machine compromise if the Web
browser on the machine is vulnerable to an exploit). Of course, malware
can also spread without exploiting software flaws. For example, software
programs, especially those of uncertain provenance, may include bundled
malware; a side effect of installing such software is to install the malware. As
another example, some viruses are installed when the virus emails copies
of itself (to spam lists or to a human's address book) and recipients follow
the email's instructions to install the attached program, which is the virus
itself.
The malware authors are in turn compensated for their efforts by bot
herders, who deploy the malware, hoping that its infectiousness will com-
promise a large population of machines (anywhere from hundreds to mil-
lions), leaving those machines under the control of the bot herder. Such a
commandeered machine is known as a bot or zombie, and a collection of
them is a bot network, or a botnet.
Bot herders profit from renting out their botnets.
Finally, those who rent the botnet make their profit from various ac-
tivities that we now list. Spam is profitable because a small percentage of
recipients do respond [571]. Launching DDoS attacks can be profitable if
the attack is used to suppress a competing online business [38, 136] or to
conduct extortion [111, 129, 160]. One can also use a botnet to host phish-
ing Web sites (in phishing, people receive email, purportedly from their
bank, that encourages them to disclose financial information at a Web site
controlled by the attacker). A final activity is to log the key strokes of the
human owner of the compromised machine, thereby gaining access to bank
accounts or other "assets".
Of course, as only a single strand in the food chain, the account just
given is an approximation. Nevertheless, it should give the reader enough
context for the remainder of this chapter.
2.2 NUMBERS OF BOTS & BOTNETS
We first consider how many bots there might be worldwide and then how
they are organized into botnets.
Estimates of the total number of bots are varied. According to Network
World [112], "Symantec says it found 6 million infected bots in the sec-
ond half of 2oo6. Currently, about 3.5 million bots are used to send spam
daily, says ... a well-known botnet hunter". The author has personally heard
informal estimates of tens of millions of bots and, based on these conversa-
tions, believes that 20 million bots is a high estimate of the worldwide total.
Moreover, as Rajab et al. observe, the total number of bots that are online at
any given moment is likely much smaller than the total number of infected
computers [1251].
In terms of how the bots are divided, there are likely a few big ones
that are hundreds of thousands, or millions, strong [24, 40, 73, 75, 104,
153]. However, most botnets are far smaller. We consider average botnet
size more completely at the end of the next chapter (§3.10.2); for now, we
simply relate one of the points made there, which is that 1o,ooo members
is a large botnet.
Thus, while the aggregate computing power of bots represents several
percentage points of the roughly one billion computers worldwide [34], no
one bot herder can command anywhere near those resources. Moreover,
bot herders frequently compete with each other to acquire bots; it is unlikely
that they would merge their armies.
Nevertheless, bots are vexing and threatening. We now summarize some
of the difficulties that they pose.
2.3 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROBLEM
The "bot problem"-meaning the existence of bots themselves and also the
attacks that they launch-is difficult for reasons that include the following:
- Adversaries are motivated, adaptable, and skilled. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, the inhabitants of this eco-system are a combination of
financially-motivated professionals and status-conscious teens (their
notion of status is strange). Both groups have an incentive to be "good
at being bad".
- Bots are unlikely to go extinct. Bots propagate as a result of two
things that are notoriously difficult to control completely: bugs and
human behavior. For this reason, we argue that while the number of
bots may decrease in the future, the phenomenon will be with us for
a long time to come. The problems caused by bots (spam, DDoS, etc.)
must therefore be treated in isolation (even if they are just symptoms);
we cannot wait for the "bot problem" to be eliminated.
- Attack platform is cheap and powerful. Botnets function as a large
collection of inexpensive computing resources: bot rental rates, cents
per bot week per host [73, 161], are orders of magnitude cheaper than
hardware purchases. Moreover, bots allow an attacker to hide his ac-
tual geographic and network whereabouts since it is the bots, not the
attacker's personal computers, that send the objectionable traffic.
- Adversarial traffic can be disguised as normal traffic. This disguise
exists on two levels. First, as illustrated in the beginning of Chapter i,
adversaries disguise the content of their traffic. Second, because a bot
army may be widely distributed, its bots often look, from a network
perspective, like a set of ordinary clients. It may therefore be difficult
or impossible for the victim (the target of a DDoS attack, an email
server receiving a lot of spam, etc.) or even the victim's Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) to filter the attack traffic by looking at the network
or geographic origin of the traffic.
- No robust notion of host identity in today's Internet. We mean two
things here. First, via address hijacking, attackers can pretend to have
multiple IP addresses. Address hijacking is more than a host simply
fudging the source IP address of its packets-a host can actually be
reachable at the adopted addresses. We describe the details of this at-
tack in Appendix c; it can be carried out either by bots or by comput-
ers that the attacker actually owns. Second, while address hijacking
is of course anti-social, there is socially acceptable Internet behav-
ior with a similar effect, namely deploying NATs (Network Address
Translators) and proxies. Whereas address hijacking allows one host
to adopt several identities, NATs and proxies cause multiple hosts to
share a single identity (thousands of hosts behind a proxy or NAT
may share a handful of IP addresses). As a result of all of these phe-
nomena, the recipient of a packet in today's Internet may be unable
to attribute that packet to a particular client.
We will further specify the threats relevant to the next two chapters in those
chapters (see 93.3 and §4.1). The descriptions presented in this chapter are
common to both threats.
3
Speak-up
This chapter is about our defense to application-level DDoS. This attack,
defined at the beginning of Chapter 1, is a specific instance of the abstract
problem described in §1.1. Recall that in this attack, computer criminals
send well-formed requests to a victimized server, the intent being to exhaust
a resource like CPU, memory, or disk bandwidth that can be depleted by a
request rate far below what is needed to saturate an access link.
Current DDoS defenses try to slow down the bad clients. Though we
stand in solidarity with these defenses in the goal of limiting the service
that attackers get, our approach is different. It is to encourage all clients to
speak up, rather than sit idly by while attackers drown them out.
To justify this approach, and to illustrate how it reflects the philosophy
in §1.2, we now discuss three categories of defense. The first approach that
one might consider is to over-provision massively: in theory, one could
purchase enough computational resources to serve both good clients and
attackers. However, anecdotal evidence [111, 151] suggests that while sites
provision additional link capacity during attacks [25, 120], even the largest
Web sites try to conserve computation by detecting bots and denying them
access, using the methods in the second category.
We call this category-approaches that try to distinguish between good
and bad clients-detect-and-block. Examples are profiling by IP address [9,
29, 1031 (a box in front of the server or the server itself admits requests ac-
cording to a learned demand profile); profiling based on application-level
behavior [128, 147] (the server denies access to clients whose request pro-
files appear deviant); and CAPTCHA-based defenses [61, 82, lo9, 151, 166],
which preferentially admit humans. These techniques are powerful because
they seek to block or explicitly limit unauthorized users, but their discrim-
inations can err, as discussed in Chapter 1. Indeed, detection-based ap-
proaches become increasingly brittle as attackers' mimicry of legitimate
clients becomes increasingly convincing (see §3.9.2 for elaboration of this
point).
It is for this reason that our philosophy in §1.2 calls for proportional
allocation, i.e., giving every client an equal share of the server without try-
ing to tell apart good and bad. Unfortunately, in today's Internet, attaining
even this goal is impossible. As discussed in Chapter 2, address hijacking (in
which one client appears to be many) and proxies (in which multiple clients
appear to be one) prevent the server from knowing how many clients it has
or whether a given set of requests originated at one client or many.
As a result, we settle for a roughly fair allocation. At a high level, our
approach is as follows. The server makes clients reveal how much of some
resource they have; examples of suitable resources are CPU cycles, memory
cycles, bandwidth, and money. Then, based on this revelation, the server
should arrange things so that ifa given client has a fractionf of the clientele's
total resources, that client can claim up to a fractionf of the server. We call
such an allocation a resource-proportional allocation. This allocation cannot
be "fooled" by the Internet's blurry notion of client identity. Specifically,
if multiple clients "pool" their resources, claiming to be one client, or if
one client splits its resources over multiple virtual clients, the allocation is
unchanged.
Our approach is kin to previous work in which clients must spend some
resource to get service [2, 10, 11, 41, 45, 46, 53, 80, 98, 114, 148, 170, 1721.
We call these proposals resource-based defenses. Ours falls into this third
category. However, the other proposals in this category neither articulate,
nor explicitly aim for, the goal of a resource-proportional allocation.'
The preceding raises the question: which client resource should the
server use? This chapter investigates bandwidth, by which we mean avail-
able upstream bandwidth to the server. Specifically, when the server is at-
tacked, it encourages all clients to consume their bandwidth (as a way of
revealing it); this behavior is what we promised to justify above.
A natural question is, "Why charge clients bandwidth? Why not charge
them CPU cycles?" In §3-9.1, we give an extended comparison and show
that bandwidth has advantages (as well as disadvantages!). For now, we sim-
ply state that many of this chapter's contributions apply to both currencies.
Those contributions, mentioned in §1.4, include (1) articulating the goal
of a resource-proportional allocation; (2) giving a family of mechanisms to
1An exception is a recent paper by Parno et al. [114], which was published after our work [169];
see §3.9.1.
charge in the currency that are simple, that find the correct "price", that do
not require clients or the server to know or guess the price, and that re-
sist gaming by adversaries; and (3) a viable system that incorporates one of
these mechanisms and works with unmodified Web clients.
This chapter presents these contributions in the context of speak-up,
a system that defends against application-level DDoS by charging clients
bandwidth for access. We believe that our work in [167, 169] (on which
this chapter is based) was the first to investigate this idea, though [70, 142]
share the same high-level motivation (see §3.9.1).
The chapter proceeds in two stages. The first stage is a quick overview. It
consists of the general threat (this section), the high-level solution (§3.1),
and responses to five common questions (93.2). The second stage follows a
particular argument. Here is the argument's outline:
- We give a detailed description of the threat and of two conditions for
addressing the threat (93-3). The first of these conditions is inherent
in any defense to this threat.
- We then describe a design goal that, if met, would mitigate the threat-
and fully defend against it, under the first condition (93-4.1).
- We next give a set of designs that, under the second condition, meet
the goal (93-4.2-§3.4.5).
- We describe our implementation and our evaluation of that imple-
mentation; our main finding is that the implementation roughly meets
the goal (93-7-§3.8).
- At this point, having shown that speak-up "meets its spec", we con-
sider whether it is an appropriate choice: we compare speak-up to al-
ternatives, critique it, and reflect on the plausibility of the threat itself
(§3.9-§3.10).
With respect to this plausibility, one might well wonder how often ap-
plication-level attacks happen today and whether they are in fact difficult
to filter. We answer this question in §3.10: according to anecdote, current
application-level attacks happen today, but they are primitive. However, in
evaluating the need for speak-up, we believe that the right questions are
not about how often the threat has happened but rather about whether the
threat could happen. (And it can.) Simply put, prudence requires proactiv-
ity. We need to consider weaknesses before they are exploited.
At the end of the chapter (§3.11), we depart from this specific threat, in
two ways. First, we observe that one may, in practice, be able to combine
speak-up with other defenses. Second, we mention other attacks, besides
application-level denial-of-service, that could call for speak-up.
3.1 HIGH LEVEL EXPLANATION
Speak-up is motivated by a simple observation about bad clients: they send
requests to victimized servers at much higher rates than legitimate clients
do. (This observation has also been made by many others, including the
authors of profiling and detection methods. Indeed, if bad clients weren't
sending at higher rates, then, as long as their numbers didn't dominate the
number of good clients, modest over-provisioning of the server would ad-
dress the attack.)
At the same time, some limiting factor must prevent bad clients from
sending even more requests. We posit that in many cases this limiting factor
is bandwidth. The specific constraint could be a physical limit (e.g., access
link capacity) or a threshold above which the attacker fears detection by
profiling tools at the server or by the human owner of the "botted" host. For
now, we assume that bad clients exhaust all of their available bandwidth on
spurious requests. In contrast, good clients, which spend substantial time
quiescent, are likely using a only small portion of their available bandwidth.
The key idea of speak-up is to exploit this difference, as we now explain with
a simple illustration.
Illustration. Imagine a simple request-response server, where each re-
quest is cheap for clients to issue, is expensive to serve, and consumes the
same quantity of server resources. Real-world examples include Web servers
receiving single-packet requests, DNS (Domain Name System) front-ends
such as those used by content distribution networks or infrastructures like
CoDoNS [127], and AFS (Andrew File System) servers. Suppose that the
server has the capacity to handle c requests per second and that the aggre-
gate demand from good clients is g requests per second, g < c. Assume
that when the server is overloaded it randomly drops excess requests. If
the attackers consume all of their aggregate upload bandwidth, B (which
for now we express in requests per second) in attacking the server, and if
g + B > c, then the good clients receive only a fraction _- of the server'sg+B
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FIGURE 3.1--Illustration of speak-up. The figure depicts an attacked server, B + g > c.
In (a), the server is not defended. In (b), the good clients send a much higher volume of
traffic, thereby capturing much more of the server than before. The good clients' traffic is
black, as is the portion of the server that they capture.
resources. Assuming B > g (if B ? g, then over-provisioning by moder-
ately increasing c would ensure g + B < c, thereby handling the attack), the
bulk of the server goes to the attacking clients. This situation is depicted in
Figure 3.1(a).
In this situation, current defenses would try to slow down the bad clients.
But what if, instead, we arranged things so that when the server is under at-
tack good clients send requests at the same rates as bad clients? Of course, the
server does not know which clients are good, but the bad clients have al-
ready "maxed out" their bandwidth (as assumed above). So if the server
encouraged all clients to use up their bandwidth, it could speed up the
good ones without telling apart good and bad. Doing so would certainly
inflate the traffic into the server during an attack. But it would also cause
the good clients to be much better represented in the mix of traffic, giving
them much more of the server's attention and the attackers much less. If
the good clients have total bandwidth G, they would now capture a fraction
G of the server's resources, as depicted in Figure 3.1(b). Since G > g, this
fraction is much larger than before.
In §3-4, we make the preceding under-specified illustration practical.
Before doing so, we answer several nagging questions (§3.2) and then char-
acterize the threat that calls for speak-up (§3-3).
3.2 FIVE QUESTIONS
How much aggregate bandwidth does the legitimate clientele need for speak-
up to be effective? Speak-up helps good clients, no matter how much band-
width they have. Speak-up either ensures that the good clients get all the
service they need or increases the service they get (compared to an attack
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without speak-up) by the ratio of their available bandwidth to their current
usage, which we expect to be very high. Moreover, as with many security
measures, speak-up "raises the bar" for attackers: to inflict the same level of
service-denial on a speak-up defended site, a much larger botnet-perhaps
several orders of magnitude larger-is required. Similarly, the amount of
over-provisioning needed at a site defended by speak-up is much less than
what a non-defended site would need.
Thanks for the sales pitch, but what we meant was: how much aggregate
bandwidth does the legitimate clientele need for speak-up to leave them un-
harmed by an attack? The answer depends on the server's spare capacity
(i.e., 1-utilization) when not under attack. Speak-up's goal is to allocate
resources in proportion to the bandwidths of requesting clients. If this goal
is met, then for a server with spare capacity 50%, the legitimate clients can
retain full service if they have the same aggregate bandwidth as the attack-
ing clients (see §3.4.1). For a server with spare capacity 90o%, the legiti-
mate clientele needs only 1/9th of the aggregate bandwidth of the attacking
clients. In §3.10.2, we elaborate on this point and discuss it in the context
of today's botnet sizes.
Then couldn't small Web sites, even if defended by speak-up, still be harmed?
Yes. There have been reports of large botnets [24, 40, 73, 75, 104, 1531.
If attacked by such a botnet, a speak-up-defended site would need a large
clientele or vast over-provisioning to withstand attack fully. However, most
botnets are much smaller, as we discuss in §3.10.2. Moreover, as stated in
§1.2, every defense has this "problem": no defense can work against a huge
population of bad clients, if the good and bad clients are indistinguishable.
Because bandwidth is in part a communal resource, doesn't the encourage-
ment to send more traffic damage the network? We first observe that speak-
up inflates traffic only to servers currently under attack-a very small frac-
tion of all servers-so the increase in total traffic will be minimal. Moreover,
the "core" appears to be heavily over-provisioned (see, e.g., [54]), so it could
absorb such an increase. (Of course, this over-provisioning could change
over time, for example with fiber in homes.) Finally, speak-up's additional
traffic is congestion-controlled and will share fairly with other traffic. We
address this question more fully in §3.5.
Couldn't speak-up "edge out" other network activity at the user's access link,
thereby introducing an opportunity cost? Yes. When triggered, speak-up may
be a heavy network consumer. Some users will not mind this fact. Others
will, and they can avoid speak-up's opportunity cost by leaving the attacked
service (see §3.9.1 for further discussion of this point).
3.3 THREAT MODEL & APPLICABILITY CONDITIONS
The preceding section gave a general picture of speak-up's applicability. We
now give a more precise description. We begin with the threat model, which
is a concrete version of the abstract problem statement in §1.1, and then
state the conditions that are required for speak-up to be most effective.
Speak-up aims to protect a server, defined as any network-accessible ser-
vice with scarce computational resources (disks, CPUs, RAM, application
licenses, file descriptors, etc.), from an attacker, defined as an entity (human
or organization) that is trying to deplete those resources with legitimate-
looking requests (database queries, HTTP requests, etc.) As mentioned in
Chapter 1, such an assault is called an application-level attack [73]. The
clientele of the server is neither pre-defined (otherwise the server can in-
stall filters to permit traffic only from known clients) nor exclusively human
(ruling out proof-of-humanity tests [61, 82, o09, 113, 151, 166]).
Each attacker sends traffic from many compromised hosts, and this traf-
fic obeys all protocols, so the server has no easy way to tell from a single
request that it was issued with ill intent. Moreover, as mentioned in Chap-
ter 2, the Internet has no robust notion of host identity. Since a determined
attacker can repeatedly request service from a site while pretending to have
different IP addresses, we assume that an abusively heavy client of a site will
not always be identifiable as such.
Most services handle requests of varying difficulty (e.g., database queries
with very different completion times). While servers may not be able to de-
termine the difficulty of a request a priori, our threat model presumes that
the attacker can send difficult requests intentionally.
We are not considering link attacks. We assume that the server's access
links are not flooded; see condition c2 below.
The canonical example of a service that is threatened by the attack just
described is a Web server for which requests are computationally intensive,
perhaps because they involve back-end database transactions or searches
(e.g., sites with search engines, travel sites, and automatic update services
for desktop software). Often, the clientele of these sites is partially or all
non-human. Beyond these server applications, other vulnerable services in-
clude the capability allocators in network architectures such as TVA [178]
and SIFF [177]. 2
There are many types of Internet services, with varying defensive require-
ments; speak-up is not appropriate for all of them. For speak-up to fully de-
fend against the threat modeled above, the following two conditions must
hold:
ci Adequate client bandwidth. To be unharmed during an attack, the good
clients must have in total roughly the same order of magnitude (or more)
bandwidth than the attacking clients. This condition is fundamental to
any defense to the threat above, in which good and bad clients are in-
distinguishable: as discussed in §1.2, if the bad population vastly out-
numbers the good population, then no defense works.
C2 Adequate link bandwidth. The protected service needs enough link
bandwidth to handle the incoming request stream (and this stream will
be inflated by speak-up). This condition is one of the main costs of
speak-up, relative to other defenses. However, we do not believe that it
is insurmountable. First, observe that most Web sites use far less inbound
bandwidth than outbound bandwidth (most Web requests are small, yet
generate big replies).3 Thus, the inbound request stream to a server
could inflate by many multiples before the inbound bandwidth equals
the outbound bandwidth. Second, if that headroom is not enough, then
servers can satisfy the condition in various ways. Options include a
permanent high-bandwidth access link, co-location at a data center, or
temporarily acquiring more bandwidth using services like [25, 120].
A further option, which we expect to be the most common deploy-
ment scenario, is ISPs-which of course have significant bandwidth-
offering speak-up as a service (just as they do with other DDoS defenses
2Such systems are intended to defend against DoS attacks. Briefly, they work as follows: to gain access
to a protected server, clients request tokens, or capabilities, from an allocator. The allocator meters
its replies (for example, to match the server's capacity). Then, routers pass traffic only from clients
with valid capabilities, thereby protecting the server from overload. In such systems, the capability
allocator itself is vulnerable to attack. See §3.9-3 for more detail.
3 As one datum, consider Wikimedia, the host of http://www.wikipedia.org. According
to [174], for the 12 months ending in August, 2007, the organization's outbound bandwidth con-
sumption was six times its inbound. And for the month of August, 2007, Wikimedia's outbound
consumption was eight times its inbound.
today), perhaps amortizing the expense over many defended sites, as
suggested in [3].
Later in this chapter (§3.10), we reflect on the extent to which this threat is
a practical concern and on whether the conditions are reasonable in prac-
tice. We also evaluate how speak-up performs when condition c2 isn't met
(§3.8.8).
3.4 DESIGN
In this section, we aim to make practical the high-level illustration in §3.1.
We use the notation from that section, and we assume that all requests cause
equal server work.
We begin with requirements (§3.4.1), then develop two specific ways to
realize these requirements (93-4.2, §3-4.3). We then consider the connec-
tions between these approaches as we reflect more generally on the space
of design possibilities (03.4-5). We also consider various attacks (93.4-4). We
revisit our assumptions in §3.5 and describe how speak-up handles hetero-
geneous requests in §3.6.
3.4.1 Design Goal and Required Mechanisms
Design Goal. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, speak-up's
principal goal is to allocate resources to competing clients in proportion to
their bandwidths:
Consider a server that can handle c requests per second. If the good
clients make g requests per second in aggregate and have aggregate
bandwidth of G requests per second to the server, and if the bad clients
have aggregate bandwidth of B requests per second, then the server
should process good requests at a rate of min(g, Gc) requests per
second.
If this goal is met, then modest over-provisioning of the server (relative to
the legitimate demand) can satisfy the good clients. For if it is met, then sat-
isfying them requires only G- c 2 g (i.e., the piece that the good clients can
get must exceed their demand). This expression translates to the idealized
server provisioning requirement:
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FIGURE 3.2-The components of speak-up. The thinner rate-limits requests to the server.
The encouragement signal is depicted by a dashed line from thinner to client (the particu-
lar encouragement mechanism is unspecified). In this example, there are two clients, and
they send equal amounts of traffic. Thus, the thinner's proportional allocation mechanism
(unspecified in this figure) admits requests so that each client claims half of the server.
which says that the server must be able to handle the "good" demand (g)
and diminished demand from the bad clients (BI). For example, if B = G
(a special case of condition cl in §3.3), then the required over-provisioning
is a factor of two (c > 2g). In practice, speak-up cannot exactly achieve this
ideal because limited cheating is possible. We analyze this effect in §3.4.4.
Required Mechanisms. Any practical realization of speak-up needs three
mechanisms. The first is a way to limit requests to the server to c per sec-
ond. However, rate-limiting alone will not change the server's allocation
to good and bad clients. Since the design goal is that this allocation reflect
available bandwidth, speak-up also needs a mechanism to reveal that band-
width: speak-up must perform encouragement, which we define as caus-
ing a client to send more traffic--potentially much more-for a single request
than it would if the server were not under attack. Third, given the incoming
bandwidths, speak-up needs a proportional allocation mechanism to admit
clients at rates proportional to their delivered bandwidths.
Under speak-up, these mechanisms are implemented by a front-end to
the server, called the thinner. As depicted in Figure 3.2, the thinner imple-
ments encouragement and controls which requests the server sees. Encour-
agement and proportional allocation can each take several forms, as we will
see in the two variations of speak-up below (93-4.2, §3.4.3). And we will see
~' '
in §3.4.5 that the choices of encouragement mechanism and proportional
allocation mechanism are orthogonal.
Before presenting these specifics, we observe that today when a server is
overloaded and fails to respond to a request, a client typically times out and
retries-thereby generating more traffic than if the server were unloaded.
However, the bandwidth increase is small (since today's timeouts are long).
In contrast, encouragement (which is initiated by an agent of the server)
will cause good clients to send significantly more traffic-while still obeying
congestion control.
3.4.2 Aggressive Retries and Random Drops
In the version of speak-up that we now describe, the thinner implements
proportional allocation by dropping requests at random to reduce the rate
to c. To implement encouragement, the thinner, for each request that it
drops, immediately asks the client to retry. This synchronous please-retry
signal causes the good clients-the bad ones are already "maxed out"-to
retry at far higher rates than they would under silent dropping. (Silent drop-
ping happens in many applications and in effect says, "please try again later",
whereas the thinner says, "please try again now".)
With the scheme as presented thus far, a good client sends only one
packet per round-trip time (RTT) while a bad client can keep many requests
outstanding, thereby manufacturing an advantage. To avoid this problem,
we modify the scheme as follows: without waiting for explicit please-retry
signals, the clients send repeated retries in a congestion-controlled stream.
Here, the feedback used by the congestion control protocol functions as
implicit please-retry signals. This modification allows all clients to pipeline
their requests and keep their pipe to the thinner full.
One might ask, "To solve the same problem, why not enforce one out-
standing retry per client?" or, "Why not dispense with retries, queue clients'
requests, and serve the oldest?" The answer is that clients are not identifi-
able: with address hijacking, discussed in Chapter 2, one client may claim
to be several, and with NATs and proxies, several clients (which may indi-
vidually have plenty of bandwidth) may appear to be one. Thus, the thinner
can enforce neither one outstanding retry per "client" nor any other quota
scheme that needs to identify clients. Ironically, taxing clients is easier than
identifying them: the continuous stream of bytes that clients are asked to
send ensures that each is charged individually.
Indeed, speak-up is a currency-based scheme (as we said earlier), and
the price for access is the average number of retries, r, that a client must
send. Observe that the thinner does not communicate r to clients: good
clients keep resending until they get through (or give up). Also, r automat-
ically changes with the attack size, as can be seen from the expressions for
r, derived below.
This approach fulfills the design goal in §3.4.1, as we now show. The
thinner admits incoming requests with some probabilityp to make the total
load reaching the server be c. There are two cases. Either the good clients
cannot afford the price, in which case they exhaust all of their bandwidth
and do not get service at rate g, or they can afford the price, in which case
they send retries until getting through. In both cases, the price, r, is 1/p. In
the first case, a load ofB + G enters the thinner, so p = Bc, r = B , and
the good clients can pay for G/r = -c requests per second. In the second
case, the good clients get service at rate g, as required, and r = B/(c - g)
(as we show immediately below). Note that in both cases r changes with the
attack size, B.
To see that r = B/(c - g) in the second case, observe that the "bad load"
that actually reaches the server reduces from B, the attackers' full budget, to
Bp. Thus, the thinner's dropping, combined with the fact that good clients
retry their "good load" of g until getting through, results in the equation
g + Bp = c, which implies r = 1/p = B/(c - g).
3.4.3 Explicit Payment Channel and Virtual Auction
We now describe another encouragement mechanism and another propor-
tional allocation mechanism; we use these mechanisms in our implemen-
tation and evaluation. They are depicted in Figure 3.3. For encouragement,
the thinner does the following. When the server is oversubscribed, the thin-
ner asks a requesting client to open a separate payment channel. The client
then sends a congestion-controlled stream of bits on this channel. (Con-
ceptually, the client is padding dummy bytes to its request.) We call a client
that is sending bits a contending client; the thinner tracks how many bits
each contending client sends.
The proportional allocation mechanism is as follows. Assume that the
server notifies the thinner when it is ready for a new request. When the
thinner receives such a notification, it holds a virtual auction: it admits to
the server the contending client that has sent the most bits, and it terminates
the corresponding payment channel.
As with the version in §3.4.2, the price here emerges naturally. Here, it
is expressed in bits per request. The "going rate" for access is the winning
bid from the most recent auction. We now consider the average price. Here,
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FIGURE 3.3--Speak-up with an explicit payment channel. For each request that arrives
when the server is busy, the thinner asks the requesting client to send dummy bits. Imagine
that an auction is about to happen. The dark gray request will win the auction because it
has five units of payment associated with it, compared to only two units for the light gray
request.
we express B and G in bits (not requests) per second and assume that the
good and bad clients are "spending everything' so B + G bits per second
enter the thinner. Since auctions happen every 1/c seconds on average, the
average price is B+bits per request.
However, we cannot claim, as in §3.4.2, that good clients get c re-
quests served per second: the auction might allow "gaming" in which ad-
versaries consistently pay a lower-than-average price, forcing good clients
to pay a higher-than-average price. In the next section, we show that the
auction can be gamed but not too badly, so all clients do in fact see prices
that are close to the average.
3-4.4 Cheating and the Virtual Auction
In considering the robustness of the virtual auction mechanism, we begin
with a theorem and then describe how practice may be both worse and bet-
ter than this theory. The theorem is based on one simplifying assumption:
that requests are served with perfect regularity (i.e., every 1/c seconds).
Theorem 3.1 In a system with regular service intervals, any client that con-
tinuously transmits an a fraction of the average bandwidth received by the
thinner gets at least an a/2 fraction of the service, regardless of how the
bad clients time or divide up their bandwidth.
Proof: Consider a client, X, that transmits an a fraction of the average band-
width. The intuition is that to keep X from winning auctions, the other
clients must deliver substantial payment.
Because our claims are purely about proportions, we choose units to
keep the discussion simple. We call the amount of bandwidth that X delivers
between every pair of auctions a dollar. Suppose that X must wait t auctions
before winning k auctions. Let tl be the number of auctions that occur until
(and including) X's first win, t2 the number that occur after that until and
including X's second win, and so on. Thus, E=1 ti = t. Since X does not
win until auction number t1, X is defeated in the previous auctions. In the
first auction, X has delivered 1 dollar, so at least 1 dollar is spent to defeat
it; in the next auction 2 dollars are needed to defeat it, and so on until the
(tl - 1)st auction when tl - 1 dollars are spent to defeat it. So 1 + 2 + - - -+
(tl - 1) = t1(t, - 1)/2 dollars are spent to defeat X before it wins. More
generally, the total dollars spent by other clients over the t auctions is at
least
k kti2 t t2 t
2 2 2
i=1 i=1
This sum is minimized, subject to E ti = t, when all the ti are equal, namely
ti = t/k. We conclude that the total spent by the other clients is at least
k t 2  t t2  t
Z2k2 2 2k 2
Adding the t dollars spent by X, the total number of dollars spent is at least
t2  t
2k 2
Thus, recalling that a is what we called the fraction of the total spent by X,
we get
2
< (t/k + 1)
It follows that
k a a
t - 2-a - 2
i.e., X receives at least an a/2 fraction of the service. E]
Observe that this analysis holds for each good client separately. It fol-
lows that if the good clients deliver in aggregate an a fraction of the band-
width, then in aggregate they will receive an a/2 fraction of the service. Note
that this claim remains true regardless of the service rate c, which need not
be known to carry out the auction.
Theory versus practice. We now consider ways in which the above theo-
rem is both weaker and stronger than what we expect to see in practice. We
begin with weaknesses. First, consider the unreasonable assumption that
requests are served with perfect regularity. To relax this assumption, the
theorem can be extended as follows: for service times that fluctuate within
a bounded range [(1 - 6)/c, (1 + 6)/c], X receives at least a (1 - 26)a/2
fraction of the service. However, even this looser restriction may be unreal-
istic in practice. And pathological service timings violate the theorem. For
example, if many request fulfillments are bunched in a tiny interval during
which X has not yet paid much, bad clients can cheaply outbid it during
this interval, if they know that the pathology is happening and are able to
time their bids. But doing so requires implausibly deep information.
Second, the theorem assumes that a good client "pays bits" at a constant
rate given by its bandwidth. However, the payment channel in our imple-
mentation runs over TCP, and TCP's slow start means that a good client's
rate must grow. Moreover, because we implement the payment channel as a
series of large HTTP POSTs (see §937), there is a quiescent period between
POSTs (equal to one RTT between client and thinner) as well as TCP's slow
start for each POST. Nevertheless, we can extend the analysis to capture this
behavior and again derive a lower bound for the fraction of service that a
given good client receives. The result is that if the good client has a small
fraction of the total bandwidth (causing it to spend a lot of time paying),
and if the HTTP POST is big compared to the bandwidth-delay product,
then the client's fraction of service is not noticeably affected (because the
quiescent periods are negligible relative to the time spent paying at full rate).
We now consider the strength of the theorem: it makes no assumptions
at all about adversarial behavior. We believe that in practice adversaries will
attack the auction by opening many concurrent TCP connections to avoid
quiescent periods, but the theorem handles every other case too. The ad-
versary can open few or many TCP connections, disregard TCP semantics,
or send continuously or in bursts. The only parameter in the theorem is the
total number of bits sent in a given interval by other clients.
The theorem does cede the adversary an extra factor of two "advantage"
in bandwidth (the good client sees only a/2 service for a bandwidth). This
advantage arises because the proof lets the adversary control exactly when
its bits arrive-sending fewer when the good client's bid is small and more
as the bid grows. This ability is powerful indeed-most likely stronger than
real adversaries have. Nevertheless, even with this highly pessimistic as-
sumption about adversarial abilities, speak-up can still do its job: the re-
quired provisioning has only increased by a factor of two over the ideal
from §3.4.1, and this provisioning is still far less than what would be re-
quired to absorb the attack without speak-up.
To see that the required provisioning increases by a factor of two, ob-
serve that the theorem says that good clients can get service of up to ca/2 =
(cB) requests per second. Yet good clients need service of g requests per
second. Thus, the required provisioning, which we denote creq, must satisfy
2(B) > g. This inequality yields creq > 2 Cid.
In §3.8-4, we quantify the adversarial advantage in our experiments by
determining how the factors mentioned in this section-quiescent periods
for good clients, bad clients opening concurrent connections-affect the
required provisioning above the ideal.
3.4.5 Design Space
We now reflect on the possible designs for speak-up and then discuss how
we chose which one to implement and evaluate.
Axes
We have so far presented two designs: "aggressive retries and random drops"
(§3.4.2) and "payment channel and virtual auction" (93.4-3). These designs
are drawn from a larger space, in which there are two orthogonal axes that
correspond to the required mechanisms from §3.4-1:
Al Encouragement method: A2 Allocation mechanism:
- Aggressive retries - Random drops
- Payment channel - Virtual auction
Thus, it is possible to imagine two other designs. We discuss them now.
"Retries and Virtual Auction"
In this design, clients send repeated retries in-band on a congestion-
controlled stream. The thinner conducts a periodic auction, selecting as the
winner the request with the most retries (rather than the most bits) up to
that point. We can apply Theorem 3.1 to this design, as follows. The theo-
rem describes clients' bandwidths in terms of a made-up unit (the "dollar"),
so we need only take this unit to be retries between auctions, rather than
bits between auctions.
"Payment Channel and Random Drops"
In this design,4 clients pay bits out of band. As in the "virtual auction" de-
signs, the thinner divides time into service intervals (i.e., time lengths of
1/c seconds), making an admission decision at the end of each interval. In
this design, however, the intervals are independent. For a given interval, the
thinner records how many bits clients have sent in that interval. At the end
of an interval, the thinner chooses randomly. Specifically, a request that has
sent a fraction f of the total bits in that interval is admitted by the thin-
ner with probabilityf. To show that this design achieves our goal, we use
the following theorem; like Theorem 3.1, it relies on the assumption that
requests are served with perfect regularity.
Theorem 3.2 Under this design, any client that continuously delivers a frac-
tion a of the average bandwidth received by the thinner gets a fraction a
of service, in expectation, regardless of how the other clients time or divide
up their bandwidth.
Proof: As in Theorem 3.1, consider a single client, X, and again assume that
X delivers a dollar between service intervals. We will examine what happens
over t time intervals. Over this period, X delivers t dollars of bandwidth. We
are given that all of the clients together deliver t/a dollars over this period,
so the other clients deliver t/a - t dollars.
Now, consider each of the i intervals. In each interval, the service that X
expects is the same as the probability that it is admitted, which is 1/(1 + bi),
where bi is the bandwidth delivered by the other clients in interval i. By
linearity of expectation, the total expected service received by X is
1 t t
Z subject to bi = - t.
- + bi -
i=1 i=l 1
The minimum-which is the worst case for X-happens when the bi are
equal to each other, i.e., bi = 1/a - 1. In that case, the expected service
received by X is
t
1 + 1/a- t,
so X can expect at least an a fraction of the total service. O
4 A good question by Jeff Erickson caused us to think of this approach.
An advantage of this approach is that the thinner need not keep track
of how many bits have been sent on behalf of each request, as we now ex-
plain. (Of course, depending on the scenario, the thinner may still need per-
request state, such as congestion control state or other connection state.) We
can regard the thinner's tasks as (a) receiving a stream of bits in each inter-
val (each packet brings a set of bits on behalf of a request); (b) at the end
of the interval, choosing a bit uniformly at random; and (c) admitting the
request on whose behalf the "winning bit" arrived. These tasks correspond
to admitting a request with probability proportional to the number of bits
that were sent on behalf of that request in the given interval.
To implement these tasks, the thinner can use reservoir sampling [851
with a reservoir of one bit (and its associated request). Reservoir sampling
takes as input a stream of unknown size and flips an appropriately weighted
coin to make a "keep-or-drop" decision for each item in the stream (a "keep"
decision evicts a previously kept item). The weights on the coins ensure
that, when the stream ends, the algorithm will have chosen a uniformly
random sample of size k (in our case, k = 1). A further refinement avoids
making a decision for each item (or bit, in our context): once the algorithm
keeps an item, it chooses a random value representing the next item to ad-
mit; it can then discard all intermediate items with a clear conscience [165].
Comparing the Possibilities
Before we actually compare the alternatives, observe that one of the de-
signs is under-specified: in the description of "aggressive retries and ran-
dom drops" in §3.4.2, we did not say how to set p, the drop probability.
However, the design and theorem above suggest one way to do so: the thin-
ner divides up time and selects one client to "win" each interval (rather than
trying to apply a drop probability to each retry independently such that the
total rate of admitted requests is c). With this method of setting p, every de-
sign in this space shares the same high-level structure: clients pipeline bits
or requests, and the thinner selects a client once every 1/c seconds. The
designs are thus directly comparable.
The differences among the designs are as follows. Axis Al is primarily
an implementation distinction, and which choice is appropriate depends on
the protected application and on how speak-up fits into the communication
protocol between clients and servers.
Axis A2 is more substantive. Here, we have a classic trade-off between
random and deterministic algorithms. The "virtual auction" is gameable in
a limited way, but clients' waiting times are bounded: once a client has paid
enough, it is served. "Random drops" is the opposite: it is not at all game-
able, but our claims about it apply only to long-term averages. At short time
scales, there will be significant variation in the server's allocation and thus
in waiting times. In particular, a typical coupon-collector analysis shows
that if there are n equivalent clients that continually make requests, some
of the clients will have to wait an expected O(n log n ) intervals to get ser-
vice. (Regard each interval as picking a client uniformly at random.) An-
other difference between the two options is that one can implement "ran-
dom drops" with less state at the thinner (by using reservoir sampling, as
described above). Which choice on axis 2 is appropriate depends on one's
goals and taste.
Rationale for our choices. For our prototype (03.7), we chose the pay-
ment channel over in-band retries for reasons related to how JavaScript
drives Web browsers. We chose the virtual auction over random drops be-
cause we wanted to avoid variance.
Other designs. One might wonder whether the design space is larger than
these four possibilities, which share a similar structure. Indeed, we used to
be enamored of a different structure, namely the version of "random drops"
described at the beginning of §3.4.2. The charm of that version was that its
thinner was stateless. However, we ultimately rejected that approach be-
cause, as described in §3.4.2, clients need to keep their pipes to the thinner
full (otherwise, recall, bad clients could manufacture a bandwidth advan-
tage). This requirement implies that the thinner must maintain congestion
control state for each client, ending the dream of a stateless thinner.
3.5 REVISITING ASSUMPTIONS
We have so far made a number of assumptions. Below we address four of
them in turn: that aside from end-hosts' access links, the Internet has in-
finite capacity; that no bottleneck link is shared (which is a special case of
the first assumption, but we address them separately); that the thinner has
infinite capacity; and that bad clients consume all of their upload band-
width when they attack. In the next section, we relax the assumption of
equal server requests.
3.5.1 Speak-up's Effect on the Network
No flow between a good client and a thinner individually exhibits anti-
social behavior. In our implementation (see §3.7), each payment channel
comprises a series of HTTP POSTs and thus inherits TCP's congestion con-
trol. For UDP applications, the payment channel could use the congestion
manager [14] or DCCP [871. (Bad clients can refuse to control congestion,
but this behavior is a link attack, which speak-up does not defend against;
see §933.) However, individually courteous flows do not automatically ex-
cuse the larger rudeness of increased traffic levels, and we must ask whether
the network can handle this increase.
To answer this question, we give two sketchy arguments suggesting that
speak-up would not increase total traffic much, and then consider the ef-
fect of such increases. First, speak-up inflates upload bandwidth, and, de-
spite the popularity of peer-to-peer file-sharing, most bytes still flow in the
download direction [54]. Thus, inflating upload traffic even to the level of
download traffic would cause an inflation factor of at most two. Second,
only a very small fraction of servers is under attack at any given time. Thus,
even if speak-up did increase the traffic to each attacked site by an order of
magnitude, the increase in overall Internet traffic would still be small.
Whatever the overall traffic increase, it is unlikely to be problematic for
the Internet "core": both anecdotes from network operators and measure-
ments [54] suggest that these links operate at low utilization. And, while the
core cannot handle every client transmitting maximally (as argued in [1641),
we expect that the fraction of clients doing so at any time will be small-
again, because few sites will be attacked at any time. Speak-up will, however,
create contention at bottleneck links (as will any heavy user of the network),
an effect that we explore experimentally in §3.8-7.
3.5.2 Shared Links
We now consider what happens when clients that share a bottleneck link
are simultaneously encouraged by the thinner. For simplicity, assume two
clients behind bottleneck link 1; the discussion generalizes to more clients. If
the clients are both good, their individual flows roughly share 1, so they get
roughly the same piece of the server. Each may be disadvantaged compared
to clients that are not similarly bottlenecked, but neither is disadvantaged
relative to the other.
If, however, one of the clients is bad, then the good client has a problem:
the bad client can open n parallel TCP connections (93.4-4), claim roughly
an n/(n + 1) fraction of l's bandwidth, and get a much larger piece of the
server. While this outcome is unfortunate for the good client, observe, first,
that the server is still protected (the bad client can "spend" at most 1). Sec-
ond, while the thinner's encouragement might instigate the bad client, the
fact is that when a good and bad client share a bottleneck link-speak-up
or no-the good client loses: the bad client can always deny service to the
good client. We experimentally investigate such sharing in §3.8.6.
3.5.3 Provisioning the Thinner
For speak-up to work, the thinner must be uncongested: a congested thin-
ner could not "get the word out" to encourage clients. Thus, the thinner
needs enough bandwidth to absorb a full DDoS attack and more (which is
condition C2 in §3.3). It also needs enough processing capacity to handle
the dummy bits. (Meeting this requirement is far easier than provisioning
the server to handle the full attack because the thinner does not do much
per-request processing.) We now argue that meeting these requirements is
plausible.
One study [138] of observed DoS attacks found that the 95th percentile
of attack size was in the low hundreds of Mbits/s (see Figure 3.15 in §3.10.2),
which agrees with other anecdotes (e.g., [162]). The traffic from speak-up
would presumably be multiples larger since the good clients would also
send at high rates. However, even with several Gbits/s of traffic in an at-
tack, the thinner's requirements are not insurmountable.
First, providers readily offer links, even temporarily (e.g., [25, 120]), that
accommodate these speeds. Such bandwidth is expensive, but co-located
servers could share a thinner, or else the ISP could provide the thinner as
a service (see condition c2 in §3.3). Second, we consider processing capac-
ity. Our unoptimized software thinner running on commodity hardware
can handle 1.5 Gbits/s of traffic and tens or even hundreds of thousands of
concurrent clients; see §3.8.1. A production solution would presumably do
much better.
3.5.4 Attackers' Constraints
The assumption that bad clients are today "maxing out" their upload band-
width was made for ease of exposition. The required assumption is only that
bad clients consistently make requests at higher rates than legitimate clients.
Specifically, if bad clients are limited by their download bandwidth, or they
are not maxed out at all today, speak-up is still useful: it makes upload band-
width into a constraint by forcing everyone to spend this resource. Since
bad clients-even those that aren't maxed out-are more active than good
ones, the imposition of this upload bandwidth constraint affects the bad
clients more, again changing the mix of the server that goes to the good
clients. Our goals and analysis in §3-4 still hold: they are in terms of the
bandwidth available to both populations, not the bandwidth that they ac-
tually use today.
3.6 HETEROGENEOUS REQUESTS
We now generalize the design to handle the more realistic case in which the
requests are unequal. There are two possibilities: either the thinner can tell
the difficulty of a request in advance, or it cannot. In the first case, the design
is straightforward: the thinner simply scales a given bandwidth payment
by the difficulty of the associated request (causing clients to pay more for
harder requests).
In the remainder of this section, we address the second case, making the
worst-case assumption that although the thinner does not know the diffi-
culty of requests in advance, attackers do, as given by the threat model in
§933. If the thinner treated all requests equally (charging, in effect, the av-
erage price for any request), an attacker could get a disproportionate share
of the server by sending only the hardest requests.
In describing the generalization to the design, we make two assump-
tions:
- As in the homogeneous case, the server processes only one request at a
time. Thus, the "hardness" of a computation is measured by how long
it takes to complete. Relaxing this assumption to account for more
complicated servers is not difficult, as long as the server implements
processor sharing among concurrent requests, but we don't delve into
those details here.
- The server exports an interface that allows the thinner to SUSPEND,
RESUME, and ABORT requests. (Many transaction managers and ap-
plication servers support such an interface.)
At a high level, the solution is for the thinner to break time into quanta,
to view a request as comprising equal-sized chunks that each consume a
quantum of the server's attention, and to hold a virtual auction for each
quantum. Thus, if a client's request is made of x chunks, the client must
win x auctions for its request to be fully served. The thinner need not know
x in advance for any request.
In more detail: rather than terminate the payment channel once the
client's request is admitted (as in §3.4.3), the thinner extracts an on-going
payment until the request completes. Given these on-going payments, the
thinner implements the following procedure every T seconds (7 is the quan-
tum length):
1. Let v be the currently-active request. Let u be the contending request
that has paid the most.
2. If u has paid more than v, then SUSPEND v, admit (or RESUME) U, and
set u's payment to zero.
3. If v has paid more than u, then let v continue executing but set v's
payment to zero (since v has not yet paid for the next quantum).
4. Time-out and ABORT any request that has been SUSPENDed for some
period (e.g., 30 seconds).
This scheme requires some cooperation from the server. First, the server
should not SUSPEND requests that hold critical locks; doing so could cause
deadlock. Second, SUSPEND, RESUME, and ABORT should have low over-
head.
In general, the approach described in this section could apply to other
defenses as well (though, to our knowledge, no one has proposed it). For ex-
ample, a profiler could allocate quanta based on clients' historical demand
rather than on how many bits clients have paid.
3.7 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype thinner in C++ as an OKWS [90] Web service
using the SFS toolkit [iol]. It runs on Linux 2.6. Any JavaScript-capable
Web browser can use our system; we have successfully tested our imple-
mentation with Firefox, Internet Explorer, Safari, and a custom client that
we use in our experiments.
The thinner is designed to be easy to deploy. It is a Web front-end that
is intended to run on a separate machine "in front" of the protected Web
server (which we will call just the server in the remainder of this section).
Moreover, there are not many configuration parameters. They are:
- The capacity of the protected server, expressed in requests per second.
- A list of URLs and regular expressions that correspond to "hard re-
quests"': Each URL and regular expression is associated with a diffi-
culty level. This difficulty level is relative to the capacity. For example,
if the server's capacity is too requests per second, and if the thinner
is configured such that a given URL has difficulty 2, then the thinner
assumes that for the server to handle that request takes an average of
.02 seconds.
- The name or address of the server.
- A custom "please wait" screen that humans will see while the server
is working and while their browser is paying bits. Existing computa-
tionally intensive Web sites already use such screens.
When the thinner gets a request, it first checks whether that request is
on the list of hard requests. If not, it passes the request directly to the server
and feeds the response back to the client on behalf of the server.
On the other hand, if the Web client has requested a "hard" URL, the
thinner immediately replies with the "please wait" screen. If there are no
other connections to the thinner (i.e., if the server is not oversubscribed),
then the thinner submits the client's request to the protected server. After
the server processes the request and replies to the thinner, the thinner re-
turns to the client (1) JavaScript that wipes the "please wait" screen and (2)
the contents of the server's reply.
If, however, other clients are communicating with the thinner (i.e., if the
server is oversubscribed), the thinner adds JavaScript after the "please wait"
HTML. As depicted in Figure 3.4, this JavaScript causes the client's browser
to dynamically construct, and then submit, a one-megabyte HTTP POST
containing random bytes. (One megabyte reflects some browsers' limits on
POSTs.) This POST is the client's bandwidth payment (93.4-3). If, while
sending these dummy bytes, the client wins an auction (we say below when
auctions happen), the thinner terminates the POST and submits the client's
request to the server, as above. And, as above, the server then replies to the
thinner, the thinner wipes the "please wait" screen, etc.
If the client completes the POST without winning an auction, then the
thinner returns JavaScript that causes the browser to send another POST,
and the process described in the previous paragraph repeats. The thinner
correlates the client's payments with its request via a "request id" field in all
HTTP requests. This field could be forged by a client, but such forgery is not
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FIGURE 3.4--Implementation of the payment channel. When the server is busy, the thin-
ner, implemented as a Web front-end, sends JavaScript to clients that causes them to send
large HTTP POSTs. The thinner ends a POST if and when the client wins the auction.
cause for concern: it amounts to contributing bandwidth to another client
or splitting bandwidth over two virtual clients, both of which are behaviors
that the design assumes of clients (see page 28, §3.4.1, and §3.4.4).
Auctions. The thinner holds auctions (and demands bandwidth payment)
whenever it has more than one connection open (this state corresponds
to over-subscription of the server). The server does not tell the thinner
whether it is free. Rather, the thinner uses the configuration parameters
(specifically, the server's capacity and the difficulty of requests) to meter re-
quests to the server in the obvious way: if we assume for a moment that all
requests are of unit difficulty, then the thinner holds an auction every 1/c
seconds. Backing off of this assumption, if a request of difficulty level d has
just been admitted to the server, then the thinner will hold the next auc-
tion d/c seconds later. To handle difficult requests fairly, the thinner scales
clients' payments by the difficulty level, and the auction winner is based on
the scaled payments.
One can configure the thinner to support hundreds of thousands of con-
current connections by setting the maximum number of connection de-
scriptors appropriately. (The thinner evicts old clients as these descriptors
deplete.) With modern versions of Linux, the limit on concurrent clients
is not per-connection descriptors but rather the RAM consumed by each
open connection.
Web
serverI
Our thinner implementation allocates a protected server in
rough proportion to clients' bandwidths.
In our experiments, the server needs to provision only 37% be-
yond the bandwidth-proportional ideal to serve 99.98% of the §3.8-3, §3.8.4
good requests.
Our unoptimized thinner implementation can sink 1.5 Gbits/s
of uploaded "payment traffic".
On a bottleneck link, speak-up traffic can crowd out other
speak-up traffic and non-speak-up traffic.
When the thinner has less bandwidth than required (i.e., when
condition C2 from 93.3 is not met), speak-up does not achieve
a bandwidth-proportional allocation but still yields a better al-
location than having no defense.
TABLE 3.1--Summary of main evaluation results.
3.8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To investigate the effectiveness and performance of speak-up, we conducted
experiments with our prototype thinner. Our primary question is how the
thinner allocates an attacked server to good clients. To answer this ques-
tion, we begin in §3.8.2 by varying the bandwidth of good (G) and bad (B)
clients, and measuring how the server is allocated with and without speak-
up. We also measure this allocation with server capacities above and be-
low the ideal in §3.4.1. In §3.8.3, we measure speak-up's latency and byte
cost. In §3.8.4, we ask how much bad clients can "cheat" speak-up to get
more than a bandwidth-proportional share of the server. §3.8.5 shows how
speak-up performs when clients have differing bandwidths and latencies to
the thinner. We also explore scenarios in which speak-up traffic shares a
bottleneck link with other speak-up traffic (§3.8.6) and with non-speak-up
traffic (93.8.7). Finally, we measure how speak-up performs when the thin-
ner's bandwidth is under-provisioned (§3.8.8); that is, we measure the effect
of not meeting condition C2 in §933. Table 3.1 summarizes our results.
3.8.1 Setup and Method
All of the experiments described here ran on the Emulab testbed [47]. The
clients run a custom Python Web client and connect to the prototype thin-
ner in various emulated topologies. The thinner runs on Emulab's "PC 3000",
which has a 3 GHz Xeon processor and 2 GBytes of RAM; the clients are
allowed to run on any of Emulab's hardware classes.
The protected server is an Apache Web server that runs on the same
host as the thinner. The thinner is configured so that "hard" requests are
those to a particular URL, U, that corresponds to a simple PHP script. That
PHP script responds to HTTP GET requests for U by first sleeping for 1/c
seconds and then returning a simple text file. c is the server capacity that we
are modeling and varies depending on the experiment. The thinner sends
the server requests for U no more often than once every 1/c seconds. If
a request arrives while the server is still "processing" (really, sleeping on
behalf of) a previous one, the thinner replies with JavaScript that makes the
client issue a one megabyte HTTP POST-the payment bytes (see §3.7).
All experiments run for 600 seconds. Each client runs on a separate
Emulab host and generates requests for U. All requests are identical. Each
client's requests are driven by a Poisson process of rate A requests/s. How-
ever, a client never allows more than a configurable number w (the window)
of outstanding requests. If the stochastic process "fires" when more than w
requests are outstanding, the client puts the new request in a backlog queue,
which drains when the client receives a response to an earlier request. If a
request is in this queue for more than lo seconds, it times out, and the client
logs a service denial.
We use the behavior just described to model both good and bad clients.
A bad client, by definition, tries to capture more than its fair share. We
model this intent as follows: in our experiments, bad clients send requests
faster than good clients, and bad clients send requests concurrently. Specif-
ically, we choose A = 40, w = 20 for bad clients and A = 2, w = 1 for good
clients.
Our choices of B and G are determined by the number of clients that
we are able to run in the testbed and by a rough model of today's client
access links. Specifically, in most of our experiments, there are 50 clients,
each with 2 Mbits/s of access bandwidth. Thus, B + G usually equals loo
Mbits/s. This scale is smaller than most attacks. Nevertheless, we believe
that the results generalize because we focus on how the prototype's behavior
differs from the theory in §3.4. By understanding this difference, one can
make predictions about speak-up's performance in larger attacks.
Because the experimental scale does not tax the thinner, we separately
measured its capacity and found that it can handle loads comparable to
recent attacks. At 90% CPU utilization on the hardware described above
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FIGURE 3.5-Server allocation when c = 100 requests/s as a function of G-. The mea-
sured results for speak-up are close to the ideal line. Without speak-up, bad clients sending
at A = 40 requests/s and w = 20 capture much more of the server.
with multiple gigabit Ethernet interfaces, in a 6oo-second experiment with
a time series of 5-second intervals, the thinner sinks payment bytes at 1451
Mbits/s (with standard deviation of 38 Mbits/s) for 1500oo-byte packets and
at 379 Mbits/s (with standard deviation of 24 Mbits/s) for 120-byte packets.
Many recent attacks are roughly this size; see §3.5.3 and §3.10.2. The capac-
ity also depends on how many concurrent clients the thinner supports; the
limit here is only the RAM for each connection (see §3.7).
3.8.2 Validating the Thinner's Allocation
When the rate of incoming requests exceeds the server's capacity, speak-up's
goal is to allocate the server's resources to a group of clients in proportion
to their aggregate bandwidth. In this section, we evaluate to what degree
our implementation meets this goal.
In our first experiment, 50 clients connect to the thinner over a ioo
Mbits/s LAN. Each client has 2 Mbits/s of bandwidth. We varyf, the frac-
tion of "good" clients (the rest are "bad"). In this homogeneous setting, G
(i.e., the fraction of "good client bandwidth") equalsf, and the server's ca-
pacity is c = 100 requests/s.
Figure 3.5 shows the fraction of the server allocated to the good clients
as a function off. Without speak-up, the bad clients capture a larger frac-
tion of the server than the good clients because they make more requests
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FIGURE 3.6-Server allocation to good and bad clients, and the fraction of good requests
that are served, without ("OFF") and with ("ON") speak-up. c varies, and G = B = 50
Mbits/s. For c = 50, 100, the allocation is roughly proportional to the aggregate band-
widths, and for c = 200, all good requests are served.
and the server, when overloaded, randomly drops requests. With speak-
up, however, the good clients can "pay" more for each of their requests-
because they make fewer-and can thus capture a fraction of the server
roughly in proportion to their bandwidth. The small difference between
the measured and ideal values is a result of the good clients not using as
much of their bandwidth as the bad clients. We discussed this adversarial
advantage in §3.4.4 and further quantify it in §3.8.3 and §3.8-4.
In the next experiment, we investigate different "provisioning regimes"'
We fix G and B, and measure the server's allocation when its capacity, c, is
less than, equal to, and greater than cid. Recall from §3.4.1 that cid is the min-
imum value of c at which all good clients get service, if speak-up is deployed
and if speak-up allocates the server exactly in proportion to client band-
width. We set G = B by configuring 50 clients, 25 good and 25 bad, each
with a bandwidth of 2 Mbits/s to the thinner over a LAN. In this scenario,
cid = 100 requests/s (from §3.4.1, Cid = g(1 + -) = 2g = 2 - 25 -A = 100),
and we experiment with c = 50, 100, 200 requests/s.
Figure 3.6 shows the results. The good clients get a larger fraction of the
server with speak-up than without. Moreover, for c = 50, 100, the alloca-
tion under speak-up is roughly proportional to the aggregate bandwidths,
and for c = 200, all good requests are served. (The bad clients get a larger
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FIGURE 3.7-Mean time to upload dummy bytes for good requests that receive service. c
varies, and G = B = 50 Mbits/s. When the server is not overloaded (c = 200), speak-up
introduces little latency.
share of the server for c = 200 because they capture the excess capacity
after the good requests have been served.) Again, one can see that the al-
location under speak-up does not exactly match the ideal: from Figure 3.6,
when speak-up is enabled and c = cid = 100, the good demand is not fully
satisfied.
3.8.3 Latency and Byte Cost
We now explore speak-up's byte cost and a pessimistic estimate of its latency
cost for the same set of experiments (c varies, 50 clients, G = B = 50
Mbits/s).
For the pessimistic latency cost, we measure the length of time that
clients spend uploading dummy bytes, as seen at the client. Figure 3.7 shows
the averages and 90oth percentiles of these measurements for the served
good requests. The reasons that this measurement is a pessimistic reflec-
tion of speak-up's true latency cost are as follows. First, for the good clients,
speak-up decreases average latency (because speak-up serves more good
requests). Second, even calling this measurement the per-request latency
cost is pessimistic because that view unrealistically implies that, without
speak-up, the "lucky" requests (the ones that receive service) never have to
wait. Third, any other resource-based defense would also introduce some
latency.
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FIGURE 3.8-Average number of bytes sent on the payment channel-the "price"-for
served requests. c varies, and G = B = 50 Mbits/s. When the server is overloaded (c =
50, 100), the price is close to the upper bound, (G + B)/c; see the text for why they are not
equal.
For the byte cost, we measure the number of bytes uploaded for served
requests-the "price"--as recorded by the thinner. Figure 3.8 shows the
average of this measurement for good and bad clients and also plots the
theoretical average price, (G + B)/c, from §3.4.3, which is labeled "Upper
Bound"
We make two observations about this data. The first is that when the
server is under-provisioned, good clients pay slightly more for service than
bad ones. The reason is as follows. All contending clients tend to overpay:
the client that will win the next auction continues to pay until the auction
happens rather than stopping after it has paid enough to win. And since
good clients pay at a faster rate per request, they tend to overshoot the "true"
price (the second-highest bid) more than the bad clients do. Note, however,
that the overpayment by any client is bounded by 1 .- (bandwidth of a client)
because a client can overpay for at most the time between two auctions.
The second observation is that the actual price is lower than the theoret-
ical one. The reason is that clients do not consume all of their bandwidth.
We now explain why they do not, considering the different values of c in
turn.
For c = 50, each good client spends an average of 1.46 Mbits/s (deter-
mined by tallying the total bits spent by good clients over the experiment).
This average is less than the 2 Mbits/s access link because of a quiescent
period between when a good client issues a request and when the thinner
replies, asking for payment. This period is 0.22 seconds on average, ow-
ing mostly to a long backlog at the thinner of requests and payment bytes
(but a little to round-trip latency). When not in a quiescent period, a good
client consumes most of its access link, delivering 1.85 Mbits/s on average,
inferred by dividing the average good client payment (Figure 3.8) by the av-
erage time spent paying (Figure 3-7). Bad clients, in contrast, keep multiple
requests outstanding so do not have "down time". For c = 50, they spend
an average of 1.84 Mbits/s.
The c = 100 case is similar to c = 50.
We now consider c = 200. Recall that the upper bound on price of
(G + B)/c is met only if all clients actually pay all of their bandwidth. How-
ever, if the server is over-provisioned and all of the good clients' requests are
served, as happens for c = 200, then the good clients do not pay the maxi-
mum that they are able. For each request, a good client pays enough to get
service, and then goes away, until the next request. This behavior causes a
lower "going rate" for access than is given by the upper bound.
3.8.4 Empirical Adversarial Advantage
As just discussed, bad clients deliver more bytes than good clients in our ex-
periments. As a result of this disparity, the server does not achieve the ideal
of a bandwidth-proportional allocation. This effect was visible in §3.8.2.
To better understand this adversarial advantage, we ask, What is the
minimum value of c at which all of the good demand is satisfied? To an-
swer this question, we experimented with the same configuration as above
(G = B = 50 Mbits/s; 50 clients) but for more values of c. We found that
at c = 137, 99.98% of the good demand is satisfed and that at c = 140, all
but one of the good clients' 30,157 requests is served. c = 137 is 37% more
provisioning than Cid, the capacity needed under exact proportional allo-
cation. We conclude that a bad client can cheat the proportional allocation
mechanism but only to a limited extent-at least under our model of bad
behavior.
We now revisit that model. First, we chose w = 20 arbitrarily. It might
be true that with a smaller or larger value for w, the bad clients could capture
more of the server. Second, bad clients do not "optimize"' As one example, in
the c = 50 experiment, the average time between when the thinner returns
JavaScript to a bad client and when the thinner actually gets bits from that
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FIGURE 3.9--Heterogeneous client bandwidth experiments with 50o LAN clients, all good.
The fraction of the server (c = 10 requests/s) allocated to the ten clients in category i, with
bandwidth 0.5 - i Mbits/s, is close to the ideal proportional allocation.
client is roughly two full seconds. During those two seconds, the bad client
is effectively paying for w - 1 (or fewer requests) rather than w requests,
so perhaps bad clients are not realizing their full adversarial advantage. In-
deed, one could imagine a bad client setting w adaptively or concentrat-
ing bandwidth on particular requests. Nevertheless, the analysis in §3.4.4
shows that bad clients cannot do much better than the naive behavior that
we model.
3.8.5 Heterogeneous Network Conditions
We now investigate the server's allocation for different client bandwidths
and RTTs. We begin with bandwidth. We assign 50 clients to 5 categories.
The to clients in category i (1 < i < 5) have bandwidth 0.5 - i Mbits/s and
are connected to the thinner over a LAN. All clients are good. The server
has capacity c = 10 requests/s. Figure 3.9 shows that the resulting server
allocation to each category is close to the bandwidth-proportional ideal.
We now consider RTT, hypothesizing that the RTT between a good
client and the thinner will affect the allocation, for two reasons. First, at
low prices, a client will have sent the full price-that is, the requisite num-
ber of bytes to win the virtual auction-before TCP has "ramped up" to fill
the client's pipe. In these cases, clients with longer RTTs will take longer to
pay. Second, and more importantly, each request has at least one associated
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FIGURE 3.10- Two sets of heterogeneous client RTT experiments with 50 LAN clients,
all good or all bad. The fraction of the server (c = 10 requests/s) captured by the to clients
in category i, with RTT 100 -i ms, varies for good clients. In contrast, bad clients' RTTs
don't matter because they open multiple connections.
quiescent period (see §3.8.1 and §3.8.3), the length of which depends on
RTT. In contrast, bad clients have multiple requests outstanding so do not
have "down time" and will not be much affected by their RTT to the thinner.
To test this hypothesis, we assign 50 clients to 5 categories. The lo clients
in category i (1 < i < 5) have RTT = 100 -i ms to the thinner, giving a wide
range of RTTs. All clients have bandwidth 2 Mbits/s, and c = 10 requests/s.
We experiment with two cases: all clients good and all bad. Figure 3.10 con-
firms our hypothesis: good clients with longer RTTs get a smaller share of
the server while for bad clients, RTT matters little. This result may seem
unfortunate, but the effect is limited: for example, in this experiment, no
good client gets more than double or less than half the ideal.
3.8.6 Good and Bad Clients Sharing a Bottleneck
When good clients share a bottleneck link with bad ones, good requests
can be "crowded out" by bad ones before reaching the thinner (see §3.5.2).
We quantify this observation with an experiment that uses the following
topology, depicted in Figure 3.11: 30 clients, each with a bandwidth of 2
Mbits/s, connect to the thinner through a common link, 1. The capacity of
1 is 20 Mbits/s. 1 is a bottleneck because the clients behind I can generate 6o
Mbits/s. Also, 5 good and 5 bad clients, each with a bandwidth of 2 Mbits/s,
-100 Mbits/s
S 20 Mbits/s
- 2 Mbits/s
O Good client
* Bad client
30 clients
FIGURE 3.11--Network topology used to measure the impact of good and bad clients
sharing a bottleneck link (§3.8.6).
connect to the thinner directly through a LAN. The server's capacity is c =
30 requests/s. We vary the number of good and bad clients behind 1, mea-
suring three cases: first, 5 good and 25 bad clients; second, 15 good and 1 5
bad clients; and third, 25 good and 5 bad clients.
Based on the topology, the clients behind I should capture half of the
server's capacity. In fact, they capture slightly less than half: in the first case,
they capture 43.8%; in the second, 47.7%; and in the third, 47.1%.
Next, we measure the allocation of the server to the good and bad clients
behind 1. We also measure, of the good requests that originate behind 1,
what fraction receive service. Figure 3.12 depicts these measurements and
compares them to the bandwidth-proportional ideals. The ideal for the first
measurement is given simply by the fraction of good and bad clients behind
1. The ideal for the second measurement, fid, is 0.25, and it is calculated as
follows. Let G, be the ideal bandwidth available to the good clients behind
1. G = 20 n, where n is the number of good clients behind 1. The fraction
20 reflects the fact that in the ideal case, the bottleneck restricts every client60
equally. Further, let gi = nA be the rate at which the good clients behind I
issue requests. Of the good requests that originate behind 1, the ideal frac-
tion that would be served, fid, is the bandwidth-proportional server piece
for the good clients behind I divided by those clients' demand:
G' C G 30 2 n30 22n30
d = G+B -_ - 60 - 0.25.
gl g1 40nA 80n
The figure shows that the good clients behind I are heavily penalized. The
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FIGURE 3.12-Server allocation when good and bad clients share a bottleneck link, 1. "Bot-
tleneck service" refers to the portion of the server captured by all of the clients behind
1. The actual breakdown of this portion (left bar) is worse for the good clients than the
bandwidth-proportional allocation (middle bar) because bad clients "hog" I. The right bar
further quantifies this effect.
reason is that each bad client keeps multiple connections outstanding so
captures much more of the bottleneck link, 1, than each good client. This
effect was hypothesized in §3.5.2.
3.8.7 Impact of Speak-up on Other Traffic
We now consider how speak-up affects other traffic, specifically what hap-
pens when a TCP endpoint, H, shares a bottleneck link, m, with clients that
are uploading dummy bits. The case when H is a TCP sender is straight-
forward: m will be shared among H's transfer and the speak-up uploads.
When H is a TCP receiver, the extra traffic from speak-up affects H in two
ways. First, ACKs from H will be lost (and delayed) more often than without
speak-up. Second, for request-response protocols (e.g., HTTP), H's request
can be delayed. Here, we investigate these effects on HTTP downloads.
We experiment with the following setup: lo good speak-up clients share
a bottleneck link, m, with H, a host that runs the HTTP client wget. m
has a bandwidth of 1 Mbit/s and one-way delay 100 ms. Each of the 11
clients has a bandwidth of 2 Mbits/s. On the other side of m are the thinner
(fronting a server with c = 2 requests/s) and a separate Web server, S. In
each experiment, H downloads a file from S loo times.
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FIGURE 3.13-Effect on an HTTP client of sharing a bottleneck link with speak-up clients.
Graph shows means of end-to-end HTTP download latencies with and without cross-
traffic from speak-up, for various HTTP transfer sizes (which are shown on a log scale).
Graph also shows standard deviations for the former measurements (the standard devi-
ations for the latter are less than 1.5% of the means). Cross-traffic from speak-up has a
significant effect on end-to-end HTTP download latency.
Figure 3.13 shows the mean download latency for various file sizes, with
and without the speak-up traffic. The figure also shows standard deviations
for the former set of measurements. For the latter set, the standard devia-
tions are less than 1.5% of the means.
There is significant "collateral damage" to "innocently bystanding" Web
transfers here: download times inflate, between 2 and 3.2 x for the various
transfer sizes. However, this experiment is quite pessimistic: the RTTs are
large, the bottleneck bandwidth is highly restrictive (roughly 20 x smaller
than the demand), and the server capacity is low. While speak-up is clearly
the exacerbating factor in this experiment, it will not have this effect on
every link.
3.8.8 Under-provisioned Thinner
We now explore how speak-up performs when condition c2 from 93.3 is
not met. That is, we measure what happens when the thinner's incoming
bandwidth is less than the combined bandwidth of its current clients. In this
case, we expect bad clients to claim a disproportionate share of the server.
The reason is as follows. When the thinner's access link is overloaded, the
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FIGURE 3.14-Server allocation as a function of the thinner's bandwidth provisioning.
G = B = 30 Mbits/s, and c = 30 requests/s. Graph depicts the actual allocation that
we measured under speak-up, as well as the ideal allocation and our prediction of the
allocation that would result if no defense were deployed. As the thinner becomes more
under-provisioned, bad clients capture an increasingly disproportionate fraction of the
server. However, even in these cases, speak-up is far better than having no defense.
thinner will not "hear" all of the incoming requests. Thus, not all of the in-
coming requests will receive timely encouragement. Because good clients
make fewer requests and keep fewer requests outstanding, a good client,
relative to a bad client, has a higher probability of having no "encouraged"
requests outstanding. Thus, on average, a good client is quiescent more of-
ten than a bad client, meaning that a good client pays fewer bits and hence
gets less service.
To measure this effect, we perform an experiment with the following
topology: 15 good and 15 bad clients, each with a bandwidth of 2 Mbits/s,
connect to the thinner over a LAN. Observe that the thinner's required
bandwidth provisioning is 60 Mbits/s. Our experiments vary the thinner's
actual access bandwidth from 30 Mbits/s, representing a thinner that is
under-provisioned by 50%, to 70 Mbits/s, representing a thinner that is am-
ply provisioned. For each case, we measure the fraction of the server that
goes to good and bad clients.
Figure 3.14 depicts the results, along with the ideal allocation and the
allocation that we project would result if no defense were deployed. This
latter allocation is the ratio of the two populations' request rates: A = 2 for
a good client and A = 40 for a bad client (see §3.8.1).
As the thinner becomes increasingly under-provisioned, bad clients
capture increasingly more of the server, which is the effect that we hypoth-
esized. Nevertheless, even in this case, speak-up is far better than nothing.
3.9 SPEAK-UP COMPARED & CRITIQUED
Having shown that speak-up roughly "meets its spec", we now compare it to
other defenses against application-level DDoS attacks. (For pointers to the
broad literature on other denial-of-service attacks and defenses, in partic-
ular link attacks, see the survey by Mirkovic and Reiher [1o8] and the bib-
liographies in [82, lo9, 178].) Some of the defenses that we discuss below
have been proposed; others are hypothetical but represent natural alterna-
tives. As the discussion proceeds, we will also critique speak-up. Some of
these critiques are specific to speak-up; some apply to speak-up's general
category, to which we turn now.
3.9.1 Resource-based Defenses
This category was pioneered by Dwork and Naor [46], who suggested, as
a spam defense, having receivers ask senders for the solutions to compu-
tationally intensive puzzles, in effect charging CPU cycles to send email.
(Back later proposed a similar idea [11].) Since then, others have done work
in the same spirit, using proof-of-work (as such schemes are known) to de-
fend against denial-of-service attacks [o10, 41, 45, 53, 80, 114, 170, 172].
Others have proposed memory, rather than CPU, cycles for similar pur-
poses [2], and still others use money as the scarce resource [98, 148].
One of the contributions of speak-up is to introduce bandwidth as the
scarce resource, or currency. Another contribution is the explicit goal of
a resource-proportional allocation. Many of the other proposals strive for
a notion of fairness, and a few implicitly achieve a resource-proportional
allocation or something close, but none state it as an objective (perhaps
because it only makes sense to state this objective after establishing that
no robust notion of host identity exists). An exception is a recent paper by
Parno et al. [114], which was published after our work [169].
We do not know of another proposal to use bandwidth as a currency.
However, Sherr, Gunter, and their co-authors [70, 142] describe a related
solution to DoS attacks on servers' computational resources. In their so-
lution, good clients send a fixed number of copies of their messages, and
the server only processes a fixed fraction of the messages that it receives,
thereby diminishing adversaries' impact. Our work shares an ethos but has
a very different realization. In that work, the drop probability and repeat
count are hard-coded, and the approach does not apply to HTTP. Further,
the authors do not consider congestion control, the implications of deploy-
ment in today's Internet, and the unequal requests case. Also, Gligor [61]
observes that a hypothetical defense based on client retries and timeouts
would require less overhead but still provide the same qualitative perfor-
mance bounds as proof-of-work schemes. Because this general approach
does not meet his more exacting performance requirements, he does not
consider using bandwidth as a currency.
Bandwidth vs. CPU
We chose bandwidth as a currency because we were originally motivated by
the key observation in §3.1, namely that good clients likely have more spare
upload capacity. However, our resource-proportional goal could just as well
be applied to CPU cycles, so we must ask, "Why bandwidth? Why not use
CPU cycles as the computational currency?" To answer this question, we
now compare these two alternatives. We do not find a clear winner. Band-
width strikes us as the more "natural" choice, but it can introduce more
collateral damage.
We begin with a hedge; we discuss contributions of speak-up that are
expressed in the context of bandwidth but could apply to other currencies:
Less mechanism, more desiderata. The existing CPU-based proposals
[10, 41, 53, 80, 114, 170, 172] incorporate far more mechanism than speak-
up: they require some or all of client modification, protocol modification
(to accommodate the puzzle challenge and response), or a network-wide
puzzle distribution system together with a trusted authority. We conjecture
that this extra mechanism is unnecessary, at least for protecting Web ap-
plications. Consider a hypothetical defense that works just like speak-up,
except instead of clients' browsers coughing up dummy bits, their browsers
cough up solutions to small, fixed-size CPU puzzles; in each interval, the
thinner admits the client that has solved the most number of puzzles. (Sim-
ilar ideas, with different implementations, are described in [114, 170].) This
defense would not require the mechanisms mentioned above.
Moreover, this hypothetical defense would, like speak-up, have the fol-
lowing desirable properties: it would find the price correctly (by "price', we
mean the going rate of access, expressed in CPU cycles or puzzle difficulty
level); it would find the price automatically, with no explicit control or ad-
justment (in some proposals, either the server sends clients puzzles of a
particular difficulty level or clients must guess a difficulty level); it would re-
sist gaming; and it would work with unmodified clients. No existing CPU-
based proposal has all of these properties. Thus, even if the reader is not
convinced by the advantages of bandwidth, speak-up's auction mechanism
is useful in CPU-based schemes too.
Advantages ofbandwidth. In a head-to-head comparison, bandwidth has
two advantages compared to CPU:
1. Implementation-independent. A scheme based on bandwidth can-
not be gamed by a faster client implementation.5 In the hypothetical CPU-
based defense just given, good clients would solve puzzles in JavaScript;
bad ones might use a puzzle-solving engine written in a low-level language,
thereby manufacturing an advantage.
2. Bandwidth is attackers' actual constraint. Today, absent any defense,
the apparent limit on attackers is bandwidth, not CPU power (if a bot, or
any host, issues requests at a high rate, its access link will be saturated long
before its CPU is taxed). Charging the resource that is the actual limiting
factor yields two benefits.
First, charging any price in that currency (including one that is be-
low what is needed to achieve a resource-proportional allocation) will have
some effect on the attackers. For example, assume that bad clients have
maxed out their bandwidth and that the "correct" price is 50 x as many bits
as are in a normal request. In this situation, if the server requires all clients
to spend, say, twice as many bits per request rather than 5o x as many bits,
then it will halve the effective request rate from the bad clients while very
probably leaving the good clients unaffected. CPU cycles offer no such ben-
efit: to affect the bad clients at all, the price in CPU cycles must be high. Of
course, in our design of speak-up, servers do not state the price as a fixed
multiple (doing so would not achieve a resource-proportional allocation),
but they could do so in a variant of the scheme.
The second benefit to charging in the scarce resource is as follows. If
the server charged in a resource that was not scarce, namely CPU cycles,
attackers could use their bandwidth to mount some other attack (e.g., a link
flooding attack or other malfeasance that requires bandwidth). Granted,
bots today do not, to our knowledge, multiplex themselves over several at-
tacks,6 but in theory bots could do so. And further granted, the protected
51 thank Trevor Blackwell for this observation (August, 2oo6).
60n the other hand, it is common for a host to be infected by multiple bots [56]; in that case, one
could imagine hosts being multiplexed over several attacks.
server likely doesn't care about preventing bots from wreaking havoc else-
where. However, the server's ISP might care. More generally, charging the
resource that is scarce limits attackers' total abilities compared to charging in
a different resource.
Disadvantages of bandwidth. Against the advantages above, bandwidth
has three disadvantages relative to CPU cycles; we believe that none of them
is fatal:
1. CPU is a purely local resource. When a client spends bandwidth, it
may adversely affect a client that isn't "speaking up". However, an analo-
gous situation holds for any network application that is a heavy bandwidth
consumer. For example, BitTorrent is one of the predominant applications
on the Internet, is a heavy consumer of clients' upload bandwidth (far more
than speak-up, which is only invoked when the server is under attack), and
likely causes collateral damage. Yet, BitTorrent seems to have gained accep-
tance anyway, so we do not view this disadvantage as fatal for bandwidth.
A possibly more serious concern in this category is that when two
"speaking up" clients share a bottleneck link, they also, as a result, "share"
an allocation at the server. Meanwhile, if the clients were paying in CPU
cycles, they would not have this problem.
2. Asymmetry of CPU puzzles. Solving a puzzle is slow; checking it is
fast. Bandwidth does not have an analogous property: the front-end to the
server must sink all of the bandwidth that clients are spending. However,
we do not view this disadvantage as fatal; see the discussion of condition c2
in §3.3.
3. Variable bandwidth costs. In some countries, customers pay their ISPs
"per-bit"' For those customers, access to a server defended by speak-up (and
under attack) would cost more than usual. One could address this disadvan-
tage by changing the implementation of speak-up slightly so that it gives
humans the opportunity to express whether they want to pay bandwidth
(e.g., one could imagine the thinner exposing the "going rate" in bits and
letting customers choose whether to continue).
Stepping back from the comparison between CPU and bandwidth, we won-
der whether there is a design that combines the two currencies to get the
advantages of both. We leave this question for future work.
Drawbacks of Resource-based Schemes
We now discuss critiques of resource-based schemes in general. First, as
discussed in condition cl in §933, any scheme that is trying to achieve a
roughly proportional allocation only works if the good clients have enough
currency (a point made by Laurie and Clayton in the context of proof-of-
work for spam control [92]).
A second disadvantage that inheres in these schemes is that they are
only roughly fair. In the context of speak-up, we call this disadvantage band-
width envy. Before speak-up, all good clients competed equally for a small
share of the server. Under speak-up, more good clients are "better off"
(i.e., can claim a larger portion of the server). But since speak-up allocates
the server's resources in proportion to clients' bandwidths, high-bandwidth
good clients are "more better off", and this inequality might be problematic.
However, observe that unfairness only occurs under attack. Thus, while we
think that this inequality is unfortunate, it is not fatal. A possible solution is
for ISPs with low-bandwidth customers to offer access to high-bandwidth
proxies whose purpose is to "pay bandwidth" to the thinner.7 These prox-
ies would have to allocate their resources fairly-perhaps by implementing
speak-up recursively.
A third critique of resource-based approaches in general, and speak-up
in particular, is that they treatflash crowds (i.e., overload from good clients
alone) as no different from an attack. This fact might appear unsettling.
However, observe that, for speak-up at least, the critique does not apply
to the canonical case of a flash crowd, in which a hyperlink from slash-
dot. org overwhelms a residential Web site's access link: speak-up would
not have been deployed to defend a low-bandwidth site (see §3.3). For sites
in our applicability regime, making good clients "bid" for access when all
clients are good is certainly not ideal, but the issues here are the same as
with speak-up in general.
A final critique of resource-based schemes is that they give attackers
some service so might be weaker than the schemes that we discuss next
that seek to block attackers. However, under those schemes, a smart bot can
imitate a good client, succeed in fooling the detection discipline, and again
get some service.
7Ben Adida suggested this idea.
3.9.2 Detect-and-Block Defenses
The most commonly deployed defense [111] is a combination of link over-
provisioning [25, 120] and profiling, which is a detect-and-block approach
offered by several vendors [9, 29, 1o3]. These latter products build a histori-
cal profile of the defended server's clientele and, when the server is attacked,
block traffic violating the profile. Many other detect-and-block schemes
have been proposed; we now mention a few. In application-level profil-
ing [128, 147], the server gives preference to clients who appear to have
"typical" behavior. Resource containers [15] perform rate-limiting to allo-
cate the server's resources to clients fairly (more generally, one can use Fair
Queuing [42] to rate-limit clients based on their IP addresses). Defenses
based on CAPTCHAS [166] (e.g., [log9, 151]) use reverse Turing tests to block
bots. Killbots [82] combines CAPTCHAs and rate-limiting, defining a bot as
a non-CAPTCHA answering host that sends too many requests to an over-
loaded server.
One critique of detect-and-block methods is that they can err. CAPT-
CHAs can be thwarted by "bad humans" (cheap labor hired to attack a site
or induced [118] to solve the CAPTCHAS) or "good bots" (legitimate, non-
human clientele or humans who do not answer CAPTCHAS). As mentioned
in Chapter 2 and the beginning of this chapter, schemes that rate-limit
clients by IP address can err because of address hijacking and proxies. Pro-
filing apparently addresses some of these shortcomings today (e.g., many le-
gitimate clients behind a proxy would cause the proxy's IP address to have
a higher baseline rate in the server's profile). However, in principle such
"behavior-based" techniques can also be "fooled": a set of savvy bots could,
over time, "build up" their profile by appearing to be legitimate clients, at
which point they could abuse their profile and attack.
3-9.3 Mechanisms for Blocking Traffic
There has been a lot of recent research focusing on mechanisms for blocking
traffic destined to servers under attack; the policies for such blocking are
often unspecified. For this reason, we believe that this class of proposals is
orthogonal to, and can be combined with, speak-up and the other members
of the taxonomy presented at the beginning of the chapter. We now give
more detail.
Examples of proposed mechanisms include the recent literature on ca-
pabilities [7, 177, 178]; dFence [95], in which server operators can dynam-
ically deploy middleboxes to filter problematic traffic; and an addressing
scheme in which hosts that are always clients cannot be addressed [741
(see the bibliographies of those papers for other examples). These propos-
als share a similar high-level structure: they describe systems to keep traffic
from potential victims-under the assumption that the infrastructure or
the protected host knows which packets are worth receiving. For example,
with capabilities [7, 177, 178], servers are protected by capability allocators
that act on their behalf. These allocators give requesting clients tokens, or
capabilities, that routers understand. Clients then place the capabilities in
the packets that they originate, and routers give such packets higher priority
than packets without capabilities.
These techniques focus on how to block traffic, not on which traffic to
block. For the latter function, the authors generally suggest detect-and-
block techniques (e.g., CAPTCHAS), but they could easily use speak-up, as
mentioned in §933. For example, when a server is over-subscribed, its capa-
bility allocator could conduct a bandwidth auction to decide which clients
receive capabilities. Indeed, under the threat in which good and bad are
indistinguishable, these proposals would have to use speak-up or another
resource-based scheme! As an example, Parno et al. [114] advocate CPU
puzzles for precisely this purpose, but their paper considers bandwidth as
a candidate resource.
3.9.4 Summary
Because detect-and-block defenses can err, we favor resource-based de-
fenses for the threat described in §3.3. We have argued that bandwidth is a
natural (but not the only) choice for the resource and that speak-up's mech-
anisms may still be useful under other resource choices. Finally, we have
addressed important critiques of resource-based approaches in general and
speak-up in particular.
3.10 PLAUSIBILITY OF THE THREAT & CONDITIONS
Though we have argued that speak-up can be an appropriate defense, given
the threat and conditions that we modeled in §3.3, we have so far not said
to what extent the threat and conditions occur in practice. Below we ad-
dress the following questions in turn: (1) How often is the threat mani-
fest? (2) How often does condition ci apply, i.e., how often are aggregate
good and bad bandwidths roughly equal? (3) Is condition c2 reasonable,
i.e., can we assume that servers have adequate link bandwidth? To answer
these questions, we synthesize the research and anecdotes of others, relying
on secondary and tertiary sources.
Our discussion will be with reference to attackers' current abilities. If
deployed, speak-up would certainly cause attackers to change their tactics;
specifically, they would try to acquire more machines. We consider such
dynamics, together with the next response from the academic and security
communities, in §6.1. For now, we simply observe that attackers are already
highly motivated to compromise machines; it follows that compromising
additional machines will be costly for them.
3.10.1 The Threat
By "the threat" we mean requests that are (a) application-level (b) legitimate-
looking and (c) of uncertain origin. We address these characteristics in turn.
For (a), reports are mixed. A data set from Shadowserver that covers DDoS
activity by -1500 botnets [140] controlled via Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
does not indicate any application-level attacks, but Prolexic Technologies
reportedly sees mostly this type [17]. However, in Prolexic's case, the re-
quests are often ill-formed, so characteristic (b) does not hold. For (c), we
know that some attackers hijack addresses for sending spam and that prox-
ies are widespread (see Chapter 2). Also, bots are ever more sophisticated,
and botnets are becoming smaller [17, 33, 35, 49, 78, 105, 125], presumably
to fly under the "detection radar" of victims and the mitigation community.
The combination of smarter but smaller bots will make the three character-
istics above-which require smart bots but which conserve the adversary's
resources-more likely.
Regardless, this discussion obscures two larger points. First, even if such
attacks have not been observed in their pure form, it is not hard to carry
them out: the vulnerability is real. Second, we believe that it is important to
be proactive, that is, to identify weaknesses before they are exploited. Thus,
even if the underground economy does not favor this attack today, we must
ask-and try to answer-the question of how to defend against it.
3.10.2 Relative Sizes of Good and Bad Clientele
We first discuss the sizes of botnets and then discuss the implications for
what types of sites speak-up can protect.
We begin by arguing that most botnets today consist offewer than loo,ooo
hosts, and even zo,ooo hosts is a large botnet. Although there have been re-
ports of botnets of over loo,ooo hosts [24, 40, 73, 75, 104, 153] (millions in
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FIGURE 3.15--Rates of potential attack incidents observed bySekar et al. [138]. This figure
is reproduced, with permission, from Figure 16 of their paper.
the case of [i1531), most botnets are far smaller. Freiling et al., in a study of
18o botnets in 2005, find that the largest botnets were up to 50,000 hosts,
with some being just several hundred strong [56, §5]. Symantec reports
that 2,000 to io,ooo hosts is a common range [1o04]. Shadowserver [1391
tracks thousands of botnets and reports a total number of bots in the sin-
gle millions, implying that the average botnet size is in the low thousands.
Cooke et al. interviewed operators from Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs; their sub-
jects indicated that whereas botnets used to have tens of thousands of nodes
several years before, sizes of hundreds to thousands of nodes became the
norm [35]. Rajab et al. find similar numbers-hundreds or thousands-for
the "live populations" of various botnets [124, 125]. Indeed, they point out
that some studies may report the "footprint"-the total number of hosts
that are infected with the bot-which may account for the larger sizes. For
speak-up, we are concerned only with the botnet's current firepower and
hence with the "live population".
The observed sizes of link flooding attacks back up these rough esti-
mates, as we now argue. First, consider the observations of Sekar et al. [138]
about attacks in a major ISP; the relevant graph from their paper is repro-
duced in Figure 3.15, and the relevant line is the solid one. The graph shows
that a 1oo Mbits/s DoS attack is over the 90oth percentile (specifically, it is
at the 93rd percentile [137]). And 1 Gbit/s attacks are at the 99.95th per-
centile [137]. Their study, combined with anecdotes [73, 152, 162], suggests
that although a small number of link-flooding attacks are over 1 Gbit/s, the
vast majority are hundreds of Mbits/s or less. These sizes in turn suggest
that the attacks are not being carried out by gigantic botnets. Our reason-
ing is as follows. One study found that the average bot has roughly ioo
Kbits/s of bandwidth [143]. Thus, even if each bot uses only a tenth of its
bandwidth during an attack, an attack at the 90oth (resp., 9 9.95th) percentile
could not have been generated by a botnet of larger than lo,ooo (resp.,
100,000) nodes. Our conclusion is that most attacks are launched from bot-
nets that are under lo,ooo hosts. (Of course, it is possible that the attackers
controlled millions of hosts, each of which was sending traffic very slowly,
but in that case, no defense works.)
Given these numbers, how big does the legitimate clientele have to be
to fully withstand attack? As mentioned in §3.2, the answer depends on
the server's utilization (or, what is the same thing, its degree of over-
provisioning), as we now illustrate. Recall from §3.4.1 that, for the good
clients to be unharmed in the ideal case, we must have c > g(1 + B/G). Let-
ting u = g/c be the usual utilization of the server, we get G/B > u/(1 - u).
If the bandwidth of a population is proportional to the number of mem-
bers, then the good clients must have u/(1 - u) as many members as the
bots to fully withstand attack. Putting this result in context, if a service has
spare capacity 90o% (i.e., u = 0.1), speak-up can fully defend it (i.e., leave
its good clients unharmed) against a 1,ooo-host (resp., lo,ooo-host) bot-
net if the good clients number -1oo (resp., -1,ooo). If a service has spare
capacity 50%, then the good clients must number -1,ooo (resp., 10o,o000).
Many sites have clienteles of this order of magnitude: observe that these
numbers refer to the good clients currently interested in the service, many of
which may be quiescent. For example, http: //www. kayak. com, a compu-
tationally-intensive travel distribution site, often claims to have at least tens
of thousands of clients online. Many of these clients are humans pausing
between queries, but, from speak-up's perspective, their machines count in
the "current clientele". A more extreme example is Wikipedia, which, ac-
cording to the Web analytics company Alexa [5], is one of the top to sites
on the Web (as of August, 2007). According to Wikipedia's statistics [173],
they get an average of 20,000 requests per second. Assuming (likely pes-
simistically) that a human reading Wikipedia makes a request once every
ten seconds, the number of concurrent clients interested in the service is
200,000.
3.10.3 Costs for the Server
We discussed howto satisfy condition c2 in §3.3 and §3.5.3. And we showed
in §3.8.8 that even if the condition isn't satisfied, speak-up still offers some
benefit. Here, we just want to make two points about c2. First, any other
scheme that were to seek a proportional allocation would also need condi-
tion ci. Thus, c2 represents the relative cost of speak-up to the server. Sec-
ond, one can regard this cost as paying bandwidth to save application-level
resources. We are not claiming that this trade-off is worthwhile for every
server, only that speak-up creates such an option and that the option may
appeal to some server owners.
3.11 REFLECTIONS
We first summarize speak-up's purpose and its costs and then discuss it in
a broader context-how and when it combines with other defenses, and
where else it may apply.
Summary. Our principal finding in this chapter has been that speak-up
mostly meets the goal in §3.4.1-a roughly fair allocation, based on clients'
bandwidths. Thus, speak-up upholds the philosophy in §1.2.
Speak-up certainly introduces costs, but they are not as onerous as they
might appear. The first set of costs, to the victimized server, we discuss im-
mediately above (condition c2). The second set of costs is to the network,
because speak-up introduces traffic when servers are attacked. Yet, every
network application introduces traffic (and some, like BitTorrent, introduce
a whole lot more traffic). And, as with most other network applications,
the traffic introduced by speak-up obeys congestion control. The third set
of costs is to the end-user: there exist variable bandwidth costs (which we
discussed in §3-9.1), and, also, speak-up may edge out other activity on the
user's upload link. Such an opportunity cost is unfortunate, but opportu-
nity costs apply to all resource-based defenses (e.g., if the server charged in
CPU cycles, the user's tasks would compute slower).
Thus, while speak-up may not make sense for every site or every denial-
of-service attack, we think that it is a reasonable choice for some "pairings".
The benefit is that the implementation, and the overall idea, are ultimately
quite simple. Moreover, the costs that we have been discussing have been
for the "worst-case" threat; when that threat is only partially manifest, the
costs of speak-up are lower, as we now describe.
Speak-up combined with other defenses. The threat described in §1.1
and §3.3 specifies that the server cannot identify its clients and that the
bad clients can mimic the good ones; it is for this threat that speak-up is
designed. Yet, this threat may not always hold in practice (as mentioned
in §3.10o), or it may hold only partially. In these cases, one can use other
defenses, with speak-up being the "fallback" or "backstop".
We now give two examples of when other defenses would apply. First,
in practice, a server may be able to recognize some of its legitimate clientele
as such. For example, when a client makes a purchase at a Web server, the
server can infer that the client is legitimate and issue a cookie to the client.
Then, when the server is overloaded or attacked, it (a) prioritizes clients
that present valid cookies but does not charge them bandwidth and (b) runs
speak-up for the remainder of its clientele. This approach saves bandwidth,
both for the known clients and for the server (because the known clients
are not speaking up). This approach also gives low bandwidth clients a way
to overcome their bandwidth disadvantage (discussed in §3.9.1)-become
known to the server. The disadvantage of this approach is that the unknown
legitimate clients will be competing for a smaller piece of the server so may
be worse off, compared to a uniform application of speak-up.
A second example is that if some requests are ill-formed or violate the
protocol, the server should drop them and run speak-up for the remaining
clients. As with the approach above, this one may result in lower costs for
the server-in this case, because fewer bad clients get service.
Other applications of speak-up. While we have discussed speak-up in
the context of defending servers against application-level denial-of-service,
it can apply more broadly. We now list three sample applications. First, one
could use a variant of speak-up to guard against "Sybil attacks" [43] (i.e.,
attacks in which clients manufacture identities) in peer-to-peer networks:
the protocol could require clients to send large and frequent heartbeat mes-
sages; clients would then be unable to "afford" many identities [831].
Second, in some contexts, speak-up could defend against link attacks:
a link is fundamentally a resource and could be protected and allocated
just like a server's computational resources. For instance, consider cases
in which the "link" is a contained channel reserved for a particular class
of traffic (as in the scenario of capability requests, covered by Parno et
al. [114]). One could allocate such a channel roughly fairly-without need-
ing a thinner-by requiring clients to send as much traffic as possible
through the channel. Then, the channel would be over-subscribed, and a
client's chances of getting bits through the channel would be in proportion
to the quantity of traffic that it sends.
Third, in DQE, the system covered in the next chapter, clients pay for
email quotas. As we will see, DQE works with a range of currencies and
policies; one option is for prospective senders to pay in bandwidth.
We now turn to DQE.
4
DQE
In this chapter, we view the attention of all of the world's email recipients
as one aggregate resource, and we describe a system that regulates the con-
sumption of this resource. The motivation for such a system is of course
spam, which over-subscribes human attention and is an instance of the ab-
stract problem in §1.1.
Consistent with the philosophy in §1.2, we look for solutions that have
two broad characteristics. First, they should limit the number of messages
sent, rather than try to divine their intent, as is done by spam filters. (Fil-
tering is a content-based solution and thus inherently unreliable, as argued
in Chapter i.) Second, the limits on message volume should obey a rough
notion of proportionality: no one sender should be able to send more than
a tiny fraction of all email. Today, in contrast, a small number of spammers
send more than three-quarters of all email [106, 107, 150]. If a system with
both of these characteristics is deployed and adopted, then the world's in-
boxes will have only a small percentage of spam (unless a large percentage
of email senders are spammers), and email that obeys the volume limits will
be delivered reliably.
To satisfy these requirements, we turn to an approach using quotas or
bankable postage. Several such schemes have been proposed before [1, 13,
89]. In general, these systems give every sender a quota of stamps. How this
quota is determined varies among proposals; options include proof of CPU
or memory cycles [1, 117], annual payment [13], having an email account
with an ISP [89], having a driver's license [13], etc. The sending host or
its email server attaches a stamp to each email message, and the receiving
host or its email server tests the incoming stamp by asking a quota enforcer
whether the enforcer has seen the stamp before. If not, the receiving host
infers that the stamp is "fresh" and then cancels it by asking the enforcer to
store a record of the stamp. Only messages with fresh stamps are delivered
by the receiving host to the human user's inbox; used stamps are presumed
to indicate spam.
Later in the chapter, we explain in detail why we prefer this approach
to alternatives and how this approach should be combined with other de-
fenses (see §4.10.1). For now, observe that it upholds our requirements and
philosophy: neither quota allocation nor enforcement uses content-based
discrimination; the allocation of quotas is supposed to be such that no one
sender is "allowed" to send outsized volumes; and quota enforcement en-
sures that only quota-obeying emails are seen by humans, thereby conserv-
ing human attention. However, for the approach to be viable, two things
are required: (1) pragmatic policies for allocating quotas (really, allocating
human attention) to achieve the rough proportionality goal; and (2) a tech-
nical mechanism for quota enforcement that can handle the volume of the
world's email, without much cheating.
In this chapter, we focus on the second of these requirements, quota en-
forcement, though we briefly cover quota allocation (see §4.7). The reason
for this imbalance of focus is that these two are different concerns: the for-
mer is a purely technical matter while the latter involves social, economic,
and policy factors. In fact, our specific aim is to show that many technical
hurdles in quota-based systems can be overcome.
To that end, this chapter describes the design and implementation
of DQE (Distributed Quota Enforcement), a quota-based spam con-
trol system. DQE adopts and augments a proposal by Balakrishnan and
Karger [13]. Their architecture meets desired properties not met by pre-
vious work, including separating allocation and enforcement, not trusting
the enforcer, and preserving privacy (see §4.2.1). DQE's augmentation is
the design, implementation, analysis, and experimental evaluation of an
enforcer that meets a second set of challenges. These challenges include
scaling to the volume of the world's email, tolerating faults, resisting at-
tack, and achieving high throughput (see §4.2.2). Our experimental results
suggest that, in addition to meeting these challenges, our implementation
of the enforcer could handle 2oo billion messages daily (a multiple of the
world's email volume) with a few thousand dedicated PCs (see §4.6). Our
work on the enforcer leads us to conclude that large-scale quota enforce-
ment is practical and viable; that conclusion is this chapter's contribution
to the spam control literature.
A second set of contributions in this chapter is independent of spam
control. We believe that the enforcer is an interesting distributed system
in its own right. It is designed to store billions of key-value pairs (canceled
stamps, in the spam context) over a set of mutually untrusting nodes (94.4).
It relies on just one trust assumption, common in distributed systems: that
the constituent hosts are determined by a trusted entity. It tolerates Byzan-
tine and crash faults in its nodes, but it does not need to be "Byzantine
Fault Tolerant" [28], for it is allowed to give wrong answers sometimes.
It achieves fault-tolerance by "replicating on demand" in response to such
wrong answers (§44.41, §44.2). Each node uses, for its internal key-value
map, a novel data structure that balances storage and speed (04.4.3). Nodes
prevent the enforcer's aggregate throughput from degrading under load-
a phenomenon that we call "distributed livelock" and that we conjecture
exists in many other distributed systems-by making only local decisions
about which requests to drop (04.4-4). And the enforcer is a candidate for
protection by speak-up! (See §4-4-5.)
Apart from these techniques, what is most interesting to us about the
enforcer is that it does a fairly large job with fairly little mechanism: it is
designed to handle millions of requests per second and is fault-tolerant,
yet the nodes do not need to maintain replicas, keep track of other nodes,
route requests for each other, or trust each other. In fact, we believe that
the enforcer is viable precisely because of its absence of mechanism. As we
discuss in §4.11, the enforcer is likely to be a useful building block in other
contexts.
This chapter's organization follows an argument that DQE can achieve our
top-level goal of proportionally allocating human attention. The outline of
the argument is as follows:
- We first consider quota enforcement (94.2-94.6). We wish to show
that, given some allocation, DQE can enforce it. We do so by:
* Defining technical goals that must be met for DQE to be viable
(§4.2).
* Describing the architecture of DQE, some of which is inherited
from [131 (4-3).
* Detailing the enforcer's design, its implementation, and our eval-
uation of that implementation. We show that the enforcer can
ensure, roughly, that any given allocation holds (i.e., the possi-
ble cheating is limited). We also show that our implementation
could handle the volume of the world's email with a few thou-
sand machines. These two results demonstrate that DQE is vi-
able (§4.4-§4.6).
- We then argue that pragmatic policies for allocation exist and that
the total consumption of human attention is appropriately bounded
(94-7-§4.8).
- We next discuss possible paths to deployment and adoption (04.9).
- Having argued that DQE is technically viable and that the non-
technical aspects (allocation, adoption) are at least not insurmount-
able, we compare DQE to alternatives; we also state how DQE should
be combined with other defenses (§4.10).
- Finally, we critique DQE and consider its applicability in other con-
texts (§4.11).
4.1 THE THREAT
We define spammers to be either authors or distributors of spam. Spam-
mers may send spam either from their own computers or from botnets that
they control. They can also use these botnets to attack DQE. Any spam-
sending computer may temporarily hijack addresses (as discussed in Chap-
ter 2 and observed in [126]). Also, we will regard spam as principally an
economic activity (so it will be reasonable for us to consider a spammer's
profit-per-message, in §4.7). For more detail about the problem of spam
and the many solutions that have been proposed (some of which we cover
in §4.10) see [37, 58, 64, 68, 1571.
4.2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS & CHALLENGES
We begin with architectural requirements and then discuss challenges that
are specific to the enforcer. The former set of goals was articulated in [131
and satisfied by the architecture described in that paper, as we show in §4.3.
The latter set of goals is unmet by previous proposals.
4.2.1 Protocol Requirements
Separate allocation and enforcement. Allocating quotas of stamps is a
social, economic, and policy function; it requires great care; it does not re-
quire much computation; and it needs to happen at very coarse-grained
timescales, such as once per year per sender. Enforcement is the exact op-
posite: it is a technical function; it can be performed "sloppily"; it requires
significant computation; and it needs to happen once per email message.
Given this contrast, Balakrishnan and Karger argue [13], and we concur,
that allocation and enforcement should be performed separately-that is,
at separate times, by separate entities, and in a way that allows any alloca-
tion policy to work with the enforcement mechanism.
No false positives. We want email to be reliable again. We assume reused
stamps indicate spam. Thus, a fresh stamp must never appear to have been
used before.
Untrusted enforcer. We do not know the likely economic model of the
enforcer, whether monolithic (i.e., owned and operated by a single entity)
or federated (i.e., many organizations with an interest in spam control do-
nate resources to a distributed system). No matter what model is adopted,
it would be wise to design the system so that clients place minimal trust in
this infrastructure.
Privacy. To reduce (already daunting) deployment hurdles, we seek to
preserve the current "semantics" of email. In particular, queries of the quota
enforcer should not identify email senders (otherwise, the enforcer knows
which senders are communicating with which receivers, violating email's
privacy model), and a receiver should not be able to use a stamp to prove
to a third party that a sender communicated with it.
4.2.2 Challenges for the Enforcer
Scalability. The enforcer must scale to current and future email volumes.
Studies estimate that 80-90 billion emails will be sent daily this year [77,
123]. (We admit that we have no way to verify these claims.) We set an
initial target of 200 billion daily messages (an average of about 2.3 million
stamp checks per second) and strive to keep pace with future growth. To
cope with these rates, the enforcer must be composed of many hosts.
Fault-tolerance. Given the required number of hosts, it is highly likely
that some subset will experience crash faults (e.g., be down) or Byzantine
faults (e.g., become subverted). The enforcer should be robust to these faults.
In particular, it should guarantee no more than a small amount of stamp
reuse, despite such failures.
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FIGURE 4. 1--DQE architecture.
High throughput. To control management and hardware costs, we wish
to minimize the required number of machines, which requires maximizing
throughput.
Attack-resilience. Spammers will have a strong incentive to cripple the
enforcer; it should thus resist denial-of-service (DoS) and resource exhaus-
tion attacks.
Mutually untrusting nodes. In both federated and monolithic enforcer
organizations, nodes could be compromised. In the federated case, even
when the nodes are uncompromised, they may not trust each other. Thus,
in either case, besides being untrusted (by clients), nodes should also be
untrusting (of other nodes), even as they do storage operations for each
other.
We now show how the above requirements are met, first discussing the gen-
eral architecture in §4.3 and then, in §944, focusing on the detailed design
of the enforcer.
4.3 DQE ARCHITECTURE
The architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1. We begin by discussing the for-
mat and allocation of stamps (§4.3.1), how stamps are checked and canceled
(§4.3.2), and how that process satisfies the requirements in §4.2.1. These
pieces-the high-level architecture, stamps, and the protocols in §4.3.2-
are what DQE inherits from [131. Indeed, most (but not all) of the ideas in
§4.3.1 and §4.3.2 appeared in [131.
We also give an overview of the enforcer (94.3-3) and survey vulnerabil-
ities (§4.3.4). Although we will refer to "sender" and "receiver'", we expect
those will be, for ease of deployment, the sender's and receiver's respective
email servers.
4.3.1 Stamp Allocation and Creation
The quota allocation policy is the purview of a few globally trusted quota
allocators (QAs), each with distinct public/private key pair (QApub, QApriv);
the QApub are well known. A participant S constructs public/private key pair
(Spub, Spriv) and presents Spub to a QA. The QA determines a quota for S and
returns to S a signed certificate (the notation {A}B means that string A is
signed with key B):
Cs = {Spub, expiration time, quota} QApriv
Anyone knowing QApub can verify, by inspecting Cs, that whoever owns Spub
has been allocated a quota. expiration time is when the certificate expires (in
our implementation, certificates are valid for one year), and quota specifies
the maximum number of stamps that S can use within a well-known epoch
(in our implementation, each day is an epoch). Epochs free the enforcer
from having to store canceled stamps for long time periods. Obtaining a
certificate is the only interaction that participants have with a QA, and it
happens on long time scales (e.g., yearly). As a result, allocation is separate
from enforcement-one of the requirements in §4.2.1-and the QA can
allocate quotas with great care.
Participants use the quota attribute of their certificates to create up to
quota stamps in any epoch. A participant with a certificate may give its
stamps to other email senders, which may be a practical way for an organi-
zation to acquire a large quota and then dole it out to individual users.
Each stamp has the form
{Cs, { i, t}Sp} .
Each i in [1, quota] is supposed to be used no more than once in the current
epoch. t is a unique identifier of the current epoch. Because email can be
delayed en route to a recipient, receivers accept stamps from the current
epoch and the one just previous.
Quotas and stamps are reminiscent of micropayment systems [26, 6o,
132]. In those systems, buyers get blocks of cash and mint payments from
the blocks. We compare DQE and micropayments in §4.10.
1. S constructs STAMP = {CS, {i, tSpriv }
2. S -+ R: {STAMP, msg}.
3. R checks that i < quota (in Cs), that t is the current or previous epoch,
that {i, t} is signed with Spriv (Spub is in Cs), and that Cs is signed with a
quota allocator's key. If not, R rejects the message; the stamp is invalid.
Otherwise, R computes POSTMARK = HASH(HASH(STAMP)).
4. R -- enforcer: TEST(POSTMARK). Enforcer replies with x. If x is
HASH (STAMP), R considers STAMP used. If x is "not found'", R continues
to step 5.
5. R -- enforcer: SET(POSTMARK, HASH(STAMP)).
FIGURE 4.2-Stamp cancellation protocol followed by sender (S), receiver (R), and the en-
forcer. The protocol upholds the design goals in §4.2.1: it gives no false positives, preserves
privacy, and does not trust the enforcer.
An alternative to senders creating their own stamps would be QAs dis-
tributing stamps to senders. We reject this approach because it would re-
quire a massive computational effort by the QAs.
4.3.2 Stamp Cancellation Protocol
This section describes the protocol followed by senders, receivers, and the
enforcer. Figure 4.2 depicts the protocol.
For a given stamp attached to an email from sender S, the receiver R
must check that the stamp is unused and must prevent reuse of the stamp
in the current epoch. To this end, R checks that the value of i in the stamp
is less than S's quota, that t identifies the current or just previous epoch,
and that the signatures are valid. If the stamp passes these tests, R commu-
nicates with the enforcer using two UDP-based Remote Procedure Calls
(RPCs): TEST and SET. R first calls TEST to check whether the enforcer has
seen a fingerprint of the stamp; if the response is "not found"' R then calls
SET, presenting the fingerprint to be stored.' The fingerprint of the stamp
'One might wonder why receivers will SET after they have already received "service" from the en-
forcer in the form of a TEST reply. Our answer is that executing these requests is inexpensive, auto-
matic, and damaging to spammers.
is HASH(STAMP), where HASH is a one-way hash function that is hard to
invert.2
For this approach to work, signatures must be deterministic. If each mes-
sage had many valid signatures, then senders could create many differ-
ent values of STAMP for the same logical stamp. Each of the STAMP val-
ues would of course lead to a different value of HASH(STAMP), giving re-
ceivers no way to detect the multiple use. To get deterministic signatures
that have provable cryptographic security, our implementation uses Full
Domain Hash3 with a large modulus [20, 36].'
Note that an adversary cannot cancel a victim's stamp before the vic-
tim has actually created it: the stamp contains a signature, so guessing
HASH(STAMP) requires either finding a collision in HASH or forging a sig-
nature.
We now return to the requirements in §4.2.1. First, we discussed
the separation of allocation and enforcement in §4.3.1. Second, false
positives are impossible: because HASH is one-way, a reply of the
fingerprint-HASH(STAMP)-in response to a TEST of the postmark-
HASH(HASH(STAMP))--proves that the enforcer has seen the (postmark,
fingerprint) pair. Thus, the enforcer cannot falsely cause an email with a
novel stamp to be labeled spam. (The enforcer can, however, allow a reused
stamp to be labeled novel; see §4.4.) Third, receivers do not trust the en-
forcer: they demand proof of reuse (i.e., the fingerprint). Finally, the pro-
tocol upholds current email privacy semantics: the enforcer sees hashes of
stamps and not stamps themselves, so it cannot infer who sent the message
corresponding to a given stamp. More details about this protocol's privacy
properties are in [131].
20ur implementation uses SHA-1, which has recently been found to be weaker than previously
thought [171]. We don't believe this weakness significantly affects our system because DQE stamps
are valid for only two days, and, at least for the near future, any attack on SHA-1 is likely to require
more computing resources than can be marshaled in this time. Moreover, DQE can easily move to
another hash function.
3Public-key signature schemes often work as follows. They (a) hash the message to be signed, to-
gether with some randomness, thereby producing a non-deterministic digest and (b) apply the
"sign" operation to this digest. In Full Domain Hash, one does not use randomness but, as with
the other schemes, does take care that the hash function produces digests that are roughly uni-
formly distributed over the full domain of the signing function. Under a particular model of how
hash functions work (the random oracle model [19]), breaking this approach is at least as hard
(roughly) as breaking the underlying problem (e.g., RSA). The difference is that, with the random-
ness, breaking the signature scheme is a little "harder"' To compensate for this effect, we choose a
larger domain for the signing function.
4I am grateful to Shabsi Walfish for pointing me to these papers.
4.3.3 The Enforcer
The enforcer stores the postmarks and fingerprints of stamps canceled (i.e.,
SET) in the current and previous epochs. It comprises thousands of un-
trusted storage nodes (which we often call just "nodes"), with the list of
approved nodes published by a trusted authority. The nodes might come
either from a single organization that operates the enforcer for profit (per-
haps paid by organizations with an interest in spam control) or else from
multiple contributing organizations.
Clients, typically incoming email servers, interact with the enforcer by
calling its interface, TEST and SET. These two RPCs are implemented by
every storage node. For a given TEST or SET, the node receiving the client's
request is called the portal for that request. Clients discover a nearby portal
either via hard-coding or via DNS.
4.3.4 Remaining Vulnerabilities
As discussed in §4.3.2, attackers cannot forge stamps, cancel stamps that
they have not seen, or induce false positives. DQE's remaining vulnerabil-
ities are in two categories: unauthorized stamp use (i.e., theft) and stamp
re-use. Since the purpose of the enforcer is to prevent reuse, we address the
second category when describing the enforcer's design in §944. We discuss
the first category in the remainder of this section.
Spammers can steal stamps from (1) the bots that they control; and (2)
email servers along the path from the sending email client to the receiving
email client. We now address these two cases. The gist of our argument is
that the effect of such stealing is limited.
Stamp theft from "botted" computers. This theft can take three forms.
First, assume that the human user of a "botted" host stores his stamps on
the email server. Then, if the spammer intercepts the server's authentica-
tion of the user (e.g., by installing a key logger to discover a password), the
spammer can compromise the email account and send stamped spam from
there. However, the user's quota would be depleted, possibly alerting him
to the compromise of his account. Moreover, out-of-band contact between
the email provider and the customer could detect the theft, in analogy with
credit card companies contacting customers to verify anomalous activity.
Next, assume that the end-user stores her stamps directly on her com-
puter (which is "botted") and that her computer, rather than the email
server, performs the stamp checks. The second form of theft is the bot sim-
ply stealing the user's stamps directly from the computer. The third form
is stealing stamps from inbound email before the DQE client software can
cancel the stamps. In both of these cases, the human would again realize
that something was wrong, either because she faced a depleted quota or
found all of her legitimate email labeled spam. Moreover, we expect both
of these forms of theft to be very rare because most people will not man-
age their stamps; doing so requires administration (to integrate stamps with
the email client, etc.), which most users will prefer to delegate to the email
server.
Note, also, that even ifa spammer succeeds in stealing stamps from all of
the hosts in his botnet-using any of the three attacks just mentioned-such
theft is unlikely to increase spam much: a botnet with loo,ooo hosts and a
daily quota of 100 stamps per machine leads to io million extra spams, a
small fraction of the tens of billions of daily spams today. We discuss this
point in further depth when considering DQE's end-to-end effectiveness,
in §4.8.
Stamp theft from email servers and relays. This theft can take three
forms. First, the spammer can compromise a source email server, allowing
the spammer to steal stamps directly. Second, the spammer can compro-
mise a destination email server (in practice many email servers perform the
source and destination roles), allowing him to steal stamps from inbound
email. In both of these cases, the users of the compromised server would
realize that something was wrong. Third, the spammer can compromise
an intermediate relay between sender and receiver, allowing him to steal
stamps from email passing through the relay. To thwart this attack, senders
can encrypt emails (including the header that contains the stamp). We be-
lieve that these three forms of theft will not lead to much extra spam because
(a) no single email server or relay is likely to carry a significant fraction of
the world's email volume; and (b) email servers, being relatively hardened
and supervised machines, are unlikely to be compromised en masse.
4-4 DETAILED DESIGN OF THE ENFORCER
The enforcer, depicted in Figure 4.3, is a high-throughput storage ser-
vice that replicates immutable key-value pairs over a group of mutually
untrusting, infrequently changing nodes. It tolerates Byzantine faults in
these nodes. We assume a trusted bunker, an entity that communicates the
system membership to the enforcer nodes. The bunker assigns random
identifiers-whose purpose we describe below-to each node and infre-
CFIGURE 4.3-Enforcer design. A TEST induces multiple GETS; a SET induces one PUT.
Here, A is the portal. The ids (idA, idB, etc.) are in a circular identifier space; their values
are determined by the bunker.
quently (e.g., daily) distributes to each node an in-list, a digitally signed,
authoritative list of the members' identifiers and IP addresses.5
Given the required size of the system-thousands of nodes (94.6.5) -we
believe that the bunker is a reasonable assumption. If a single organization
operates the enforcer, the bunker can be simply the human who deploys
the machines. If the enforcer is federated, a small number of neutral people
can implement the bunker: managing a list of several thousand relatively
reliable machines that are donated by various organizations is a "human
scale" job. Moreover, because the enforcer is robust to failed nodes, adding
machines to the in-list requires only light vetting, and removing crashed
or compromised machines from the in-list can happen lazily (e.g., as the
result of background auditing by the bunker or by other nodes). Of course,
the bunker is a single point of vulnerability, but observe that humans, not
computers, execute most of its functions. Nevertheless, to guard against a
compromised bunker, nodes accept only limited daily changes to the in-list.
Clients' queries-e.g., TEST(HASH(HASH(Stamp)))-are interpreted by
the enforcer as queries on key-value pairs, i.e., as TEST(k) or SET(k, v),
where k = HASH(v). (Throughout, we use k and v to mean keys and values.)
Portals implement TEST and SET by invoking at other nodes a UDP-
based RPC interface, internal to the enforcer, of GET(k) and PUT(k, v). To
5 The bunker is a configuration server. We use the term bunker because it connotes an entity that can
do its work without being connected. For example, if the bunker were attacked, it could disseminate
the in-list by fax.
ensure that GET and PUT are invoked only by other nodes, the in-list can
include nodes' public keys, which nodes can use to establish pairwise shared
secrets for lightweight packet authentication (e.g., HMAC [88]).
The rest of this section describes the detailed design of the enforcer. We
first specify TEST and SET (§44.41) and show that even with crash failures
(i.e., down or unreachable nodes), the enforcer guarantees little stamp reuse
(§4.4.2). We then show how nodes achieve high throughput with an effi-
cient implementation of PUT and GET (04.4.3) and a way to avoid degrad-
ing under load (94.4-4). We then consider attacks on nodes (4.4-.5-§944.6)
and attacks by nodes, and we argue that a Byzantine failure reduces to a
crash failure in our context (§4.4-7). Our design decisions are driven by the
challenges in §4.2.2, but the mapping between them is not clean: multiple
challenges are relevant to each design decision, and vice versa.
4.4.1 TEST and SET
Each key k presented to a portal in TEST or SET has r assigned nodes that
could store it; these nodes are a "random" subset (determined by k) of en-
forcer nodes. We say below how to determine r. To implement TEST(k),
a portal invokes GET(k) at k's r assigned nodes in turn. The portal stops
when either a node replies with a v such that k = HASH(V), in which case
the portal returns v to its client, or else when it has tried all r nodes without
such a reply, in which case the portal returns "not found"' To implement
SET(k, v), the portal chooses one of the r assigned nodes uniformly at ran-
dom and invokes PUT(k, v) there. Pseudo-code for TEST and SET is shown
in Figure 4.4. The purpose of 1 PUT and r GETS-as opposed to the usual r
PUTS and 1 GET-iS to conserve storage.
A key's assigned nodes are determined by consistent hashing [841 in a
circular identifier space using r hash functions.6 The bunker-given identi-
fier mentioned above is a random choice from this space. To achieve near-
uniform per-node storage with high probability, each node actually has
multiple identifiers [149] deterministically derived from its bunker-given
one.
Churn
Churn generates no extra work for the system. To handle intra-day churn
(i.e., nodes going down and coming up between daily distributions of the
6This use of consistent hashing [84] is reminiscent of DHTs [12], but the enforcer and DHTs have
different structures and different goals; see §4.10.3.
procedure TEST(k)
V <- GET(k) //local check
if v - "not found" then return (v)
// r assigned nodes determined by in-list
nodes <- ASSIGNED_NODES(k)
for each n E nodes do {
v -- n.GET(k) // invoke RPC
H ifRPC times out, continue
if v • "not found" and k = HASH(v) then return (v)
}
// all nodes returned "not found" or timed out
return ("not found")
procedure SET(k, v)
PUT(k, v) // local store
nodes +- ASSIGNED_NODES(k)
n <- choose random n c nodes
n.PUT(k, v) // invoke RPC
FIGURE 4.4-Pseudo-code for TEST and SET in terms of GET and PUT.
in-list), portals do not track which nodes are up; instead they apply to each
PUT or GET request a timeout of several seconds with no retry, and inter-
pret a timed-out GET as simply a "not found". (A few seconds of latency is
not problematic for the portal's client-an incoming email server-because
sender-receiver latency in email is often seconds and sometimes minutes.)
Moreover, when a node fails, other nodes do not "take over" the failed node's
data: the invariant "every (k, v) pair must always exist at r locations" is not
needed for our application.
To handle inter-day churn (i.e., in-list changes), the assigned nodes for
most (k, v) pairs must not change; otherwise, queries on previously SET
stamps (e.g., "yesterday's" stamps) would fail. This requirement is satisfied
because the bunker makes only minor in-list changes from day-to-day and
because, from consistent hashing, these minor membership changes lead
to proportionately minor changes in the assigned nodes [84].
4.4.2 Fault-Tolerance Analysis
We now show how to set r to prevent significant stamp reuse. As mentioned
at the beginning of this chapter, we view everyone's attention as one aggre-
gate resource. For this reason, we need only bound total stamp reuse; it is
acceptable if some stamps are reused more than others or some recipients
get more spam than others.
We will assume that nodes, even subverted ones, do not abuse their por-
tal role; we revisit this assumption in §4.4.7.
Our analysis depends on a parameter p, the fraction of the n total ma-
chines that fail during a two-day period (recall that an epoch is a day and
that nodes store stamps' fingerprints for the current and previous epochs).
We do not require that failures are independent, only that p is a reasonably
small fraction (e.g., one-tenth or one-fifth). To avoid highly correlated fail-
ures (the most extreme of which is p = 1), we imagine each node choosing
one of several different software implementations. We believe that it is rea-
sonable to presume a few active implementations: an enforcer node's func-
tions, being only a few thousand lines of code (see §4.5), are not hard to
re-implement.
We don't distinguish the causes of failures-some machines may be sub-
verted, while others may simply crash. To keep the analysis simple, we also
do not characterize machines as reliable for some fraction of the time-
we simply count in p any machine that fails to operate perfectly over the
two-day period. Nodes that do operate perfectly (i.e., remain up and follow
the protocol) during this period are called good. We believe that carefully
chosen nodes can usually be good so that p = 0.1, for example, might be a
reasonably conservative estimate. Nevertheless, observe that this model is
very pessimistic: a node that is offline for a few minutes is no longer good,
yet such an outage would scarcely increase total spam.
We first consider each stamp's expected reuse and then show that, with
very near certainty, the actual total stamp reuse is close to the expected
total-regardless of which subset of np nodes fails.
Bounding Expected Reuse Per Stamp
We now give some intuition for why a stamp's expected reuse is small. For
a given stamp, reuse stops once the corresponding (k, v) pair is PUT on a
good node (at that point, future TESTS Will "find" (k, v)). If most enforcer
nodes are good, this event usually happens quickly, limiting the total reuse
per stamp. There is a possibility (with probability less than p'r) that none of
the r assigned nodes is good. In this case, an adversary can reuse the stamp
once at each of the n portals. (Infinite reuse is prevented by the "local PUT"
in the first line of SET in Figure 4.4.) However, these "lucky" stamps do not
worry us: recall that our goal is to keep small the total number of reuses
across all stamps. While such "lucky" stamps contribute to this total, they
do so in a limited way.
We now make the preceding intuition more precise:
Theorem 4.1 Under the assumptions above, the expected number of uses
of a stamp is less than 1/(1 - p)2 + prn.
Proof: Observe that each apparently fresh use of a stamp induces a PUT to
an assigned node (because of the receiver-enforcer protocol; see lines 4 and
5 in Figure 4.2). And, as mentioned above, once the stamp is PUT to a good
assigned node, the adversary can no longer reuse that stamp successfully.
Since PUTr are random, some will be to a node that has already received a
PUT for the stamp (in which case the node is bad), while others are to "new"
nodes. Each time a PUT happens on a new node, there is a 1 -p chance that
the node is good.
Now, consider a single stamp. We make a worst-case assumption that
an adversary tries to reuse this stamp an infinite number of times.
Let Ii be an indicator random variable for the event that the stamp needs
to be PUT to at least i - 1 distinct nodes before hitting a good one, and let
Ti be the number of PUT, after i - 1 distinct nodes have been tried, needed
to get to the ith distinct node. As a special case, let Tr+1 = n - E-' 1r Ti to
reflect the fact that if all r assigned nodes are bad, an adversary can reuse
the stamp once at each portal. E[Ii] = Pr[Ii = 1] < pi-'. (The inequality
enters because p is the fraction of bad nodes, so a key's choice of "bad" nodes
happens without replacement.) For i E {1,.. . ,r},IE[Ti] = r/(r - i + 1),
since each PUT attempt for the stamp has a (r - i + 1)/r chance of selecting
a new node. Finally, for i E {1,..., r + 1}, the random variables Ii and
Ti are independent. Then, assuming adversaries try to reuse each stamp ad
infinitum, the expected number of PUTs (i.e., uses of the stamp) is:
E[IIT 1 + I2T2  " + IrTr + Ir+ITr+i]
= E[II]E[TI] + E[I2]E[T2] + -. + E[Ir]E[Tr] + E[Ir+,]E[Tr+,]
r 2 r r r
< l + P r _- - + p 2. . . + rr-1 r-2 1- j=l r-j+1r-l2
r-1 r
= p '- +p n- r (4-1)
i=0 j=l -j+l
r--1
< E pr + prn. (4.2)
i=0
Applying the inequality r/(r - i) < i + 1 and taking the infinite sum, we
can bound (4.2):
< (i + l)pi prn= d pi + prn,
i=O dp i=O
giving the claimed upper bound of 1/(1 - p)2 + prn. I-
If we set r = 1 + log1 /P n and take p = 0.1, then, applying the theorem, a
stamp's expected number of uses is less than 1/(1 -p) 2 +p 1 + 3p = 1.3,
close to the ideal of one use per stamp.
Bounding Total Reuse
Having considered a given stamp's expected reuse, we now aim to show that
the actual total reuse stays close to the expected total reuse--regardless of
which subset of nodes fails. This result means that an adversary can "choose"
which np nodes fail, with little effect on the total stamp reuse. To establish
this result, we first state a theorem and then reflect on what the theorem
means in our context. We prove the theorem in Appendix D.
Theorem 4.2 Let K be the number of stamps that are active in a given day.
IfK > (6n 2 + 300n)/6 2, then, with probability at least 1 - e-'o0 , there is no
subset of size np whose failure leads to more than (1 + e) times the expected
total use across all stamps. -1
We anticipate n r 1500 (see §4.6.5). If we want e = 0.05 (i.e., 5% more use
than is given by the expectation), then how large must K be for the theorem
to hold? We need K > (6 - (1500)2 + 300 - 1500)/(0.05)2 = 5.6 billion
stamps. We are in fact designing for K to be in the hundreds of billions, so
the theorem holds for our scenario. Thus, we can be confident that there
does not exist an unfortunate subset, that is, one whose failure leads to 5%
more than the expected stamp reuse.
The above assumes that the network never loses RPCs (packet loss leads
to extra stamp uses). If packets are lost often enough to substantially affect
the enforcer's accuracy, then clients and portals can retry RPCs. Doing so
procedure GET(k)
b +- INDEX.LOOKUP(k)
if b == null then return ("not found")
a +- DISK.READ(b) //array a gets disk block b
if k V a then // scan all keys in a
return ("not found") // index gave false location
else return (v) // v next to k in array a
procedure PUT(k, v)
if HASH(V) • k then return ("invalid")
b - INDEX.LOOKUP(k)
if b == null then
b +- DISK.WRITE(k,v) // write is sequential
// b is disk block where write happened
INDEX.INSERT(k, b)
else // we think k is in block b
a - DISK.READ(b) //array a gets disk block b
if k V a then //false location: k not in block b
b' - DISK.WRITE(k, V)
INDEX.OVERFLOW.INSERT(k, b')
FIGURE 4.5-Pseudo-code for GET and PUT. A node switches between batches of writes
and reads; that asynchrony is not shown.
will lower the effective drop rate and make the false negatives from dropped
packets a negligible contribution to total spam. Our implementation does
not currently issue such retries.
4.4.3 Implementation of GET and PUT
In our early implementation, nodes stored their internal key-value maps in
memory, which let them give fast "found" and "not found" answers to GETS.
However, we realized that the total number of stamps that the enforcer must
store makes RAM scarce. Thus, nodes must store keys and values in a way
that conserves RAM yet, as much as possible, allows high PUT and GET
throughput. The rest of this section describes how they do so. In particular,
their key-value stores have the following properties, which we justify below:
Index
Hash Table Overflow Table
Hash Table Overflow Table20-byte key 24-bit offset
.24-bit offset /
Disk (k,v) (k2,V2) (k3,v3) (k0ol1v101)(k4,V4) ... (k1 oo,v1 00 ) ... (k200,V200)
FIGURE 4.6-In-RAM index mapping from k to log block that holds (k, v).
1. PUTS are fast;
2. After a crash, nodes can recover most previously canceled stamps;
3. Each key-value pair costs 5.5 bytes rather than 40 bytes of RAM;
4. "Not found" answers to GETS are almost always fast;
5. "Found" answers to GETS require a disk random access.
As in previous systems [93, 122, 134], nodes write incoming data-key-
value pairs here-to a disk log sequentially and keep an index that maps
keys to locations in the log. In our system, the index lives in memory and
maps keys to log blocks, each of which contains multiple key-value pairs.
Our index can return false locations: it occasionally "claims" that a given
key is on the disk even though the node has never stored the key.
When a node looks up a key k, the index returns either "not stored" or a
block b. In the latter case, the node reads b from the on-disk log and scans
the keys in b to see if k is indeed stored. Pseudo-code describing how GETS
and PUTS interact with the index is shown in Figure 4.5.
We now describe the structure of the index, depicted in Figure 4.6. The
index has two components. First is a modified open addressing hash table,
the entries of which are divided into an 8-bit checksum and a 24-bit pointer
to a block (of size, e.g., 4 Kbytes). A key k, like in standard open addressing
as described by Knuth, "determines a 'probe sequence' namely a sequence
of table positions that are to be inspected whenever k is inserted or looked
up" [86], with insertion happening in the first empty position. When inser-
tion happens, the node stores an 8-bit checksum of k as well as a pointer to
the block that holds k. (The checksum and probe sequence should be un-
predictable to an adversary.) A false location happens when a lookup on key
k finds an entry for which the top 8 bits are k's checksum while the bottom
bits point to a block that does not hold k. This case is handled by the index's
second component, an overflow table storing those (k, v) pairs for which k
wrongly appears to be in the hash table. INDEX.LOOKUP(), in Figure 4.5,
checks this table.
Analysis. Our analysis of the index focuses on the memory cost and the
lookup speed.
We use the standard assumption that hash functions map each key to
a random output, and in particular that the probe sequence for each key
is an independent random sequence. We also assume that the checksum is
an independent random value. Let a < 1 be the load factor (i.e., ratio of
non-empty entries to total entries) of the hash table. Let N be the number
of keys that a node will store. We pessimistically assume that all N keys are
already in the index.
We first calculate the probability that a key will be inserted in the over-
flow table. Consider a key, k, that the node is about to insert in the index.
Each position in the probe sequence is empty with probability 1 - a. If the
entry is not empty, then it has a matching checksum with probability 1/c,
where c is the number of distinct checksum values (256 in our case). Thus,
a probe has one of three possible outcomes: empty (with probability 1 - a),
matching checksum (with probability a/c) and non-matching checksum
(with probability a( 1- 1/c)). The node stops probing when one of the first
two cases applies. The probability of the second case (matching checksum,
which forces k into the overflow table), conditioned on the event that the
node stopped probing, is equal to the probability of the second case divided
by the probability of the first two cases, namely /c = ; Thus,1-a+a/c c+(1-c)a
under our pessimistic assumption, k has probability c+( of winding up
in the overflow table.
Then, if the node stores N keys, the expected number of keys in the
overflow table is at most cN,. Each entry in the overflow table takes up
32 bytes (20o bytes for the key, 4 bytes for the disk offset, and 8 bytes for
pointers to maintain the data structure; in our implementation, that data
structure is a red-black tree). Since the hash table has size N/a and since
each entry is exactly 4 bytes, the expected total size of the structure in bytes
is
N (4 32a
a C+
S c+-(1- c) a
Taking c = 256 and a < 1, the expression above is minimized at a* =
.85. At this value of a, the expression equals 5.54N. (We took c as a fixed
quantity because the 8-bit checksum was easy to implement. We could have
optimized further by minimizing the expression over values of c and a.)
We now calculate the expected number of lookups per key. Since each
entry is empty with probability 1 - a, a node expects to inspect 1/(1 - a)
entries before finding the desired key or discovering it is absent. For a =
0.85, 1/(1 - a) = 6.66.
We now return to the properties above. For property 1, PUTS are fast be-
cause the node, rather than interleaving reads and writes, does each in
batches, yielding sequential disk writes. Property 2 holds because on boot-
ing, a node scans its log to rebuild the index. For property 3: as calculated
above,'the total expected size of the structure is 5.54N bytes, meaning that
each of the N (k, v) pairs that the node stores costs 5.54 bytes. Property 4
holds because for negative GET(k) requests (i.e., k not found), nodes inspect
an average of 6.66 entries in the probe sequence (as calculated above), and
the rare false location incurs a disk random access. For affirmative GETS
(i.e., reused stamps), the node visits an average of 6.66 entries to look up
the block, b, that holds v; the node then does a disk random access to get b,
as property 5 states.
These disk accesses are one of the enforcer's principal bottlenecks, as
shown in §4.6.3. To ease this bottleneck, nodes cache recently retrieved
(k, v) pairs in RAM.
Nodes use the block device interface rather than the file system. With
the file system, the kernel would, on retrieving a (k, v) pair from disk, put
in its buffer cache the entire disk block holding (k, v). However, most of
that cached block would be a waste of space: nodes' disk reads exhibit no
reference locality.
4.4.4 Avoiding "Distributed Livelock"
The enforcer must not degrade under high load. Such load could be from
heavy legitimate use or from attackers' spurious requests (as in the next
section). In fact, our implementation's capacity, measured by total correct
TEST responses, did originally worsen under load. This section describes
our change to avoid this behavior. See §4.6.6 for experimental evidence of
the technique's effectiveness.
Observe that the packets causing nodes to do work are UDP RPC re-
quests or responses and that these packets separate into three classes. The
classes are: (1) TEST or SET requests from clients; (2) GET or PUT requests
from other enforcer nodes; and (3) GET or PUT responses. To achieve the
enforcer's throughput goal, which is to maximize the number of successful
PUTS and GETS, We have the individual nodes prioritize these packet classes.
The highest priority class is (3), the lowest (1).
When nodes did not prioritize and instead served these classes round-
robin, overload-defined as the CPU being unable to do the work induced
by all arriving packets-caused two problems. First, each packet class ex-
perienced drops, so many GETS and PUTS were unsuccessful since either
the request or the response was dropped. Second, the system admitted too
many TESTS and SETS, i.e., it overcommitted to clients. The combination
was distributed livelock: each node spent cycles on TESTS and SETS and
meanwhile dropped GET and PUT requests and responses from other nodes.
Prioritizing the three classes, in contrast to round-robin, improves
throughput and implements admission control: a node, in its role as portal,
commits to handling a TEST or SET only if it has no other pending work in
its role as node. We can view the work induced by a TEST or SET as a dis-
tributed pipeline; each stage is the arrival at any node of a packet related to
the request. In this view, a PUT response, for example, indicates that the en-
forcer as a whole has done most of the work for the underlying SET request;
dropping such a packet wastes work.
To implement the priorities, each of the three packet classes goes to its
own UDP destination port and thus its own queue (socket) on the node.
The node reads from the highest priority queue (socket) with data. If the
node cannot keep up with a packet class, the associated socket buffer fills,
and the kernel drops packets in that class.
An alternate way to avoid distributed livelock might be for a node to
maintain a set of windows, one for every other node, of outstanding RPCs.
With this approach, each node's incoming request queue would be bounded
by the window size times the number of nodes, and hence no node would
be overloaded. The reason that we rejected this approach is that we did not
know how to set the size of the window.
The general approach described in this section-which applies the prin-
ciple that, under load, one should drop from the beginning of a pipeline
to maximize throughput-could be useful for other distributed systems.
There is certainly much work addressing overload: see, e.g., SEDA [175,
176], LRP [44], and Defensive Programming [121] and their bibliographies;
these proposals use fine-grained resource allocation to protect servers from
overload. Other work (see, e.g., Neptune [141] and its bibliography) fo-
cuses on clusters of equivalent servers, with the goal of proper allocation
of requests to servers. All of this research concerns requests of single hosts,
unlike the simple priority scheme described here, which concerns logical
requests happening on several hosts.
Discussion. In reflecting on the technique just presented, we make two
points. First, we have discussed only how to maintain throughput in the
face of heavy load; we have said nothing about which requests and clients
are served. In particular, one could imagine that, under attack, the enforcer
keeps constant throughput but spends most of its resources on bad clients.
The next section describes our defense to this situation.
Our second point is that the technique, as described, is a heuristic. It
achieves a particular goal (maximizing the number of successful PUTS and
GETS), and that goal serves our purpose, which is to prevent the number
of correct TEST responses from decreasing under load. However, the real
goal should be to maximize the correct TEST responses under load-giving
such responses is the whole purpose of the enforcer. To achieve this other
goal, a different priority scheme is likely needed. In particular, it is not at
all clear that PUTS and GETS should have the same priority, that TESTS and
SETS should have the same priority, or that all GET responses should have
the same priority (e.g., perhaps responses from different "stages" of a given
TEST request should be prioritized differently). However, there are difficult
questions here because the priority scheme will in turn affect the ratio of
TESTS and SETS that are presented, and, also, adversaries might try tb game
the scheme to thwart the enforcer. We are leaving to future work the ques-
tion of what priority scheme is optimal.
4.4.5 Resource Exhaustion Attacks
Several years ago, a popular DNS-based block list (DNSBL) was forced of-
fline [69], and a few months later another such service was attacked [1591,
suggesting that effective anti-spam services with open interfaces are tar-
gets for denial-of-service (DOS) attacks. If successful, DQE would be a ma-
jor threat to spammers, so we must ensure that the enforcer resists attack.
We do not focus on packet floods, in which attackers exhaust the enforcer's
bandwidth with packets that are not well-formed requests. These attacks
can be handled with various commercial (e.g., upstream firewalls) and aca-
demic (see [io8] for a survey) solutions. We thus assume that enforcer
nodes see only well-formed RPC requests.
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The attack that we focus on in this section is a flood of spurious RPCs,
which we call a resource exhaustion attack. The aim is to waste nodes' re-
sources, specifically: disk random accesses on affirmative GETS, entries in
the RAM index (which is exhausted long before the disk fills) for PUTS,
and CPU cycles to process RPCs. This attack is difficult because one cannot
differentiate "good" from "bad": requests are TEST(k) and SET(HASH(V), V)
where k, v are any 2o-byte values. Absent further mechanism, handling this
attack requires the enforcer to be provisioned for the legitimate load plus
as many TESTS and SETS as the attacker can send.
Resource exhaustion attacks appear difficult. Indeed, they have all of the
vexing characteristics of the abstract problem in §1.1. Yet, resource exhaus-
tion attacks are a kind of application-level DDoS, so we can apply speak-up!
We said in 93.3 that speak-up works best under conditions cl and c2.
We now revisit those conditions in the context of attacks on the enforcer.
We begin with c2, which says that the enforcer should have ample band-
width.
Attacks on the enforcer could be far larger than the attacks on individ-
ual servers that we discussed in Chapter 3. Those attacks are conducted
by one or a small number of botnets. In contrast, the enforcer, if deployed,
would be a threat to spammers' livelihood and could very well cause them to
"join forces" and launch large aggregate attacks. If there are 20 million bots
worldwide (see §2.2), and each has an average bandwidth of loo Kbits/s (as
mentioned in §3.10.2 based on a study [143]), then the adversaries could
launch 2 Tbits/s of attack traffic. This amount is daunting, but the enforcer
already needs to comprise roughly a thousand nodes (see §4.6.5). If each
node has a bandwidth of 1 Gbit/s, then the enforcer would have an aggre-
gate bandwidth of at least 1 Tbit/s, which is in striking distance of the largest
possible attack. Observe that nodes need not have this bandwidth "year-
round"; they could acquire it temporarily, when needed. So condition c2
seems within reach.
Condition cl, on the other hand, might go unmet: the good clients of
the enforcer, the world's email servers, may not in aggregate have, or want to
spend, terabits of bandwidth. But this unmet condition does not necessarily
disqualify speak-up in this scenario. The reason is as follows. Recall that the
purpose of condition cl is to ensure that a server protected by speak-up
need not over-provision much, relative to the good demand, to give all of
its good clients service (see §3.4.1). However, in this scenario, the enforcer
plans on most of its work being caused by adversarial behavior-because
most email is spam. Moreover, as a result of this planning, we might be
able to dispense not only with cl but also with a bandwidth-proportional
allocation. We make these points more concrete below.
Defending the Enforcer with Options Inspired by Speak-up
We have claimed that speak-up can defend the enforcer. More accurately,
the enforcer can employ any of several defenses that are inspired by speak-
up. The choices are as follows, and we discuss them in turn:
1. Every node always charges a fixed bandwidth price for a TEST or a SET.
2. When overloaded, and only when overloaded, a node charges a fixed
bandwidth price for a TEST or a SET.
3. When overloaded, and only when overloaded, a node conducts band-
width auctions, i.e., it applies speak-up as described in Chapter 3.
Fixed bandwidth price. To explain why the first choice can defend against
resource exhaustion attacks, and to see why both cl and a bandwidth-
proportional allocation are dispensable, let us make an assumption-which
we revisit shortly-that attackers are sending as much spam as they can.
Specifically, let us assume that they are limited by bandwidth. As in Chap-
ter 3, this limit reflects either a constraint like access links or some threshold
above which the attacker fears detection by the human owner of a compro-
mised machine.
Observe that, independent of our assumption, the enforcer is indiffer-
ent between the attacker sending (1) a spurious TEST and (2) a single spam
message, thereby inducing a legitimate TEST (and, rarely, a SET); the re-
sources consumed by the enforcer are the same in both cases. Now, under
the assumption above, we can neutralize resource exhaustion attacks by ar-
ranging for a TEST or a SET to require the same amount of bandwidth as
sending a spam. Our reasoning is as follows. If attackers are "maxed out"
and if sending a TEST and a spam costs the same bandwidth, then attack-
ers cannot cause more TESTs and SETs than would be induced anyway by
current email volumes-for which the enforcer must already be provisioned.
Of course, despite our assumption above, today's attackers are unlikely
to be "maxed out" However, they have some bandwidth limit. If this limit
and current spam volumes are the same order of magnitude, then the ap-
proach described here means that the enforcer's required provisioning, rel-
ative to what is already required to handle the world's spam volume, is a
small constant factor.
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If, however, a more pessimistic case materializes-the most extreme
of which is our back-of-the-envelope calculation above of 2 Tbits/s of at-
tack traffic-then the enforcer needs more provisioning or else needs to
charge a price higher than the average number of bits in a spam. Con-
cretely, if we assume that the enforcer is 1500 nodes and that each node
has worst-case capacity 320-4 requests/s (see §4.6.5), then the aggregate
capacity is ,-2 million requests/s, so the average price per request needs
to be roughly (2 Tbits/s) / (2 million requests/s), which is approximately 1
Mbit, or 125 Kbytes, per request. If legitimate DQE clients cannot afford
this price, then the enforcer needs more provisioning, which would lower
the required price. For perspective, we now compare this fully pessimistic
case to the optimistic baseline under this variant of speak-up. That baseline,
as described above, is to set the price of a TEST equal to the average size of
a spam. Many spams are on the order of 1o Kbytes. Thus, the optimistic
price, roughly 1o Kbytes, is about 1o x better than the fully pessimistic sce-
nario, in terms of its effect on either the bandwidth cost to legitimate clients
(125 Kbytes, assuming the same provisioning) or on the required enforcer
over-provisioning.
In any case, all of this estimated over-provisioning is an upper bound:
the most damaging spurious request is a TEST that causes a disk access by
asking a node for an existing stamp fingerprint (§4.6.3), yet nodes cache
key-value pairs (94.4-3). If, for example, half of spurious TESTS generate
cache hits, the required provisioning halves.
Fixed bandwidth price only under overload. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that when the enforcer is not under attack, good clients and the
enforcer do not consume extra bandwidth. The disadvantage is that attack-
ers can induce more TESTS and SETS, compared to the previous approach.
The reason is as follows. Before a node is overloaded, TESTS and SETS at
that node are "cheap". Thus, attackers can (a) make TEST and SET requests
at each of the nodes, stopping just short of pushing them into overload and
(b) spend their remaining bandwidth budget on sending spam (here, the
attacker is "paying retail" for the TESTS and SETS induced by the spam).
The result of this strategy is that attackers get some TESTS and SETS "at a
discount", thereby allowing them to induce more than they could in the
previous approach.
This disadvantage is limited because attackers can only get this bargain
when consuming the spare capacity at each of the nodes. And the enforcer
can compensate for this effect with increased provisioning.
Full-blown speak-up. The advantage of full-blown speak-up is that it may
induce a much higher price, causing attackers to have even less impact. The
disadvantage is that this higher price costs more bandwidth for the legiti-
mate clients and the enforcer. Observe that charging less than this price still
restricts attackers (as we argued for the previous two approaches) though
gives them more than a bandwidth-proportional share. Yet, as mentioned
earlier in this section, we probably do not need to restrict attackers to a
bandwidth-proportional share because the enforcer is provisioned to give
bad clients-and the requests that they induce-a disproportionate share
anyway.
So far, we have not specified how enforcer nodes charge bandwidth. They
have several options, including asking for long requests or demanding many
copies of each request. In fact, the enforcer need not charge bandwidth: the
discussion above could apply to a currency of CPU or memory cycles.
We have not yet addressed hotspots. Recall that we are not discussing
link attacks in this section, so the type of hotspot that we now consider is
a portal overloaded by spurious RPCs. If any particular portal is attacked,
clients can use another one. Moreover, a bandwidth-limited attacker may
not want to overload a portal because doing so amounts to wasting work
that could be better spent issuing spurious TESTS and SETS to other por-
tals. And, this adversarial strategy of not wasting work is precisely what the
enforcer as a whole is already provisioned for, regardless of whether the
spurious requests are concentrated at individual portals.
Finally, we note that even if the enforcer is knocked offline temporarily,
the system can recover. During periods of enforcer outage, email servers
can fall back on other spam defenses in the whitelisting family (see §4.10.1,
page 128), perhaps queuing for later verification the emails that must go
through the DQE checks.
4.4.6 Widespread, Simultaneous Stamp Reuse
One might imagine an attack in which the adversary simultaneously sends
the same stamp to many recipients, in the hope of overloading the assigned
nodes or otherwise thwarting the enforcer. However, we believe (but have
not experimented to verify) that the enforcer will handle this attack prop-
erly. Consider a single portal that receives TEST(k), where k corresponds to
the stamp in question. If the TEST arrives before any client has submitted
SET(k, v), then the portal will return "not found". However, the window in
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which portals are "ignorant" of the stamp is small: any client that receives
"not found" will SET the (k, v) pair that corresponds to the stamp, at which
point all future calls of TEST(k) will "find" (k, v).
This scenario does not overload the assigned nodes, for two reasons.
First, the main bottleneck for an assigned node is disk random accesses
(see §4.6.3), yet only one disk access per assigned node is required because
the node will store the (k, v) pair in its RAM cache (04.4.3). Second, portals
cache in RAM the responses to TESTS and also perform "local PUTS" when
clients call SET (94-4.1). As a result, when a portal receives TEST(k) for a
"popular" k, the portal will likely not need to contact the assigned node in
the first place.
4.4.7 Adversarial Nodes
We now argue that for the protocol described in 94.4.1, a Byzantine failure
reduces to a crash failure. Nodes do not route requests for each other. A
node cannot lie in response to GET(k) because for a false v, HASH(V) would
not be k (so a node cannot make a fresh stamp look reused). A node's only
attack is to cause a stamp to be reused by ignoring PUT and GET requests,
but doing so is indistinguishable from a crash failure. Thus, the analysis
in §944.2, which applies to crash failures, captures the effect of adversarial
nodes. Of course, depending on the deployment (federated or monolithic),
one might have to assume a higher or lower p.
However, the analysis does not cover a node that abuses its portal role
and endlessly gives its clients false negative answers, letting much spam
through. Note, though, that if adversarial portals are rare, then a random
choice is unlikely to find an adversarial one. Furthermore, if a client re-
ceives much spam with apparently fresh stamps, it may become suspicious
and switch portals, or it can query multiple portals.
Another attack for an adversarial node is to execute spurious PUTS and
GETS at other nodes, exhausting their resources. In defense, nodes main-
tain "put quotas" and "get quotas" for each other, which relies on the fact
that the assignment of (k, v) pairs to nodes is balanced. Deciding how to
set and apply these quotas is future work. The challenge is that a node will
need to make instantaneous decisions yet will need to allocate fairly an ag-
gregate resource-its capacity (total number of disk accesses and total RAM
consumed) over the course of a day.
105
4.4.8 Limitations
The enforcer may be clustered, wide-area, or a combination of the two. Be-
cause our present concern is throughput, our implementation and evalu-
ation are geared only to the fully clustered case. We briefly consider the
wide-area case now. If the nodes are separated by low capacity links, dis-
tributed livelock avoidance (04.4-4) is not needed, but congestion control
is. Options include long-lived pairwise DCCP [87] connections or a scheme
like STP in Dhash++ [391.
4.5 IMPLEMENTATION
We describe our implementation of the enforcer nodes and DQE client
software; the latter runs at email senders and receivers, and handled the
inbound and outbound email of several users for over six months.
4.5.1 Enforcer Node Software
The enforcer is a 5000-line event-driven C++ program that exposes its in-
terfaces via XDR RPC over UDP. It uses libasync [lol] and its asynchronous
I/O daemon [93]. We modified libasync slightly to implement distributed
livelock avoidance (04.4-4). We have successfully tested the enforcer on
Linux 2.6 and FreeBSD 5.3. We play the bunker role ourselves by config-
uring the enforcer nodes with an in-list that specifies random identifiers.
We have not implemented per-portal quotas to defend against resource ex-
haustion by adversarial nodes (94.4-7), a speak-up-related defense against
resource exhaustion by adversarial clients (§4.4-5), HMAC for inter-portal
authentication (94-4), or rate-limiting of inbound PUTS (§4.6.3).
4.5.2 DQE Client Software
The DQE client software is two Python modules. The sender module is in-
voked by a sendmail hook; it creates a stamp (using a certificate signed by
a virtual quota allocator) and inserts it in a new header in the departing
message. The receiver module is invoked by procmail; it checks whether
the email has a stamp and, if so, executes a TEST RPC over XDR to a portal.
Depending on the results (no stamp, already canceled stamp, forged stamp,
etc.), the module adds a header to the email for processing by filter rules.
To reduce client-perceived latency, the module first delivers email to the
recipient and then, for fresh stamps, asynchronously executes the SET.
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The analysis (§4-4.2) accurately reflects how actual failures affect
observed stamp reuse. Even with 20% of the nodes faulty, the aver- §4.6.2
age number of reuses is under 1.5.
Microbenchmarks (§4.6.3) predict the enforcer's performance ex-
actly. The bottleneck is disk accesses. 94.6.4
The enforcer can handle 200 billion emails per day (a multiple of the
current email volume) with a few thousand PCs. More specifically,
the enforcer needs -5400 disks to handle this volume, provided §4.6.5
that the peak:average ratio is 1.
The scheme to avoid livelock (04.4-4) meets its goal of preventing
the rate of correct TEST responses from degrading under load. 94.6.6
TAB LE 4.1 -Summary of evaluation results.
4.6 EVALUATION OF THE ENFORCER
In this section, we evaluate the enforcer experimentally. We first investigate
how its observed fault-tolerance-in terms of the average number of stamp
reuses as a function of the number of faulty machines-matches the analysis
in §4.4.2. We next investigate the capacity of a single enforcer node, mea-
sure how this capacity scales with multiple nodes, and then estimate the
number of dedicated enforcer nodes needed to handle 200 billion emails
per day (our target volume; see §4.2.2). Finally, we evaluate the livelock
avoidance scheme from 44-4.4 Table 4.1 summarizes our results.
All of our experiments use the Emulab testbed [471]. In these experi-
ments, between one and 64 enforcer nodes are connected to a single LAN,
modeling a clustered network service with a high-speed access link.
4.6.1 Environment
Each enforcer node runs on a separate Emulab host. To simulate clients and
to test the enforcer under load, we run up to 25 instances of an open-loop
tester, U (again, one per Emulab host). All hosts run Linux FC4 (2.6 kernel)
and are Emulab's "PC 3000s", which have 3 GHz Xeon processors, 2 GBytes
of RAM, 1oo Mbits/s Ethernet interfaces, and 1o,ooo RPM SCSI disks.
Each U follows a Poisson process to generate TESTS and selects the por-
tal for each TEST uniformly at random. This process models various email
servers sending TESTS to various enforcer nodes. (As argued in [115], Pois-
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son processes appropriately model a collection of many random, unrelated
session arrivals in the Internet.) The proportion of reused TESTS (stamps7
previously SET by U) to fresh TESTS (stamps never SET by U) is configurable.
These two TEST types model an email server receiving a spam or non-spam
message, respectively. In response to a "not found" reply-which happens
either if the stamp is fresh or if the enforcer lost the reused stamp-U issues
a SET to the portal that it chose for the TEST.
Our reported experiments run for 12 or 30 minutes. Separately, we ran a
12-hour test to verify that the performance of the enforcer does not degrade
over time.
4.6.2 Fault-Tolerance
We investigate whether failures in the implemented system reflect the fault-
tolerance analysis. Recall that this analysis (in §4.4.2) upper bounds the
expected number of stamp uses in terms of the fraction of bad nodes, p.
The analysis also shows that the worst-case stamp reuse is very close to the
expectation. For this reason, we focus on the expectation in this section.
Recall that a node is considered bad if it is ever down while a given stamp
is relevant (two days). Below, we model "bad" with crash faults, only. We
do not model Byzantine faults explicitly because, as mentioned in §4.4.7, a
Byzantine fault has the same effect as a crash fault-causing a stamp to be
reused.
We run two experiments in which we vary the number of bad nodes.
These experiments measure how often the enforcer-because some of its
nodes have crashed-fails to "find" stamps it has already "heard" about.
In the first experiment, called crashed, the bad nodes are never up. In
the second, called churning, the bad nodes repeat a 90o-second cycle of 45
seconds of down time followed by 45 seconds of up time. Both experiments
run for 30 minutes. The Us issue TESTS and SETS to the up nodes, as de-
scribed in §4.6.1. Half of the TESTS are for fresh stamps, and the other half
are for a reuse group-843,750o reused stamps that are each queried 32 times
during the experiment. This group of TESTS models an adversary trying to
reuse a stamp. The Us count the number of "not found" replies for each
stamp in the reuse group; each such reply counts as a stamp use. We set
n = 40, and the number of bad nodes is between 6 and lo, so p varies
between 0.15 and 0.25. For the replication factor (94-4.1), we set r = 3.
7In this section, we often use "stamp" to refer to the key-value pair associated with the stamp.
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FIGURE 4.7-Effect of "bad" nodes on stamp reuse for two types of "bad" Observed uses
obey the upper bound from the analysis (see §4.4.2). The crashed case can be analyzed
exactly; the observations track this analysis closely.
The results are depicted in Figure 4.7. The two "observed" lines plot the
average number of times a stamp in the "reuse group" was used successfully.
These observations obey the model's least upper bound. This bound, from
equation (4-1) in 94.4.2, is 1+p+3p2 +p 3 [40 (1 - p) - (1 + 2 3)] and
is labeled "upper bound". (We take n = 40(1 -p) instead of n = 40 because,
as mentioned above, the Us issue TESTS and SETS only to the "up" nodes.)
The crashed experiment is amenable to an exact expectation calculation.
The resulting expression8 is depicted by the line labeled "crashed, analytic";
it matches the observations well.
4.6.3 Single-node Microbenchmarks
We now examine the performance of a single-node enforcer.
RAM. We begin by considering RAM and asking how it limits the num-
ber of PUTS. Each key-value pair consumes roughly 5.5 bytes of memory
in expectation (94.4-3), and each is stored for two days (94.3-3). Thus, with
one GByte of RAM, a node can store slightly fewer than 200 million key-
8The expression is as follows. Let m = 40(1 - p). The expression is (1 - p)3 (1) +
3p 2 (1 - p)a + 3p(1 - p) 2/3 + p 3m (_-(l)32) Ci i ( ), and 3 is
S1 (.a i(2 ± (m - i - 1)). See AppendiX, and for is
-i-( - m-i (2 + 
- 1)). See Appendix E..x for a derivation.E(=m --3l--'--'-- ) "3
lo09
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value pairs, which, over two days, is roughly 1,1oo PUTS per second. A node
can certainly accept a higher average rate over any given period but must
limit the total number of PUTS it accepts each day to loo million for every
GByte of RAM.
Disk. We next ask how the disk limits GETS. (The disk does not bottle-
neck PUTS because writes are sequential and because disk space is ample.)
Consider a key k requested at a node d. We call a GET slow if d stores k on
disk (if so, d has an entry for k in its index) and k is not in d's RAM cache
(see §4.4.3). We expect d's ability to respond to slow GETS to be limited by
disk random accesses. To verify this belief, an instance of U sends TESTS
and SETS at a high rate to a single-node enforcer, inducing local GETS and
PUTS. The node runs with its cache of key-value pairs disabled. The node re-
sponds to an average of 400 slow GETs per second (measured over 5-second
intervals, with standard deviation less than lo% of the mean).
To understand this performance, we benchmarked the disk as follows.
We wrote a utility that sits in a tight loop, doing random access disk reads
within a contiguous "blob"; the size of this blob is configurable. To get disk
parallelism, we run eight instances of the utility (which models the eight
async I/O daemons used by our implementation; see §4.5). We find that
when the size of the blob is small (e.g., 2 GBytes), a node can do 400 random
accesses per second, which matches the single-node local GET rate observed
above. But this number is quite high!9 The reason that the disk can do so
many accesses per second is that, with only 2 GBytes of data, the "blob" is a
narrow band on the disk, so the disk head (which is presumably following
an elevator scheduling algorithm) can read multiple key-value pairs per ro-
tation. Likewise, in the local GET experiment, U was not running for long,
so the universe of reused keys was small, so nodes were not doing random
accesses over a large chunk of the disk.
A more appropriate blob size for our purposes is 16 GBytes: this size
models a node with 2 GBytes of RAM storing 400 million key-value pairs
on a single disk. This blob size is pessimistic, first, because nodes could have
multiple disks, thereby storing fewer key-value pairs per disk. Second, 400
million key-value pairs is likely far beyond what a node needs to store: our
back-of-the-envelope in §4.6.5 finds 50 billion new key-value pairs per day.
Divided over looo nodes (an under-estimate), the per-node total is only
91 am grateful to Bill Bolosky for observing that 400 accesses per second is much larger than would
be expected, given a disk that spins at lo,ooo RPM, or -167 rotations per second.
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Operation Ops/sec Bottleneck
PUT 1,100 RAM
slow GET 320 disk
fast GET 38,000 CPU
TABLE 4.2-Single-node performance, assuming 1 GByte of RAM.
loo million key-value pairs in storage (because nodes store key-value pairs
from two days). In any case, when the blob size is 16 GBytes, the bench-
mark is limited to 320 random accesses per second. We will use this more
pessimistic disk capacity when estimating the required size of the enforcer
later in this section.
CPU. We next consider fast GETS, which are GETS on keys k for which
the node has k cached or is not storing k. In either case, the node can reply
quickly. For this type of GET, we expect the bottleneck to be the CPU. To
test this hypothesis, U again sends many TESTS and SETS. Indeed, CPU us-
age reaches o00% (again, measured over 5-second intervals with standard
deviation less than lo0% of the mean), after which the node can handle no
more than 38,000 RPCs. A profile of our implementation indicates that the
specific CPU bottleneck is malloc ().
Table 4.2 summarizes the above findings.
4.6.4 Capacity of the Enforcer
We now measure the capacity of multiple-node enforcers and seek to ex-
plain the results using the microbenchmarks just given. We define capac-
ity as the maximum rate at which the system can respond correctly to the
reused requests. Knowing the capacity as a function of the number of nodes
will help us, in the next section, answer the dual question: how many nodes
the enforcer must comprise to handle a given volume of email (assuming
each email generates a TEST).
The measured capacity will depend on the workload. Specifically, which
resource is the bottleneck-RAM or disk-depends on the ratio of fresh
to reused TESTS. The reason is that fresh TESTS consume RAM (the SETS
that follow these TESTS induce PUTS) while reused TESTS may incur a disk
random access.
Note that the resources consumed by a TEST are different in the multiple-
node case. A TEST now generates r (or r- 1, if the portal is an assigned node)
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GET RPCs, each of which consumes CPU cycles at the sender and receiver.
A reused TEST still incurs only one disk access in the entire enforcer (since a
portal issues GETS sequentially and stops once a node replies affirmatively).
The resources consumed by a SET are also different in the multiple-node
case: a SET now induces two PUTS (one remote and one local).
32-node experiments. We first determine the capacity of a 32-node en-
forcer. To emulate the per-node load of a several thousand-node deploy-
ment, we set r = 5. We set r to this value because, from §4.4.2, r = 1 +
logl /p n; we take p = 0.1 and n to be several thousand, which is the upper
bound in §4.6.5. Note that this reasoning is not circular: the upper bound
on n is not determined by r but rather by disk or RAM capacity.
We run two groups of experiments in which 20 instances of U send
half fresh and half reused TESTS at various rates to this enforcer. In the first
group, called disk, the nodes' LRU caches are disabled, forcing a disk ran-
dom access for every affirmative GET (§044-3). In the second group, called
CPU, we enable the LRU caches and set them large enough that stamps
will be stored in the cache for the duration of the experiment. The first
group of experiments is fully pessimistic and models a disk-bound work-
load whereas the second is (unrealistically) optimistic and models a work-
load in which RPC processing is the bottleneck. We ignore the RAM bot-
tleneck in these experiments but consider it at the end of the section.
Each node reports how many reused TESTS it served over the last 5
seconds (if too many arrive, the node's kernel silently drops). Each exper-
iment run happens at a different TEST rate. For each run, we produce a
value by averaging together all of the nodes' 5-second reports. Figure 4.8
graphs the positive response rate as a function of the TEST rate. The left
and right y-axes show, respectively, a per-node per-second mean and a per-
second mean over all nodes; the x-axis is the aggregate sent TEST rate. (The
standard deviations are less than 9% of the means.) The graph shows that
maximum per-node capacity is 400 reused TESTS/sec when the disk is the
bottleneck and 1,875 reused TESTs/sec when RPC processing is the bottle-
neck; these correspond to 800 and 3,750 total TESTs/sec (recall that half of
the sent TESTS are reused).
The microbenchmarks explain these numbers. The per-node disk ca-
pacity is exactly what we observed in the single-node case (in both the ex-
periment just done and the single-node experiment, the "blob" size is not
large, so the per-node capacity is high, relative to what one would expect
from a lo,ooo RPM disk). We now connect the per-node TEST-processing
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FIGURE 4.8-For a 32-node enforcer, mean response rate to TEST requests as function of
sent TEST rate for disk- and CPU-bound workloads. The two y-axes show the response
rate in different units: (1) per-node and (2) over the enforcer in aggregate. Here, r = 5,
and each reported sample's standard deviation is less than 9% of its mean.
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FIGURE 4.9-Enforcer capacity under two workloads as a function of number of nodes
in the enforcer. The y-axis is the same as the right-hand y-axis in Figure 4.8. Standard
deviations are smaller than 10% of the reported means.
rate (3,750 per second) to the RPC-processing microbenchmark (38,ooo
per second). Recall that a TEST generates multiple GET requests and multi-
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ple GET responses (how many depends on whether the TEST is fresh). Also,
if the stamp was fresh, a TEST induces a SET request, a PUT request, and
a PUT response. Taking all of these "requests" together (and counting re-
sponses as "requests" because each response also causes the node to do
work), the average TEST generates 9.95 "requests" in this experiment, as
shown in Appendix E.2. Thus, 3,750 TEST requests per node per second
is 37,312 "requests" per node per second, which is within 2% of the mi-
crobenchmark from §4.6.3 (last row of Table 4.2).
One might notice that the CPU line in Figure 4.8 degrades after 1,875
positive responses per second per node (the enforcer's RPC-processing ca-
pacity). The reason is as follows. Giving the enforcer more TESTS and SETS
than it can handle causes it to drop some. Dropped SETS cause some future
reused TESTS to be seen as fresh by the enforcer-but fresh TESTS induce r
or r - 1 GETS while reused TESTS induce roughly (r + 1)/2 GETS On aver-
age since a portal stops querying when it gets a positive response. Thus, the
degradation happens because extra RPCs from fresh-looking TESTS con-
sume capacity. This degradation is not ideal, but it does not continue indef-
initely.
Scaling. We now measure the enforcer's capacity as a function of the num-
ber of nodes, hypothesizing near-linear scaling. We run the same experi-
ments as for 32 nodes but with enforcers of 8, 16, and 64 nodes. Figure 4.9
plots the maximum point from each experiment. (The standard deviations
are smaller than 1o% of the means.) The results confirm our hypothesis
across this (limited) range of system sizes: an additional node at the margin
lets the enforcer handle, depending on the workload, an additional 400 or
1,875 TESTS/Sec-the per-node averages for the 32-node experiment.
We now view the enforcer's scaling properties in terms of its request
mix. Assume pessimistically that all reused TEST requests cost a disk ran-
dom access. Then, doubling the rate of spam (reused TEST requests) will
double the required enforcer size.
Doubling the rate of non-spam, however, (i.e., fresh TEST requests) will
only affect the required enforcer size if there is enough non-spam so that
the enforcer's resource bottleneck is RAM. To be concrete, assume that
each node in the enforcer has 1 GByte of RAM and receives 2oo reused
TESTs/second and 550 fresh TESTs/second. Then, the enforcer is correctly
provisioned, but RAM is the resource that is driving the provisioning. For
in this case, each node processes an average of 550 SETs/second (recall
that each fresh TEST iS followed by a SET) and 1,100 PUTS/second (recall
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200 billion emails daily (target from §4.2.2)
x 75% spam [1o6, 107, 150]
150 billion disk random accesses / day (pessimistic)
320 disk random accesses / second / disk (§4.6.3)
86400 seconds / day
5425 disks needed
4 disks / node (as one possibility)
1356 nodes needed
TABLE 4.3 -Estimate of enforcer size (based on average rates), and assuming each node
has 4 disks.
that each SET induces a remote PUT and a local one), which is the single-
node performance limit (see Table 4.2). More generally, RAM becomes a
bottleneck-and the rate of non-spam drives the required enforcer size-
when the ratio of fresh TESTS to reused TESTS is greater than or equal to the
ratio of a single node's performance limits, namely 550 fresh TESTS/sec for
every GByte of RAM to 320 reused TESTs/sec for every disk. (We assume
320, rather than 400, disk random accesses per node per second, because
320 better models a node that is under load; see §4.6.3.)
4.6.5 Estimating the Enforcer Size
We now give a rough estimate of the number of dedicated enforcer nodes
required to handle current email volumes. We will assume that putting four
disks in a node (a) is a reasonable thing to do; and (b) quadruples the node's
capacity to handle disk random accesses. We believe that (a) is true based
on server configurations and the cost of disks. We did not experiment to
verify (b).
The calculation is summarized in Table 4.3. Our target is 200 billion
messages daily. Current estimates suggest that the percentage of all email
that is spam is roughly 75% [io6, 107, 150o].1 We make the worst-case as-
sumption that every reused TEST-each of which models a spam message-
causes the enforcer to do a disk random access.
With this assumption and at this spam rate, the scaling bottleneck is
disk capacity, not RAM. To show why, we follow the discussion at the end
of the last section. For RAM to be the bottleneck, the node must have fewer
10The estimates vary somewhat. Some of them are as high as 90o% (and in other months, the estimates
have been as low as 60%).
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than x GBytes of RAM, where x satisfies the following inequality: 1/3 >
550x/(320 -4). (This inequality says that the ratio 25% fresh to 75% reused
TEST requests is greater than the ratio of a single node's RAM bottleneck to
its random access disk capacity.) This inequality holds for x < 0.78. Most
modern machines have much more RAM than 0.78 GBytes, so we conclude
that disk, not RAM, is the scaling bottleneck (even with 4 disks per node).
The enforcer must do 150 billion disk random accesses per day and,
since the required enforcer size scales linearly with the number of required
disk accesses (§4.6.4), a straightforward calculation gives the required num-
ber of machines. For the disks in our experiments, the number is about
1,300 machines.
So far we have considered only average request rates. We must ask how
many machines the enforcer needs to handle peak email loads while bound-
ing reply latency. To answer this question, we would need to determine the
peak-to-average ratio of email reception rates at email servers (their work-
load induces the enforcer's workload). As one data point, we analyzed the
logs of our research group's email server, dividing a five-week period in early
2oo6 into o0-minute windows. The maximum window saw 4 times the vol-
ume of the average window. Separately, we verified with a 14-hour test that
a 32-node enforcer can handle a workload of like burstiness with worst-case
latency of io minutes. Thus, if global email is this bursty, the enforcer would
need 5,400 machines (the peak-to-average ratio times the 1,300 machines
derived above) to give the same worst-case latency.
However, global email traffic is likely far smoother than one server's
workload. And spam traffic may be smoother still: the spam in Jung et al.'s
2004 data [81] exhibits-over ten minute windows, as above-a peak-to-
average ratio of 1.9:1. Also, Gomes et al. [62] claim that spam is less variable
than legitimate email. Thus, many fewer than 5,400 machines may be re-
quired. On the other hand, the enforcer may need some over-provisioning
for spurious TESTS (§944-5). For now, we conclude that the enforcer needs
"a few thousand" machines and leave to future work a study of email bursti-
ness and attacker ability.
4.6.6 Avoiding "Distributed Livelock"
We now briefly evaluate the scheme to avoid livelock (from §4.4.4). The goal
of the scheme is to prevent the rate of correct TEST responses from degrad-
ing under high load. To verify that the scheme meets this goal, we run the
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following experiment: 20 U instances send TEST requests (half fresh, half
reused) at high rates, first, to a 32-node enforcer with the scheme and then,
for comparison, to an otherwise identical enforcer without the scheme.
Here, r = 5 and the nodes' caches are enabled. Also, each stamp is used
no more than twice; TESTS thus generate multiple GETS, some of which
are dropped by the enforcer without the scheme. Figure 4.10 graphs the
positive responses as a function of the TEST rate. At high TEST rates, an
enforcer with the scheme gives twice as many positive responses-that is,
blocks more than twice as much spam-as an enforcer without the scheme.
4.6.7 Limitations
Although we have tested the enforcer under heavy load to verify that it does
not degrade, we have not tested a flash crowd in which a single popular
stamp s is TESTed at all (several thousand) of the enforcer nodes. However,
as discussed in §944.6, we do not believe that this case will be problematic.
We have also not addressed heterogeneity. For static heterogeneity, i.e.,
nodes that have unequal resources (e.g., CPU, RAM), the bunker can adjust
the load-balanced assignment of keys to values. Dynamic heterogeneity, i.e.,
when certain nodes are busy, will be handled by the enforcer's robustness
to unresponsive nodes and by the application's insensitivity to latency.
4.7 QUOTA ALLOCATION
Recall that our top-level objective is to allocate human attention to senders
in rough proportion to their numbers, meaning that no sender should be
able to claim an outsized portion of aggregate human attention. To achieve
this goal, we need to make validly stamped spam--i.e., the spam that reaches
inboxes and claims human attention-a small fraction of all email. In this
section, we consider how to do so. We begin with a basic analysis of what is
required to limit spammers, then discuss the effect on legitimate senders,
and finally address some policy questions briefly.
Limiting spammers. Stamps can only limit spammers if a stamp costs a
scarce resource. For simplicity, we view stamps as costing money and do not
discuss how to translate currencies like CPU [1], identity [13], or human
attention [166] into money. We now ask what per-stamp monetary price
would be required.
Assume that the spam industry has profit function p(m), which it cur-
rently maximizes by sending m = m* emails. If DQE is deployed and in-
duces a stamp cost of c per email, then setting c > p(m*)/m' will make it
uneconomical for the industry to send more than m' emails, because for
m > m', the added costs m -p(m*) / m' will exceed the entire possible profit
p(m*). Thus, to reduce spam by a factorf > 1, i.e., to make m' = m*/f, it
suffices to set c = m/) = f p(m*)/m*. That is, to reduce spam by a factor
f > 1, a sufficient price per message isf times the profit-per-message."
Although we will use this estimate of c below, the above analysis is very
pessimistic. Roughly speaking, the analysis assumes that p(m) attains the
maximum, p(m*), for many m < m*. This assumption implies an improb-
able shape for the function p(m) and is likely false. For consider a variety
of scams, each with a different profit-per-message when sent in the optimal
amount. If, as we expect, most scams yield low profit, and few yield high
profit, then setting a price c will prevent all scams with rate-of-return less
than c. For example, if each scam sends the same amount, and if the number
of scams returning more than a given amount q exponentially decays with
q, then additive price increases in stamps result in multiplicative decreases
in spam.
1I am grateful to James Grimmelmann for this paragraph. After observing that the previous version
of this paragraph, in [168], was not fully explicit, he suggested the current wording, nearly verbatim
(March, 2007).
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We now give a rough estimate for c. First, consider spammers' profit per
message. Goodman and Rounthwaite [65] survey media reports and find a
wide range of purported values for spammers' revenues. The most conser-
vative (i.e., the highest) per-message revenue that they survey is $300 for
sending a million messages (.03 cents per message). Assuming (pessimisti-
cally) that this report applies to all spammers and that spammers have no
costs, then reducing spam by a factorf > 1 requires a cost of.03f cents per
message. But what value off is appropriate? As mentioned earlier, a rough
estimate of current spam rates is 75% of all email [10o6, 107, 150]. To make
spam 5% of the email that people receive, f needs to be approximately 50.
(f needs to satisfy 75/f = 0.05.) Thus, based on these pessimistic es-
timates, the per-email cost to spammers should be roughly 1.5 cents per
message.
The analysis above holds even if DQE causes spammers to change tac-
tics drastically (e.g., they might now create more appealing spams). The
analysis assumes only that spammers are profit-maximizing and therefore
incorporates all possible spammer strategies. (If creating more appealing
spams actually resulted in more than 1/f as much spam, then this new
strategy must be more profitable than their old one, contradicting our as-
sumption that spammers are currently optimizing.)
Effect on legitimate senders. Although Laurie and Clayton [92] argue, in
the context of computational puzzles, that no price exists that affects spam-
mers while leaving legitimate users mostly unaffected, their analysis does
not take into account "refunds" of computational work [1]. In our context,
such "refunds" correspond to a social protocol in which receivers do not
demand stamps from known senders. With such a social protocol, senders
would need very few stamps (most people do not send large quantities of
unsolicited email to strangers; doing so is the definition of spamming!)
If a legitimate sender directs one out of every loo emails to a stranger
and emails loo recipients per day, then legitimate senders would have to
pay on average 1.5 cents per day. This price is $5.50 per year per sender. Of
course, we cannot prove that this rough estimate of cost would be negligi-
ble for legitimate senders, but perhaps the bundled allocation policy briefly
mentioned below will be helpful.
Policy questions. One policy question is how to translate per-email prices
into quotas, which are allocated in blocks. If the quotas have much "head-
room" to account for days of heavy sending, then (1) quotas might be more
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expensive than is necessary for legitimate senders (in effect, they will have
to pay for more than they actually send); and (2) if adversaries compromise
machines (see §4.8), they will be able to send more emails than the hu-
man owner of the machine would normally send, leading to extra emails.
One possible answer is simply to plan for little headroom in users' quotas,
say because quotas are actually allocated to organizations, not individuals,
and organizations might send similar rates of email each day, even if their
constituent senders are bursty. Another option is for the quota allocator to
"bump up" a sender's quota temporarily by selling a quota that expires in
the near future.
A more difficult policy question is: how can quota allocation give the
poor fair sending rights without allowing spammers to send? We are not
experts in this area and just mention one possibility. Perhaps a combination
of explicit allocation in poor areas of the world, bundled quotas elsewhere
(e.g., with an email account comes free stamps), and pricing for additional
usage could impose the required price while making only heavy users pay.
4.8 SYNTHESIS: END-TO-END EFFECTIVENESS
To complete the argument that we previewed at the beginning of the chap-
ter, we now consider DQE's end-to-end effectiveness, taking into account
the combined effect of allocation, enforcement, and cheating. We aim to
show that, under DQE, the spam that consumes human attention is, com-
pared to all email that consumes human attention, a manageable fraction.
To do so, we simply tally how much spammers can send.
First, as described in the previous section, the quota allocator should
arrange for stamps to limit spammers to 5% of the total email volume. Sec-
ond, spammers can steal stamps. As mentioned in §4.3.4, this effect is likely
to be limited and is manageable via out-of-band communication between
email providers and senders. However, even if we put aside these points
and give the adversary tremendous power, stamp theft still has only a lim-
ited effect. Our reasoning is as follows. Assume pessimistically that spam-
mers steal stamps from every bot. There are roughly 1 billion computers in
the world [34], and a high estimate of the total number of bots is 20 mil-
lion (see §2.2), or 2% of the world's computers. If we make an even more
pessimistic assumption that spammers can steal all of the quota from 5% of
the hosts on the Internet, they can still send only roughly 10o% of the world's
email. (We are assuming little headroom in quotas.)
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The third and last contribution to the tally is cheating via stamp reuse.
As we have argued, this cheating is limited (see §4.4.2 and §4.6.2). For ex-
ample, if 15% of the nodes in the enforcer are bad, then each stamp can be
used 1.3 times in expectation. And, as mentioned in §944.2 (page 94), the
actual total use is almost certainly no more than 5% of the expected total,
so we can bound the uses per stamp by 1.3 - 1.05 = 1.37. Thus, if spam-
mers reuse all of the stamps to which they have access, then their 10o% (5%
legitimately allocated, 5% stolen) becomes 13.7/(13.7 + 90) = 13.2% of all
email. This fraction is still manageable.
4.9 ADOPTION & USAGE
In this section, we briefly discuss pragmatic concerns, including how DQE
could gain adoption, how quota allocators could be established, and how
DQE could be integrated with existing systems.
Adoption. We now speculate about paths to adoption. First, large email
providers have an interest in reducing spam. A group of them could agree
on a stamp format, allocate quotas to their users, and run the enforcer co-
operatively. If each provider ran its own, separate enforcer, our design still
applies: each enforcer must cope with a large universe of stamps.
Two other possibilities are organization-by-organization adoption and
individual-by-individual adoption. In the former case, the incremental ben-
efit is as follows. Currently, many organizations whitelist email from their
organization (e.g., someone at MIT might accept all email with source ad-
dress matching the pattern *. mit. edu). However, spammers take advan-
tage of such whitelists by spoofing the source email address to match the re-
cipient's domain. With DQE deployed in an organization, recipients would
expect email from within their organization to be stamped, eliminating the
need for these whitelists.'2
In the latter case-individual-by-individual adoption-the incremental
benefit is that stamping one's email and sending to another DQE-enabled
user ensures that one's email will not be caught in a spam filter. In both of
these cases, the deployment challenge is agreeing on a quota allocator and
establishing an enforcer. The local changes (to email servers; email clients
need not change) are less daunting.
12DQE does not uniquely bring this benefit, but our purpose here is only to show a benefit to incre-
mental adoption.
Quota allocators. The DQE architecture relies on globally trusted alloca-
tors (94-3.1), which raises some questions, including:
- Where do quota allocators come from? Who performs the function?
- How can we fulfill the requirement that quota allocators are globally
trusted?
- How can we make sure that the quota allocators "do the right thing"
(i.e., charge the right prices, do not cheat, do not become hacked)?
We do not have definitive answers but suggest possibilities. For each of
the possibilities, we answer the questions above.
The first alternative is that a consortium of email providers establishes
a non-profit allocator, with a charter that would legally bind the allocator
to "do the right thing" (charging an appropriate quantity for stamps but not
profiteering). The trust in this organization would derive from the fact of
its legal charter and observers' belief that the organization was adhering to
its charter.
A second alternative is that an organization like ICANN or Verisign op-
erates the allocator (in ICANN's case, the allocator could be a non-profit).
Although ICANN and Verisign are favorite targets of disapproval, the fact is
that these organizations are implicitly trusted by almost all Internet users.
As in the above case, the protection against the allocator cheating would be
public scrutiny, mainly.
Another possibility is for each country to establish a quota allocator.
Because some nations' allocators might "cheat" (by assigning huge quotas)
recipients would need to apply reputation mechanisms to the set of alloca-
tors. Quota allocators would gradually lose trust if recipients received high
volumes of spam with valid stamps from that allocator. Such a reputation
scheme would reduce the general "detection" or "reputation" problem of
"How can any given recipient trust any given sender?" to the problem of
deciding which of a set of 200 allocators is trustworthy. This reduced prob-
lem seems tractable.
A final possibility is a competitive market in which anyone could estab-
lish an allocator. In such a market, allocators might have an incentive to
cheat somewhat (e.g., charging "too much" for stamps). However, reputa-
tion systems are needed here anyway (as in the case above), and we hypoth-
esize that these mechanisms could limit such abuse.
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Usage. The amount of stamped spam will be tolerable, as we have argued.
Thus, following the "no false positives" goal, stamped email should always
be passed to the human user. For unstamped email: before DQE is widely
deployed, this email should go through content filters (again risking false
positives), and under widespread DQE deployment, this email can be con-
sidered spam. We expect that DQE will incorporate whitelists, where peo-
ple agree not to cancel stamps from people they know (indeed, our rough
analysis of the cost to good clients depends on such whitelists; see §4.7).
With whitelists, senders should still stamp their emails to prevent spoofing,
but these stamps should not "count" against the sender's quota. (This social
protocol is similar to the refunds that are proposed by [1].) In §4.10.1, we
further discuss how one may combine DQE with other defenses.
Mailing lists. For moderated lists, senders can spend a single stamp, and
the list owner can then either sign the message or spend stamps for each
receiver. Unmoderated, open mailing lists are problematic: spammers can
multiply their effect while spending only one stamp. Partially-moderated
lists might become more common under DQE. Here, messages from new
contributors would be moderated (requiring only a glance to determine
if the email is spam), and messages from known valid senders-based on
past contributions and identified by the public key in the stamp-would be
automatically sent to the list, again using either the list owner's public key
or stamps for each recipient. In such lists, the moderation needed would
be little (it would be proportional to the number of messages from new
contributors), so more lists could convert to this form.
4.10 RELATED WORK
We first survey work on spam control to justify both our choice of quota-
based spam control (or bankable postage) in general and the architecture of
DQE in particular; we also say how DQE can be combined with other de-
fenses. We then describe how DQE's architecture relates to micropayments
(which share a similar purpose) and finally compare the enforcer to related
distributed systems.
4.10.1 Spam Control
In this section, we cover only technical solutions, not legal ones. For surveys
that include both kinds of solutions, see [68, 1571].
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We take as a starting point that labeling valid email as spam is unac-
ceptable. To some extent, this stance is a matter of taste.
Filtering. The dominant defense to spam today is spam filters (e.g., [66,
144]), which analyze incoming email to classify it as spam or legitimate.
A variant is collaborative filtering, in which the filtering logic has access to
many users' email, allowing it to detect mass mailings. These tools certainly
offer inboxes relief, but their decisions are error-prone and sometimes cause
valid email to be labeled spam, as discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, we
believe that spammers have the motive and ability to fool filters reliably,
thereby making filters ineffective in the long run-regardless of one's tol-
erance for errors. Given this weakness, many have proposed solutions that
do not examine message content; we discuss some of them now.
Heuristics that do not examine message content. Blacklists (e.g., [158])
are collections of IP addresses that are suspected of originating spam. (The
intent is that filters would consult these lists in deciding how to classify a
message.) However, such lists are also prone to error. First, spammers can
often acquire new IP addresses, as our threat model presumes (see Chap-
ter 2 and §4.1). Second, blacklists routinely include innocent hosts. This
"impugning" happens for various reasons, including blacklisting of an en-
tire netblock, dynamic assignment of an IP address to a bot and subsequent
reassignment to an innocent host, and a NAT situation in which an inno-
cent host and a bot appear to have the same IP address.
Whitelisting, in contrast, explicitly seeks reliability. For example, the re-
cently proposed (and brilliantly named) Re: [59] uses friend-of-friend rela-
tionships to let correspondents whitelist each other automatically, at which
point all email that they send to each other will be delivered to the receiving
human. However, whitelisting still allows some errors (for non-whitelisted
senders).
Of course, whitelisting can be combined with other approaches. One
example of a complementary approach is challenge/response. Here, the re-
ceiver's email server or client asks non-whitelisted senders to respond to
a challenge, such as a proof-of-humanity test [166]; if the sender responds
successfully, the sender's email will be delivered, and the sender will then be
whitelisted. We believe that there are several problems with this approach.
First, as mentioned in the previous chapter (93.9.2), spammers might pay
people to respond to proof-of-humanity challenges. Second, some non-
human senders, (e.g., some software programs) are legitimate. Third, this
approach changes the "social dynamics": the sender now has to do work,
even if the sender was the one "doing the favor'.
A related tactic is for a receiver to make it hard for people to send him
email, say by requiring potential senders to register on a Web page (e.g.,
[ioo]). Such an approach undoubtedly reduces the spam to the recipient
(though it might not if everyone deployed it). However, it also changes the
social dynamics of email drastically, and the recipient may not feel com-
fortable asking potential senders to exert more effort than is usual.
Another technique is exemplified by the Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
[146]. With this approach, administrative domains publish in DNS a list of
IP addresses that are allowed to send email from that domain. Receiving
email servers can then query DNS to verify that the sending email server's
IP address actually matches the envelope header on the email. Systems like
Mail Avenger [102] use SPF (and other techniques) to detect email from
bots that have installed "illegal" email servers on desktop machines. How-
ever, SPF provides only a heuristic and cannot stop spam on its own. One
reason is that spammers can invent bogus envelope headers and can adopt
IP addresses temporarily. Either or both of these things thwarts the pur-
pose of SPE A related check, also performed by Mail Avenger, is to verify
that the sending email server can receive email, the purpose being to screen
out illegal email servers that are running on bots behind firewalls and NATs.
However, this check is again a heuristic: not all of spammers' hijacked ma-
chines are behind firewalls and NATs, and, moreover, spammers need not
send from bots.
Most of the approaches in this category are helpful (and meet our re-
quirement of not labeling legitimate email as spam). However, we seek a
"backstop"-a solution that, if heuristics fail, limits volumes explicitly.
Explicit limits on volume. A strawman in this category is a world in which
ESPs (Email Service Providers) become known as "good"; "good" means
that they limit their users' outbound emails (e.g., using techniques like those
in [65]). However, we believe that some kind of global accounting system-
something like DQE's enforcer, for example-is required to guarantee that
ESPs (of which there could be thousands) actually limit their users' out-
bound emails. Templeton [154] also focuses explicitly on volumes. He en-
visions an infrastructure formed by cooperating ISPs to handle worldwide
email; the infrastructure throttles email from untrusted sources that send
too much. Unlike DQE, this proposal assumes a trusted enforcement in-
frastructure. Moreover, it assumes that, given an email, the actual network
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address of the source can be identified, yet in our threat model, such iden-
tifications are not reliable.
Given the above, we believe that limiting volumes explicitly requires at-
taching a cost to sending. Thus, we turn to the general category of email
postage.
Postage
We first discuss the various proposals in this category and then compare
pairwise postage to bankable postage; DQE is in the latter category.
Pairwise postage. The high-level idea of email postage is that senders
should pay to send email, the hope being that no sender will be able to af-
ford to send vast quantities of unsolicited email (see 94-7 for our basic eco-
nomic arguments). There have been many variations of email postage and
a lot of debate about how best to implement it and in what currency to set
the price. Some have suggested that senders pay receivers in money, letting
receivers set the price of their attention [ 50, 94, 131]. To implement such a
scheme, one would presumably use micropayment systems, described be-
low in §4.10.2. Zmail [91] is a variation of this idea: the parties, represented
by their ESPs, settle once per day. This proposal avoids some infrastructure
(namely a system to handle transactions online) but at the following cost:
given a discrepancy between two parties' accounts, the bank cannot prove
which of the two parties cheated. (In Zmail, ESPs are supposed to be certi-
fied as "compliant", but such certification does not guarantee good behav-
ior.) The proposal contrasts with DQE in two ways: first, DQE is not in the
business of certifying email participants as good or bad (anyone can obtain
a quota), and second, DQE, as a system, is robust to cheating.
Others have suggested that senders pay receivers in CPU cycles [11, 46]
or memory cycles [2, 45] (the latter being fairer because memory band-
widths are more uniform than CPU bandwidths): to send an email viewed
as valid, a sender must exhibit the solution to an appropriate computational
puzzle (as in proof-of-work, discussed in the last chapter; see §3.9.1). Still
others have suggested that senders pay human attention (e.g., [145]); this
suggestion is related to challenge/response schemes, mentioned above.
Bankable postage. As a variation on postage, Abadi et al. pioneered bank-
able postage [1], in which senders buy tickets from a third party (called a
"Ticket Server", or TS) and attach these tickets to emails. Receivers check
with the TS to verify that tickets are fresh, cancel tickets with the TS, and
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optionally refund them. The proposal is agnostic to the currency in which
tickets are sold.
Though DQE and TS export a similar high-level interface to clients,
they have very different realizations. TS does not meet most of our goals
(see §4.2). Specifically, it relies on a trusted, central server for the enforce-
ment function so does not meet our requirements that the enforcement
function scale to the volume of the world's email and that it be fault-tolerant,
attack-resilient, and untrusted. Also, TS does not separate allocation and
enforcement or preserve sender-receiver email privacy.
Another bankable postage scheme, SHRED [89], also has a trusted, cen-
tral cancellation authority. And Goodmail [63]--now used by two major
email providers [32]-resembles TS. (See also Bonded Sender [22], which
is not a postage proposal but has the same goal as Goodmail.) Goodmail
accredits bulk emailers, trying to ensure that they send only solicited email,
and tags their email as "certified"' The providers then bypass filters to deliver
such email to their customers directly. However, Goodmail does not elimi-
nate the problem of valid email labeled spam because only "reputable bulk
emailers" get this favored treatment. Moreover, like TS, Goodmail com-
bines allocation and enforcement, does not preserve privacy, and presum-
ably does not offer a large-scale enforcement solution.
Bankable Postage vs. Pairwise Postage
Advantages of bankable postage. Bankable postage has four advantages
compared to pairwise postage; we use citations to indicate which authors
first made the observation:
1. Asynchrony [1]. In a pairwise proposal, senders have to "purchase"
the right to send every time they want to send email. But this requirement
is problematic, as we now show by considering two different currencies. If
the currency is money, then a micropayment infrastructure that can pro-
cess requests "online" is needed, at which point the system would resem-
ble DQE; see §4.10.2 below. If the currency is CPU cycles, then the pay-
ment will disrupt the sender's workflow. To see why, let us consider what
price in CPU cycles might restrict spam. The answer, roughly speaking, is
that the price has to be high enough so that a bot, even one whose CPU
works around the clock, cannot send significantly more spam than a legit-
imate client. Most legitimate clients send fewer than 2oo emails per day;
to limit bots even to that number requires an average CPU price of (1440
minutes/day)(i day/2oo emails) , 7 CPU minutes/email. This price is un-
acceptably high to be incurred "online". Human attention does not have the
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problems just mentioned; however, it has others, as listed above during our
description of challenge/response.
2. Separation of allocation & enforcement [13]. Bankable postage cre-
ates the possibility of separating allocation and enforcement. That possibil-
ity, which DQE seizes for reasons discussed in §4.2.1, leads to the following
benefit: DQE can support a range of currencies and policies (in the pairwise
case, in contrast, the currency and policy are "hard-coded" into the system).
Thus, one way to view DQE is as a general platform that can accommodate
the debate about which currency or platform is correct.
3. Stockpiling [1]. Senders can get tickets from various sources, e.g.,
their ISPs, rather than paying for every ticket.
4. Refunds [1]. If payment is incurred online and if senders use a non-
recoverable resource like CPU cycles, then refunds are impossible. If pay-
ment is incurred offline, then receivers can let friendly senders reuse their
tickets. Such refunds give a higher effective price to spammers, whose re-
ceivers would not refund.
Disadvantages of bankable postage. Against the above advantages, bank-
able postage has the following disadvantage:
Less infrastructure required (possibly). Bankable postage, and DQE in
particular, require infrastructure that does not yet exist: globally trusted
quota allocators, the enforcer, and the bunker. We have argued throughout
that the enforcer is practical, and we have indicated in §4.7 and §4.9 why
we think that a quota allocator could come into being. However, there is no
question that it would be preferable to avoid this extra infrastructure.
Unlike DQE, many of the schemes described above (e.g., whitelisting,
SPF, connecting back to the email server) can be adopted either in grass-
roots pairwise fashion or unilaterally. And pairwise postage likewise does
not require infrastructure-if the currency is CPU cycles or human atten-
tion. However, if the currency is money, then a third party is needed, namely
a bank to implement micropayments. And in that case, a system like the
enforcer is called for, as we show below in §4.10.2. This fact means that
bankable postage may be a way to implement pairwise postage.
Combining DQE with Other Defenses
DQE may work better in conjunction with other defenses. Indeed, our
rough economic analysis in §4.7 presumes that senders and receivers make
heavy use of whitelists, allowing them to see a far lower per-email price than
spammers do.
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More generally, DQE works with any algorithm in the "whitelisting fam-
ily', meaning any algorithm that, given an email, outputs either "yes, this
email is valid" or "I don't know" Except for the transition period, DQE
ought not work with an algorithm that can output "no" (e.g., filtering or
blacklisting)--such algorithms may sometimes label valid email as spam,
an error that we view as unacceptable. Thus, here is how DQE can combine
with other defenses: imagine that the recipient has deployed n defenses in
the whitelisting family, D1,. . . , Dn. Given an email, the recipient's algorithm
is as follows. Run each of the Di. If any outputs "yes", stop and accept the
email. (We are assuming that the Di do not output "yes" wrongly.) If all out-
put "I don't know", then invoke DQE's checks. Accept the email if and only
if the email is stamped and all of the stamp checks (valid signatures, under
quota, fresh stamp, etc.) pass.
This description makes explicit that DQE may function best as a "back-
stop" when other defenses fail.
4.10.2 Micropayments
The architecture and protocols of DQE, as described in §943, resemble a
micropayment or digital cash system. In some of those schemes, a bank
(corresponding to our allocator) allocates a block of "cash" (corresponding
to our quota) to a user, who then spends the cash in units of "digital coins"
(corresponding to our stamps). There has been a lot of work in the area of
micropayments and digital cash (see [26, 60, 132] and citations therein).
One of the main problems in these systems is preventing users from
spending a given digital coin twice; this attack is known as double-spending.
The existing solutions for preventing double-spending at large scale do so
in an offline fashion-at the end of the day, vendors turn over their coins
to the bank, which detects double-spending by looking at the set of coins
presented to it. However, for many applications (e.g., [18]), once-per-day
timescales are too coarse-grained. Indeed, in our context, double-spending
corresponds to stamp reuse, which of course DQE must detect as it hap-
pens.
Large-scale online detection of double-spending is currently viewed by
the digital cash literature as technically infeasible: it is too computationally
expensive for the bank to be involved in millions of transactions per sec-
ond [26, 60]. Meanwhile, such online detection is the whole point of the
enforcer! And because the enforcer is untrusted and presumed to fault, the
bank needn't spend much to guarantee perfect correctness or even operate
the infrastructure itself.
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Thus, we believe that DQE makes a contribution to the digital cash lit-
erature: we show how to build an inexpensive, untrusted system that de-
tects double-spending at intra-day timescales and handles millions of re-
quests per second. To incorporate the enforcer, the designers of digital cash
systems could arrange that, when digital coins are spent, vendors HASH,
TEST, and SET them. These checks would be a hint, to prevent gross double-
spending. Then, at the end of the day, the bank and vendors could run the
protocols that actually exchange digital coins for cash, thereby detecting
double-spending precisely.
4.10.3 Related Distributed Systems
Because the enforcer stores key-value pairs, distributed hash tables (DHTs)
[12] seemed a natural substrate, and our first design used one. However,
we abandoned them because (1) most DHTs do not handle mutually un-
trusting nodes and (2) in most DHTs, nodes route requests for each other,
which can decrease throughput if request handling is a bottleneck. Castro
et al. [27] address (1) but use considerable mechanism to handle untrusting
nodes that route requests for each other. Conversely, one-hop DHTs [71, 72]
eschew routing, but nodes must trust each other to propagate membership
information. In contrast, the enforcer relies on limited scale to avoid rout-
ing and on a trusted entity, the bunker (94-4), to determine its membership.
Such static configuration is common; it is used by distributed systems
that take the replicated state machine approach [135] to fault-tolerance (e.g.,
the Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) literature [28], the recently proposed
BAR model [4], and Rosebud [133]) as well as by Byzantine Quorum Sys-
tems (e.g., [96, 97]) and by cluster-based systems with strong semantics
(e.g., [671).
What makes the enforcer unusual compared to the work just mentioned
is that, to tolerate faults (Byzantine or otherwise), the enforcer does not
need mechanism beyond the bunker: enforcer nodes do not need to know
which other nodes are currently up (in contrast to replicated state machine
solutions), and neither enforcer nodes nor enforcer clients try to protect
data or ensure its consistency (in contrast to the Byzantine quorum litera-
ture and cluster-based systems with strong semantics). The reason that the
enforcer gets away with this simplicity is weak semantics. It stores only im-
mutable data, and the entire application is robust to lost data.
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4.11 CRITIQUE & REFLECTIONS
We first critique DQE and reflect on its ability to handle spam, then give
examples of where else DQE may apply, and finally reflect on the enforcer
as an independently interesting system that may be a useful building block
in other contexts.
DQE and spam. We have argued in this chapter that DQE can meet our
goal of controlling spam via a roughly fair allocation of human attention;
see §4.8 for a summary of the argument. At a high level, the way DQE is
supposed to work is that (1) the economic mechanism of quotas will arrive
at a proper allocation, and (2) a technical mechanism-the enforcer-will
ensure that this allocation mostly holds in practice.
The principal critique of DQE is that the first part of this supposition,
the non-technical part, may be improbable. The top-level challenge is adop-
tion: to be fully effective, DQE must be in use everywhere, and achiev-
ing ubiquitous adoption is a tall order. Second, it may be unreasonable to
suppose the existence of a small number of globally trusted quota alloca-
tors (though we discussed in §4.9 how such allocators might arise). Finally,
we may be underestimating the difficulty of a quota allocation policy that
meets the goal of reducing spam while leaving legitimate senders mostly
unaffected (though we discussed this topic in §4.7).
We are more confident, however, about the second part of the supposi-
tion, the technical part. Based on our work, we believe that an enforcer com-
prising several thousand dedicated, mutually untrusting hosts can handle
stamp queries at the volume of the world's email. Such an infrastructure,
together with the other technical mechanisms in DQE, meets the design
goals in §4.2-and shows that large-scale quota enforcement is practical.
Indeed, the cost of the enforcer in hardware, single millions of dollars, is
low and could be shared among many organizations and email providers
that have an interest in reducing spam.
DQE and other applications. As Abadi et al. [1] note, the general ap-
proach of issuing and canceling stamps can apply to any computational ser-
vice. In particular, one could imagine using DQE to regulate consumption
of the resources of OpenDHT [130], Coral [55], or S3 [6], all of which are
distributed systems that are intended to have large clienteles.
The enforcer. We believe that, apart from quotas, the enforcer is useful by
itself in other contexts. As discussed in §4.10.2, the various digital cash sys-
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tems could use the enforcer as a hint to prevent intra-day double-spending.
Indeed, one of the authors of a recent e-cash proposal agrees that the en-
forcer could likely fill that void (i.e., online prevention of cheating) in his
context [18, 791].
The enforcer's simplicity-particularly the minimal trust assumptions-
encourages our belief in its practicality, both in the spam context and in
others. Nevertheless, the enforcer was not an "easy problem". Though its
external structure is now spare, it is the end of a series of designs-and a
few implementations-that we tried. Its internal structure is, we believe,
of independent interest. The enforcer is fault-tolerant but stores only one
copy (roughly) of each key-value pair, it introduces a novel data structure
that implements a dictionary interface, it avoids livelock (a problem that
we conjecture exists in many other distributed systems if they are over-
loaded), and it resists a range of attacks. More generally, we believe that
the enforcer is a novel design point: a set of nodes that implement a simple
storage abstraction but avoid neighbor maintenance, replica maintenance,
and mutual trust. And, the "price of distrust" in this system-in terms of
what extra mechanisms are required because of mutual distrust-is zero.
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5
Comparisons & Connections
In abstract terms, speak-up and DQE are two very different ways of allocat-
ing scarce resources. Their side-by-side inclusion in this dissertation raises
several questions:
- What other abstract approaches to resource allocation are there, and
what are the key differences and similarities among the various ap-
proaches?
- Why have we applied speak-up to the problem of DDoS and DQE to
the problem of spam, rather than vice-versa?
- What are the fundamental connections between speak-up and DQE?
This chapter answers these questions in turn. To answer the first one, and to
develop an informal vocabulary for discussing the others, we now consider
a taxonomy of abstract resource allocation methods.
5.1 TAXONOMY
In any question of resource allocation, there is some set of scarce resources,
some set of requesters of those resources, and some entity-an allocator-
that decides which requests to fulfill. The entity's decisions may be explicit
(e.g., "requester A gets 5 units") or implicit (e.g., "the resources go to the one
who asks first"), and the entity may be the direct owner of the resources or a
delegate that controls them. The taxonomy that we give in this section con-
cerns (1) how the entity makes its decisions and (2) when the requester may
consume the allocated resource. We will certainly not break new ground in
economics; rather, our purpose is to establish a simple framework for com-
paring many possible approaches, including DQE and speak-up.
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Time of Consumption
Moment of Allocation Appointed Future Moment During Some Window
-t First come, first served (*) over-subscribed server free movie tickets free gift certificates
' Explicit, constant pricing highway tolls most sports tickets DQE, snail-mail stamps
Explicit, variable pricing grocery airfares stock options
Auction speak-up auction of any tickets auction of stock options
Fair allocations (*) fair queuing graduation tickets disk quotas
Historical profiling (*) restaurant seating club membership whitelisting
Blocking undesirables (*) CAPTCHAS club membership blacklisting
(*) Clients must be reliably identifiable for the discipline to be effective.
FIGURE 5.1 -Taxonomy of abstract methods for resource allocation, with examples for
each point. The taxonomy has two axes: the admission discipline (left) and the time at
which the resources are consumed, relative to when they are allocated (top).
Our taxonomy is depicted in Figure 5.1 and has two axes. The first cov-
ers the actual admission rule, and the second concerns whether the allo-
cated resource is consumed by requesters at the moment of allocation, at
a specific point in the future, or at many possible points in the future. We
have no proof that this taxonomy is complete, but it seems to capture many
approaches used by computer systems and processes in "everyday life". Our
elaboration of this taxonomy, below, will be abstract, but for each of the
categories, we will give examples, both technical and "real world".
5.1.1 Axis i: Admission Discipline
First come, first served. The easiest allocation policy is simply to give the
resource to the requester that "gets there first': Examples include an over-
subscribed Web server that does not aim for a fair allocation and someone
giving out free movie tickets to the first takers. When other disciplines re-
sult in over-subscription, they may wind up incorporating this one. For ex-
ample, if the allocator intends to charge a price but sets the price too low,
then demand will be too high, and the resource will be allocated to the first
requesters that pay.
Explicit, constant pricing. The allocator charges requesters in some cur-
rency. Of course, the price decided by the allocator may result in under- or
over-subscription of the resource. In the latter case, some other discipline
is also in effect implicitly (such as first come, first served, as mentioned
above). One example in this category is consumer goods, sold at retail; in
these cases, stores charge fixed prices for items but may run out of the item
or be stuck with surplus. Other examples include highway tolls, snail-mail
postage, and a pairwise email postage system (94.10.1) in which the price
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to send email, in CPU cycles or money, is fixed. A final example is quota al-
location in DQE under the policy, discussed in §4.7, in which senders pay
a fixed price to the quota allocator for the right to send a certain number of
emails.
Explicit, variable pricing. This discipline is similar to the previous one,
except that in this case the allocator adjusts the price frequently. "Every-
day life" examples include trading posts, airline fares, and bookies in Las
Vegas adjusting the price of a sports bet based on the existing "betting
market'" Technical examples include pairwise postage proposals for email
(see §4.10.1) in which recipients adjust the price of sending them email
based on how busy they are [50, 94].
Auction. Auctions have many incarnations (English auctions, Dutch auc-
tions, Vickrey auctions, etc.). They free the allocator from having to "guess"
or "estimate" a price because the auction mechanism finds an appropriate
price. Two technical examples are as follows. First, recall that in one incar-
nation of speak-up (03-4.3), the thinner uses a type of auction to decide
which request to admit. Second, one could imagine a pairwise postage pro-
posal for email in which recipients auction off the right to interrupt them
(that is, the sender whose email gets through to the recipient is the one who
is willing to pay the most). "Everyday life" examples of auctions are many
(e.g., Treasury auctions to price new issues of U.S. government debt, selling
famous works of art, etc.).
Fair allocations. In this discipline, the allocator gives every requester a
"fair share" of the resources, meaning that if there are n requesters, each
one should be able to claim a fraction 1/n of the resources (under max-
min fairness, heavy requesters can get more than this fraction, by getting
the resources not claimed by light requesters). Technical examples include
Fair Queuing [42] and its many variants. An "everyday life" example is the
way that universities allocate tickets to their graduation ceremonies: every
student can claim several tickets.
Historical profiling. As mentioned in §3.9.2, profiling as a DDoS defense
gives service to "regulars". Another technical example is whitelisting in the
case of spam (previous legitimate clients of a given human's attention are al-
lowed to consume that person's attention in the future). One "everyday life"
example is club membership: "last year's" members typically have priority in
becoming members the following year. Another is restaurant seating when
the host chooses to give priority to regulars.
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Blocking undesirables. As discussed in Chapter 1, §3.9.2, and §4.10.1, al-
locations in this category block "unwelcome" requests outright (e.g., CAPT-
CHAS [166] block requests from non-humans and spam filters block email
that appears to be spam). Non-technical examples are many: admission to
nightclubs on a busy night, accepting papers to conferences, etc.
Observe that some of the disciplines require that clients or requests be
identifiable; if they are not, then the allocation method cannot work. These
disciplines are first come first served, fair allocations, historical profiling,
and blocking undesirables.
5.1.2 Axis 2: Permissible Consumption Times
This axis is orthogonal to the one above: one can incorporate any of the
disciplines above into any of the approaches below.
During some window. We will call these approaches during-window ap-
proaches. Here, the allocator gives requesters a "right" and that right is good
for a period of time. For example, under DQE, senders may mint a certain
number of stamps (i.e., may consume a certain amount of human atten-
tion) at any point during the day. Another technical example is disk quotas
for UNIX users. "Everyday life" examples include cellular telephone min-
utes, subway tokens (having purchased a token, a rider can use the token for
as long as the fare hasn't increased), snail-mail postage stamps, gift certifi-
cates, and stock options (because, having purchased the stock option, the
holder may convert it to the underlying equity at any time before the option
expires).
At an appointed future time. We will call these approaches appointed-
future approaches. Here, the allocator gives requesters the ability to con-
sume a resource at an appointed time. For example, tickets to sporting events
give the holder the right to attend at a specific time on a specific day. As
another "everyday life" example, dormitory assignments generally happen
before the academic year begins, but the assignment is good for a partic-
ular time (in this case, the following academic year). Technical examples
include situations in which using scarce computing resources (e.g., a high
performance cluster) requires an advance reservation for a particular time.
At the moment of allocation. We will call these approaches moment-of-
allocation approaches. This case is similar to the one above, except that the
allocator is making its decisions for the current moment. "Everyday life"
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examples include restaurant seating, paying a toll to enter a highway, and
situations in which a customer exchanges cash for ownership of a good.
Technical examples are as follows. First, consider speak-up: when the
server is overloaded, it simultaneously charges clients, makes its allocation
decisions, and fulfills requests. Second, in capability systems (see §3.9-3),
clients use the requested capabilities in the near future. Also, consider how
providers like Gmail and Yahoo give out free email accounts: after having
decided that the client is acceptable (usually because the client correctly an-
swered a CAPTCHA), the provider immediately issues a new email account.
Last, consider pairwise postage for email (see §4.10.1) when senders incur
the cost in "real time' for example, by paying CPU cycles.
5.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE TAXONOMY
For each of the axes, we now discuss which scenarios call for which choices.
5.2.1 Axis 1 (Admission Discipline)
One of the main questions here is whether to charge requesters, that is
whether to use one of the pricing methods (constant, variable, or auction)
or whether to use one of the disciplines that requires identifying clients or
their requests. Which decision is appropriate of course depends on context.
Given the definition of the abstract problem in §1.1, and the specific instan-
tiations that we have addressed in this dissertation, identifying clients is not
reliable,' so we turn to pricing methods. In other contexts, one might prefer
not to charge clients (e.g., if one is offering a "free" service and can filter out
"bad" requests). On the other hand, in some contexts, charging clients is
obviously desirable (e.g., if one is selling a product).
5.2.2 Axis 2 (Permissible Consumption Times)
The advantages of the during-window approaches are as follows. First, they
might be a natural fit, given the social context. For example, it would be
awkward to give a gift certificate that denied its recipient control over when
to spend it. Second, these approaches often permit fungibility, because a
given requester's right to claim future resources is often reflected in a "ticket"
or "token" that the requester can transfer to another entity. Third, these ap-
1We discuss this point in § 1.2, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3.
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proaches, being essentially options, give the requester more flexibility com-
pared to the other approaches.
The advantages of appointed-future approaches are as follows. First,
there is no uncertainty about when the resource is consumed, so the alloca-
tor does not have to worry that too many "claims" or "rights to consume" are
outstanding. Second, separating consumption from allocation might be far
more convenient for both the allocator and requesters than decisions made
"in the heat of the moment": For example, if the Red Sox were to sell tickets
to their World Series games right before the game started, the result would
be mayhem.
Moment-of-allocation approaches require less overhead so are appro-
priate when there is no need for the other two approaches. The reason that
they require less overhead is that, with the other two approaches, the al-
locator must give a requester a token-a ticket, stamp, etc.-that is valid
in the future (either at a particular moment or for a period of time). Im-
plementing this token and ensuring that it is not counterfeit requires some
mechanism. For example, consider nightclubs: they take guests' money and
then let them inside, whereas using advance tickets would require a ticket
office. Moreover, moment-of-allocation approaches may be required if the
demand becomes manifest shortly before consumption occurs. For exam-
ple, if human Web users want access to a Web site right now, not in the
future, then the server has no choice but to allocate for the current mo-
ment.
5.2.3 Other Considerations
There are of course other considerations besides the ones above. For exam-
ple, with respect to the first axis, social convention may dictate which pric-
ing method-auction or constant pricing-is acceptable. Another example
is with respect to the second axis: if an allocator cannot make decisions
until all of the demand has become manifest (e.g., deciding which i,ooo
people gain admission out of lo,ooo people who have expressed interest),
then moment-of-allocation does not work.
5.3 OUR CHOICES
In this section, we reflect on why we chose (1) speak-up to defend against
denial-of-service (2) DQE to defend against spam, and (3) speak-up again
to defend the enforcer against resource exhaustion attacks (see §4.4.5).
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Why speak-up for DDoS defense? In the taxonomy in §5.1, speak-up is
given by (auction, moment-of-allocation). We now explain why this design
point is appropriate for our context. Consider the second axis in the tax-
onomy. In our context, the server needs to allocate itself instantaneously;
nothing is gained by separating allocation and consumption. Now, con-
sider the admission discipline (axis 1). For this function, we require one of
the "pricing" methods because we presume that clients are not identifiable
(see §2.3). We chose auctions (as opposed to variable or constant prices) be-
cause they are a simple way to match the aggregate demand to the server's
capacity. Of course, the preceding does not explain why we chose speak-up
out of all possible (auction, moment-of-allocation) defenses; for this rea-
soning, see §3.9.1.
Why DQE for spam defense? In the taxonomy in §5.1, DQE is given
by (constant pricing, during-window). For the first axis, we require some
pricing scheme because the other approaches do not meet our require-
ment from §1.2 of not examining the contents of messages. Of the pricing
schemes, we choose fixed per-email prices because it permits a simple ar-
gument that the total volume of spam would decrease to a manageable level
(see §4.7). However, other policies for axis 1 would also work; indeed, DQE
works with any quota allocation policy.
For axis 2, our reason for choosing during-window is as follows. Con-
sider the alternatives. First, appointed-future approaches do not apply be-
cause senders cannot predict exactly when they are going to send email. The
second alternative is to have senders pay when they want to send email, cor-
responding to moment-of-allocation approaches. Yet, we already addressed
the disadvantages of senders incurring costs in real time; see §4.10.1. As
we argued in that section, senders buying stamps "in advance"-which is a
during-window approach-gives more flexibility.
Another option that might appear to be a moment-of-allocation ap-
proach is senders paying receivers in digital cash. However, this option is
actually a during-window approach because the digital cash is valid for a
some (possibly long) period of time. Indeed, because of this extended va-
lidity, digital cash schemes, like DQE, need to prevent double-spending.
The enforcer is one way to do so; see §4.10.2.
Why speak-up to protect DQE's enforcer? As discussed in 944.45, we sug-
gest defending the enforcer against resource exhaustion attacks by using
speak-up or a variant. Our reasons are as follows; we again argue in terms
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of the taxonomy in §5.1. First, consider axis 1. The discussion in §4.4.5
calls for one of the pricing approaches because we presume that clients are
not identifiable. Moreover, even if clients were identifiable, the distributed
nature of the enforcer would make it difficult to apply a discipline that de-
pends on tracking how many requests each client sends to the enforcer in
aggregate.
For axis 2, we call for a moment-of-allocation approach. The reasons
are as follows. First, appointed-future approaches do not apply because
DQE clients do not know in advance the specific moments when they
need to contact the enforcer. Second, consider during-window approaches.
Here, some entity would have to allocate tokens-tickets or stamps or
certificates-giving DQE clients the right to make TEST and SET requests.
Yet, what would prevent clients from reusing these tokens? This problem is
the same as preventing stamp reuse for email. Thus, one would need an-
other enforcer, and what would protect that enforcer against resource ex-
haustion attacks? To put this reasoning another way, a during-window ap-
proach would require a mechanism to prevent double-spending, and that
mechanism would tax precisely the resources that we are trying to defend.
For this reason, we must defend the enforcer with an approach in which
clients "pay" for service "directly" without intermediating tokens, tickets,
stamps, certificates, etc.
But then why use DQE at all? Given our argument that speak-up (or a
variant) is required to protect DQE's enforcer, one might wonder, "Why
not cut out the middleman and use speak-up to defend against spam di-
rectly?" For example, email servers could require prospective senders to
attach dummy bytes to the end of messages. The reason that we do not fa-
vor this approach is that it would be similar to receivers charging senders
pairwise in CPU cycles, the disadvantages of which we cover in §4.10.1. (As
a side point, our arguments do not rule out a scenario in which a quota al-
locator doles out certificates based on bandwidth payments from clients. In
that scenario, bandwidth, or some other resource, would be used twice-
once to procure the quota and once to protect the enforcer.)
5.4 CONNECTIONS
We now discuss the fundamental connection between DQE and speak-
up. More generally, we illustrate a connection between during-window ap-
proaches and moment-of-allocation approaches.
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Any-time approaches require a mechanism that mediates between the
act of allocation and the act of consumption. This mechanism can be to-
kens, tickets, stamps (in the case of DQE), certificates, signed attestations,
etc. Because requesters have latitude in when they spend these tokens-that
is, because the tokens are valid at many points in time-the system must
prevent double-spending. As examples, retail stores collect gift certificates
after the customer spends them, and DQE's enforcer controls stamp reuse.
If the scale of the system is limited, then tracking clients' spending does not
require a separate infrastructure. For example, a "real world" store can keep
track of the gift certificates that it issues, and an operating system can keep
track of its users' disk quotas.
However, if the scale of the system is very large, as in the case of the
world's email load, then a distributed system for preventing token reuse is
very likely required. Once such a system is called for, the resources of that
system must be allocated properly. And for this latter function, a moment-
of-allocation approach is required. Why? Because, as illustrated in the pre-
vious section, a during-window approach would reintroduce the problem:
it would require another set of tokens, which would require an infrastruc-
ture to prevent double-spending, which would have to be protected, etc.
(Appointed-future approaches do not apply because they would require
that participants know in advance when they need to make requests of the
distributed system.)
In summary, then, a during-window allocation method of sufficient
scale needs an enforcement mechanism, and such an enforcement mecha-
nism must protect its resources using a moment-of-allocation approach.
This high-level relationship explains why DQE's enforcer depends on
speak-up or something like it.
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6
Critiques & Conclusion
A recapitulation of this dissertation's narrative is as follows. We defined an
abstract problem, namely, good and bad clients making requests for some
scarce resource, with the good and bad requests indistinguishable. We ar-
gued that the abstract problem is motivated by criminals perpetrating at-
tacks that are hard to filter. We advanced a philosophy to guide any solution
to the abstract problem, namely, that solutions should not try to differenti-
ate among clients and should instead aim to allocate the scarce resources in
proportion to clients' numbers. We presented solutions to two instances of
the abstract problem and argued that they uphold the philosophy. Specif-
ically, we presented speak-up as a defense against DDoS and DQE as a
defense against spam. We justified our choices of speak-up and DQE by
comparing them within the same framework. This framework also allowed
us to articulate a fundamental connection between the two defenses or,
more accurately, between their general approaches.
This narrative brings to mind two high-level critiques. (We critiqued speak-
up and DQE individually in §3.9 and §4.11, respectively.)
The first critique is as follows: our philosophy says to avoid solutions
that examine the contents of requests because such heuristics err, yet any
allocation discipline can err. For example, under speak-up, a low-bandwidth
legitimate client may get less of the server than it demands; this shortfall is a
form of error. And under DQE, if the quota allocator sets the wrong price,
unsavory clients can purchase too many stamps. Moreover, both systems
permit some gaming (though, as we proved, only to a limited extent).
Our response to this first critique concerns the degree of the error. If
bad requests look exactly like good ones, then heuristics are no better than
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random guessing and thus introduce a vast amount of error. In that case, the
only defenses that work are those based on over-provisioning or on charg-
ing clients (like speak-up and DQE). Of course, one might well ask whether
bad and good requests actually are hard to differentiate, which brings us to
the second critique.
This next critique is about the abstract problem itself and about our
view of the present and the future. The threat that this dissertation defends
against is one in which adversaries issue totally convincing, legitimate-
looking requests. Yet, what if this view is too pessimistic? Indeed, as we
discussed at the end of Chapter 3, today's application-level attacks are prim-
itive. Perhaps tomorrow's adversaries will be no more advanced than to-
day's. Or perhaps the economics of the Internet underworld will shift so
that spam and denial-of-service no longer afflict the Internet.
Our response to this second critique is to ask: what if the pessimal future
that motivated DQE and speak-up does become fact? What if, as we suspect,
bad requests continue to evolve until they are indistinguishable from good
requests? What if spam and denial-of-service increase in frequency and in-
tensity? We need to be prepared for that world. In that world, the best that
we can hope for is rough proportionality: if lo0% of the clients are bad, we
hope to limit them to lo% of the scarce resources.
This ethos is appealing, for it is egalitarian. A seeming weakness is that
if 90% of the clients are bad, then they get 90% of the scarce resources. How-
ever, this fact is independent of our philosophy. Indeed, if the bad clients
outnumber the good ones ten to one, and the two populations are indistin-
guishable, the only way to ensure that all good clients get service is heavy
over-provisioning (so that the "slice" that the good clients can claim meets
their demand) together with proportional allocation (so that the bad clients
can't deny the good ones even this "slice").
6.1 LOOKING AHEAD
Such predictions about the future as we make above invite questions about
how the dynamics between adversaries and "good guys" will evolve. For
example, even if we grant ourselves that future defenses need to strive for
rough proportionality, as argued just above, it does not follow that the par-
ticular required defenses will include DQE and speak-up: couldn't the "good
guys" change the landscape so that some other proportional allocation de-
fense suffices? We now discuss this question and others about the future.
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Speak-up and DQE are motivated by a specific threat. Iffuture responses from
various "good guy" communities-academics, security professionals, law en-
forcement, etc.--mitigate that threat, are these two defenses still needed? We
first consider how the threat could be mitigated. For our current purposes,
the threat in §1.1 has three components: (1) adversaries issue legitimate-
looking requests; (2) the Internet's notion of identity is fuzzy; and (3) adver-
saries use bots as a low-cost computing platform. It is of course impossible
to predict future solutions, but we believe that (1) is unavoidable (a smart
adversary will always be able to imitate a good client) whereas (2) and (3)
could be substantially mitigated by the community.
With respect to (2), changes to the Internet architecture could elimi-
nate address hijacking and the need for proxies and NATs (in fact, if all
providers applied today's "best practices", address hijacking would be more
difficult than it is right now). For (3), the bot population could be curtailed
substantially by a combination of two thrusts. The first is "botnet hunting"'
which law enforcement and other security professionals do today but which
could and would be amplified if the political will were in place. The second
is to continue the trend of software architecture changes that make operat-
ing systems and applications harder to compromise.
But would such responses eliminate the need for DQE and speak-up?
Our belief is that, regardless of these responses, DQE, or some other form of
email postage, would still be required. The reason is that mitigating (2) and
(3) would not fundamentally restrict spammers from sending bulk email.
In this scenario, they might need to send email from their own computers
and to spend more on computing resources, but those changes are not the
kind of inherent restrictions that result from per-email costs.
Speak-up, in contrast, would likely not be needed to defend Web servers
against application-level DDoS. The reason is that with (2) mitigated, the
server would be able to map each request to some client identifier. Thus,
when overloaded, the server could achieve a fair allocation explicitly, with-
out needing to use bandwidth payments as a proxy for identity.
However, speak-up or some other resource-based defense (see §3.9.1)
would still be needed in at least one context-defending a distributed re-
source like DQE's enforcer (as discussed in §4.4.5 and 95-3). If each enforcer
node allocated itself "fairly" across all requesting clients but did not charge
clients, then an attacker could claim a piece of every enforcer node, result-
ing in a globally unfair allocation. In contrast, making clients "pay" for ser-
vice in some currency ensures that any client's share of the total enforcer is
bounded by that client's share of the total client currency.
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Assuming that some proportional allocation defense is deployed and effective,
how are the adversaries likely to respond? If the author were in the adver-
sary's position, he would attack speak-up and DQE in particular by trying
to amass as many resources as possible (Chapters 3 and 4 show that these
systems resist many other attacks). More generally, if a proportional alloca-
tion defense is deployed, then an attacker's power is given by the number of
hosts that he controls, so the attacker's response will be to try to acquire
more hosts. Thus, attackers may concentrate less on crafting legitimate-
looking requests and even more on compromising machines.
And how will the "good guys" respond to those efforts? They will respond
by trying to minimize the number of machines available to adversaries. As
mentioned above, they can do so via "botnet hunting" and architectural
changes to operating system and application software. Their efforts will not
be perfect: even if they could eliminate compromised machines altogether,
adversaries could still use their own computers to mount attacks.
Given all of this back-and-forth, how can we argue that DQE and speak-up
will have a positive effect? We cannot predict the future. However, if the cur-
rent economics of computer crime-the cost to compromise a machine, the
profit from spamming, etc.-remain roughly the same, then we can in fact
make predictions about adversaries even if we cause them to change tactics.
For example, we showed in 94-7 that a per-email cost off times the profit
per-email would limit validly stamped spam to a fraction 1/f of today's
spam volume. Our only assumption in that (highly pessimistic) analysis is
that spammers are profit-maximizing. Under that assumption, DQE could
"disrupt the market" for spam or push spammers to new strategies, but their
total volume would still be limited to the 1/If fraction. (If spammers' new
strategies actually allowed them to buy more stamps, then the new strate-
gies yield more profit than the old ones, contradicting our assumption that
spammers are currently following the optimal strategy.)
For speak-up, the case is less clear because we do not understand the
economics of DoS as clearly as the economics of email. However, we can
still consider how speak-up affects attackers' costs. Recall that speak-up
forces attackers to acquire many more machines to conduct the same level
of service-denial as they can under the status quo (as stated in §3.2). Thus,
the question becomes: how hard is it for an adversary to compromise or
control orders of magnitude more machines?
We believe that such compromises would in fact be costly for attackers,
145
if not downright crippling. Our reasons are twofold. First, compromising
machines is already a competitive activity; bot herders compete with each
other based on how many machines they control. Thus, any given adver-
sary today already has an incentive to compromise as many machines as
he can. Second, compromising machines happens automatically (e.g., two
ways that worms spread are by scanning and as users open attachments
that email themselves to the users' contact lists). Thus, we can assume that
for any known exploit, all of the vulnerable machines are already compro-
mised (roughly speaking). The implication is that compromising further
machines requires identifying further vulnerabilities. Yet, doing so cannot
be easy: if a vulnerability were easy to find, it would have been found al-
ready, given the competition mentioned above.
To sum up our predictions about speak-up: while we cannot predict
attackers' next steps, we do know that speak-up has increased their costs-
and that the increase is likely to be significant.
Of course, the economics of computer crime could change, causing adver-
saries to adopt new tactics-and this point is independent of whether DQE
and speak-up are adopted as defenses. For this reason, our reflections above
should be recognized as speculations.
6.2 LOOKING BACK
At the end of the day, we do not wish to sell short speak-up and DQE. Even
if the pessimal scenarios that motivated these systems do not materialize,
we believe that they are interesting for concrete technical reasons.
Speak-up introduces the idea that bandwidth could be a computational
currency and presents several mechanisms for charging in this currency.
These mechanisms are simple (both conceptually and in implementation),
resist gaming, find the correct price automatically without requiring ex-
plicit server-client communication, and likely apply to other currencies.
And, speak-up admits a practical implementation.
DQE illustrates that large-scale, distributed quota enforcement is prac-
tical, in part because its enforcer can handle the volume of the world's
email with just several thousand machines. As we discussed at the end of
Chapter 4, DQE can apply to other contexts, and the enforcer by itself is
likely to be a useful building block when one needs a system to prevent
double-spending of "tokens"--stamps, digital coins, etc. The enforcer's spe-
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cific techniques (summarized in §1.4 and §4.11, and at the beginning of
Chapter 4) are interesting. And, more generally, it occupies a novel design
point for distributed systems. Specifically, its weak semantics permit it to
shed many mechanisms-including neighbor maintenance, replica mainte-
nance, and heavyweight cryptography-that are required of other systems.
The result is a system that can scale to a workload of hundreds of billions
of requests per day.
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Appendix
A
Questions about Speak-up
A.1 THE THREAT
How often do application-level attacks occur?
We do not know how often they occur. They seem to be less common than
other forms of DDoS but, according to anecdote, the trend is toward such
attacks. See §3.10.1 for more detail.
Why would an adversary favor this type of attack?
Such attacks are harder to filter (because existing DDoS-prevention tools al-
ready have the ability to filter other kinds of attacks). Moreover, application-
level attacks require less bandwidth (because the request rate needed to de-
plete an application-level resource is often far below what is needed to sat-
urate a server's access link). This latter characteristic would attract adver-
saries who have access to small botnets or who need to conserve resources,
and indeed there are reports that botnets are becoming smaller [17, 33, 35,
49, 78, 105, 1251.
If such attacks are not yet common, why bother thinking about the defense?
We answer this question in §3.10.1 and Chapter 6. Briefly, there are a few
reasons. First, the vulnerability still exists and thus could be exploited in the
future. Second, we believe that the trend is toward such attacks. Last, we
believe that it is important to be proactive, that is, to identify and defend
against weaknesses before they are exploited.
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How often are the attacking clients' requests actually indistinguishable from
the legitimate clients' requests?
We do not know. According to anecdote, many application-level attacks
are primitive and hence easily filtered. However, as argued just above,
we believe that the trend is toward smarter attacks and smaller botnets.
See §3.10.1.
What makes you think that bad clients send requests at higher rates than
legitimate clients do?
If bad clients weren't sending at higher rates, then, as long as their numbers
didn't dominate the number of good clients, the server could restore service
to the good clients with modest over-provisioning. (If the number of bad
clients is vastly larger than the number of good clients, and requests from
the two populations are indistinguishable, then no defense works.)
Aren't there millions of bots? Aren't current DDoS attacks 1 o Gbits/s? How
can speak-up possibly defend against that?
See §3.2, §3.3, and §3.10.2. In short: first, only a few botnets are of this size
and only a minuscule fraction of attacks are lo Gbits/s (93.10.2). Second,
speak-up (or any resource-based defense) works best when the adversarial
and good populations are roughly the same order of magnitude. As men-
tioned in the answer to the previous question, if the adversarial population
vastly outnumbers the good population, and if requests from the two pop-
ulations are indistinguishable, then no defense works.
Can speak-up defend tiny Web sites?
Yes and no. Speak-up helps no matter what. However, speak-up cannot
leave the legitimate clientele unharmed by an attack unless the legitimate
population and the attacking population are of the same order of magni-
tude (or unless the server is highly over-provisioned). See §3.2.
A.2 THE COSTS OF SPEAK-UP
Doesn't speak-up harm the network, a communal resource?
See §3.2, §3.5.1, and §3.11. Our brief answer is that speak-up introduces ex-
tra traffic only when a server is attacked, that speak-up's traffic is congestion-
controlled, that the network core appears to be over-provisioned, and that
one should regard speak-up as simply a heavy user of the network. However,
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as with any application (e.g., BitTorrent), there might be collateral damage
from the extra traffic introduced by speak-up.
But bad guys won't control congestion!
True. However, a bad client refusing to control congestion is carrying out a
link attack, which speak-up does not defend against (a bad client can carry
out such an attack today); see §33.3 And, if a bad client does flood, the bad
client won't get much more of the server than it would if it obeyed conges-
tion control (see §93.44). Thus, speak-up does its job regardless of whether
bad clients control congestion.
What is the effect of speak-up when links are shared?
See §3.5.2.
Bandwidth is expensive, so why would a site want to use speak-up, given
that speak-up requires the site to allocate a lot of inbound bandwidth?
The economics of every site are different. For some sites, speak-up is cer-
tainly less economical than over-provisioning the server's application-level
resources to handle every good and bad request. However, we believe that
there are other sites for which bandwidth is not terribly expensive; see con-
dition C2 in §3.3 and §3.5.3.
Doesn't speak-up introduce opportunity costs for end-users?
Yes, but such costs are introduced by any network application and, indeed,
by any resource-based defense. See §3.2 and §3.11.
A.3 THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPEAK-UP
Won't speak-up cause adversaries to acquire more resources (i.e., compro-
mised hosts)? For example, if speak-up has nullified a loo-node botnet,
won't an adversary just build a 1o,ooo-node botnet? Thus, won't speak-up
inflame the bot problem?
It is true that speak-up (or any resource-based defense) creates additional
incentive for adversaries to compromise machines. However, the cost to
doing so is likely quite high: we believe that many of the computers world-
wide that could be compromised cheaply already have been. Thus, speak-up
increases the adversary's costs, thereby resulting in a "higher fence". We dis-
cuss this point in §3.2 and §6.1.
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Doesn't speak-up give ISPs an incentive to encourage botnets as a way to
increase the bandwidth demanded by good clients?
Such misalignment of incentives can happen in many commercial relation-
ships (e.g., investment managers who needlessly generate commissions),
but society relies on a combination of regulation, professional norms, and
reputation to limit harmful conduct.
If the problem is bots, then shouldn't researchers address that mess instead
of encouraging more traffic?
Our answer to this philosophical question is that cleaning up bots is crucial,
but even if bots are curtailed by orders of magnitude, a server with scarce
computational resources must still limit bots' influence. Speak-up is a way
to do so.
A.4 ALTERNATE DEFENSES
Instead of charging clients bandwidth and allocating the server in a way
that is roughly fair, why not allocate the server in a way that is explicitly
fair by giving every client the same piece?
Doing so requires that the server be able to identify its clients. However,
our threat model presumes that, given a request, the server cannot be sure
which client originated it. The reasons for such uncertainty are address hi-
jacking, proxies, and NAT. For more detail, see §1.2, §2.3, §3.3, and page
28.
Why does speak-up make clients consume bandwidth? Why doesn't speak-
up simply determine how much bandwidth each of its clients has (say, by
using a bandwidth-probing tool) and then allocate the server according to
this determination?
Doing so would again require that the server be able to identify its clients.
For example, if an adversary adopts several IP addresses, each of these ad-
dresses would appear to have the same bandwidth, thereby giving the ad-
versary a bandwidth advantage.
Instead of charging clients bandwidth, why not charge them CPU cycles?
Such a defense would be a reasonable alternative. For a detailed comparison
of bandwidth and CPU cycles as computational currencies, see §3.9.1.
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Sites need to protect themselves against link attacks (and speak-up does not
serve this purpose, as you state in §3.3). So why not regard the application
as being connected to a virtual link, and use existing link defenses to protect
the application?
Depending on the scenario, this approach may work. However, deploying
link defenses often requires network modification or help from ISPs; it may
be easier to deal with application-level attacks on one's own. Also, many de-
fenses against link attacks work by detecting very high amounts of aggregate
traffic, and an effective application-level attack needs far less bandwidth so
may not trigger these defenses. Finally, adversaries may move away from
link attacks, removing the need for link defenses.
How does speak-up compare to ... ?
Please see §939. In that section, we compare speak-up to many other de-
fenses.
A.5 DETAILS OF THE MECHANISM
Can bandwidth be faked? For example, can a client compress its bandwidth
payment to give the illusion that it is paying more bits? Or, could a client
get a proxy to pay bits on its behalf?
The thinner counts the bits that arrive on behalf of a request, so a client
connecting directly to the thinner cannot fake its bandwidth payment. And,
proxies generally relay what clients send, so if a client compresses its pay-
ment en route to the proxy, then the proxy will submit a compressed request
to the thinner.
By how much does speak-up increase bandwidth consumption?
Assume that the bad clients were flooding independent of speak-up. In
the worst case, the good clients need to spend all of their bandwidth. In
this case, the extra bandwidth consumption is G/(gn), where G is the total
bandwidth of the good clients expressed in bits/s, g is the good clients' le-
gitimate demand expressed in requests/s, and n is the size of a request, in
bits. However, if the good clients do not need to spend all of their band-
width, the bandwidth consumption may be far smaller; see the discussion
of "price" in §3.4.2.
Does speak-up allow bad clients to amplify their impact? For example, if
bad clients attack a site, they can trigger speak-up, causing the good clients
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to pay bandwidth. Don't adversaries therefore have a disproportionate abil-
ity to increase traffic under speak-up?
At a high level, the answer is no. The "price"-that is, the extra traffic intro-
duced by speak-up-varies with the attack size. Roughly, if the bad clients
do not spend much bandwidth, then they do not make the good clients
spend much bandwidth. Like the previous question, this one is related to
the discussion of "price" in §3.4.2.
Can the bad clients amplify their impact by cycling through a population
of servers, driving each into overload but spending only a little bit of time
at each server?
No. The purpose of speak-up is exactly to give clients service in proportion
to the bandwidth that they spend. Thus, if the bad clients go from site to site,
never spending much bandwidth at any site, then they will not get much
service. Moreover, if they follow this pattern, then the price at each of the
sites will be low, so the good clients will not spend much bandwidth either.
If the bad clients do spend many bits and temporarily drive up the price at
a site, that price will subside once those bad clients leave.
A.6 ATTACKS ON THE THINNER
What happens if the thinner gets a lot of clients or connections at once? Can
it run out offile descriptors?
Yes, but the implementation protects itself against this possibility. The im-
plementation recycles file descriptors that correspond to requests that have
not been "active" for some period. Moreover, we have configured the thin-
ner to allocate up to hundreds of thousands of file descriptors; see §3.7.
Is it possible to build a production-quality thinner, given that the box would
have to sink bits at high rate and maintain a lot of state?
Yes, we believe it is possible. The state for each request is very little-a TCP
control block, a counter for the number of bytes that have been paid on
behalf of that request, and a small amount of other per-request data. More-
over, even our unoptimized implementation can sink bits at a high rate;
see §3.8.1.
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A.7 OTHER QUESTIONS
What happens if a server defended by speak-up experiences a flash crowd,
that is, overload from legitimate clients?
Such a server will conduct a bandwidth auction, just as if it were under at-
tack. Though this fact might seem distasteful, observe that if the server is
overloaded it still has to decide which requests to drop. Deciding based on
bandwidth is not necessarily worse than making random choices. We dis-
cuss this question in more detail when critiquing resource-based schemes
(see §3.9.1).
Does your implementation ofspeak-up work if the Web client does not run
JavaScript?
No. See §3.7.
Under speak-up, all clients are encouraged to send at high rates. So how
is one supposed to tell the difference between the legitimate clients and the
bots?
An attacked Web site cannot tell; indeed, part of the motivation for speak-
up is that it can be difficult for Web sites to identify clients. However, the
ISP of a given bot should be able to tell, based on the computer's traffic
consumption: for a good client, most of the sites that it visits are not under
attack, whereas a bot consumes much more of its access link. Thus, if it were
economically attractive for ISPs to identify and eliminate bots, they could
do so.
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Appendix
B
Questions about DQE
B.1 GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT DQE
I don't get much spam anymore. Isn't the spam problem solved?
No. It is true that the big email providers prevent a lot of spam from showing
up in their customers' inboxes, but these providers have huge resources to
devote to the problem of identifying spam. Many people use regional ISPs
that do not have the resources to be as effective. Moreover, the big email
providers may be causing "false positives" (legitimate email in the spam
folder). Finally, even the big email service providers (ESPs) dislike spam,
suggesting that it is still a problem.
Do you think that it will ever be solved?
We do not believe that spam will stop being sent (we believe that it will al-
ways be easy for someone to harvest email addresses and send vast amounts
of email to them). However, we believe that the symptoms-wasted human
attention-can be mitigated. DQE is one way to do so.
Why do receivers TEST a stamp with the enforcer and then SET it? Why
doesn't the enforcer expose a TEST-AND-SET primitive?
The enforcer is not trusted by the other participants in DQE (see §4.2.1).
Thus, the TEST call must "test" the enforcer to verify that it really has seen
the stamp (see §4.3.2). Such verification prevents the enforcer from labeling
valid email as spam. A TEST-AND-SET primitive would defeat this purpose
by presenting the "answer" along with the "test". The enforcer would then
be able to lie to receivers.
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How is DQE's enforcer diferent from a DHT?
The enforcer and DHTs each store key-value pairs, but the enforcer has a
very different design. For example, the enforcer is allowed to "lose data".
Also, the membership of the enforcer is fixed. See §4.10.3 for further com-
parison.
B.2 ATTACKS ON DQE
Can stamps be stolen? What is the effect of such theft?
Yes, our threat model presumes that stamps can be stolen from end-hosts
(though such theft would probably be difficult in practice). Nevertheless, as
we show in §4.3.4 and §4.8, such theft is unlikely to thwart DQE.
What if an email server is compromised?
In this case, the adversary can steal stamps from email that passes through
the email server. However, if email servers were easy to compromise, we
would see much more spam coming from legitimate email servers. More-
over, the human owners of the email server would be able to detect that
such theft was occurring. See §4.3.4 for further discussion of this attack.
What prevents adversaries from counterfeiting stamps?
The cryptography in stamps combined with the trust that everyone places
in the quota allocator. See 94.3.1. Briefly, an adversary cannot forge a valid
certificate; doing so requires forging the quota allocator's signature. Because
adversaries cannot forge certificates, they cannot forge stamps.
What happens if a stamp is reused in bulk, all at once? Will that overload
the enforcer and/or allow a lot of spam through?
We address this attack in §4.4.6.
What if the portal is adversarial? Can't it endlessly give the wrong answer
to requesting clients?
Yes, but clients choose portals that they trust, and if the portal is adversarial,
the client will begin to suspect it; see §944.7. Also, recall that the portal can
only lie in one direction: it can only declare that a given stamp is fresh; it
cannot label a fresh stamp as reused.
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B.3 ALLOCATION, DEPLOYMENT, & ADOPTION
How are you going to get DQE adopted? Doesn't it require everyone to start
using it before it is useful?
Adoption is definitely a challenge. However, DQE can be useful even before
everyone begins using it; see §4.9.
How does quota allocation work? Whatprevents the spammers from getting
large quotas? If quotas cost money, how can quotas be assigned equitably?
How do you know that the quotas would not harm legitimate senders?
We answer these questions when discussing quota allocation policy in §4.7.
Where does the quota allocator come from? What entity performs this func-
tion? How can you ensure that quota allocators are globally trusted? What
prevents the allocators from cheating?
We answer these questions in §4.9.
Are quotas assigned per-person, per-machine, or per-organization?
From a technical perspective, any of these options works. However, we imag-
ine that, for ease of deployment and management, organizations would ac-
quire quotas for their users and then dole out pieces of the quotas to them.
So human users have to understand stamps?
No. Email servers can handle all of the DQE-related work.
How do mailing lists work under DQE?
See §4.9.
B.4 MICROPAYMENTS & DIGITAL POSTAGE
What is the relationship between DQE and digital postage schemes?
DQE is a bankable postage [1] scheme. In §4.10.1, we discuss how DQE
relates to digital postage generally and bankable postage in particular.
But aren't digital postage schemes known not to work?
No. There are two sets of issues raised by digital postage schemes. The first
regards pricing. The question here is how to impose a price on spammers
without affecting legitimate clients. However, refunding stamps can address
such concerns; see §4.7. The second set of issues is technical: there has not
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been a concrete proposal for a system that could prevent double-spending
at the volume of the world's email (tens or hundreds of billions of emails
per day) in an online fashion. DQE fills this void.
How does DQE relate to micropayments?
See §4.10.2. DQE implements a lightweight variant of micropayments. And,
as mentioned just above, the micropayment literature does not describe
a system that could handle millions of requests per second and prevent
double-spending of generic currency in an online fashion. (The existing mi-
cropayment systems can detect such double-spending either off-line or with
vendor-specific currency.) Thus, existing micropayment systems could use
DQE's enforcer for this purpose.
B.5 ALTERNATIVES
As an alternative to DQE, why not have ISPs rate-limit each of their users?
This approach would impose a quota on users but would not require the
allocator and the enforcer.
Such an approach would still require a mechanism to make sure that ISPs
were not cheating. That mechanism would need to keep track of every email
and would probably end up looking something like DQE's enforcer.
Instead ofDQE, why not have receivers charge CPU cycles pairwise?
See the postage section of §4.10.1.
Shouldn't senders pay receivers directly instead ofpaying some third-party?
This policy is reasonable. How should one implement it? As mentioned
in §4.10.2, current micropayment proposals do not scale to the volume of
the world's email. As it happens, we think that DQE might be able to im-
plement this policy (receivers would exchange their stamps for money at
the end of the day or year). If we are right, then DQE is agnostic to whether
senders pay receivers or a third party.
Why not defend against spam using legal means?
One can certainly do so. However, the current volume of spam is an indi-
cation that legal strategies are not enough on their own. Our interest is in
finding a technical solution that works independent of the legal system.
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What about controlling spam by ... ?
Please see §4.10. In that section, we survey many defenses and compare
DQE to them.
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Appendix
C
Address Hijacking
In this appendix, we describe how an adversary can temporarily adopt IP
addresses that it does not own. The attack can take various forms.
Spurious BGP Advertisements
An attacker can issue spurious Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) advertise-
ments, thereby declaring to the Internet's routing infrastructure that the
attacker owns a block of IP addresses to which he is not entitled. The re-
sult is that the attacker may now be reachable at potentially millions of
IP addresses. This attack works because many ISPs (a) accept BGP routes
without validating their provenance and (b) propagate these routes to other
ISPs [52]. Such spurious adoption of IP addresses has been observed be-
fore [23] and correlated with spam transmissions [126].
Stealing from the Local Subnet
A host can steal IP addresses from its subnet [51]; this attack is particularly
useful if the thieving host is a bot in a sparsely populated subnet. The attack
works as follows:
- The thieving host, H, cycles through the IP addresses in the subnet.
For each IP address X, H broadcasts an ARP (Address Resolution Pro-
tocol) request for X.
- If H does not receive a reply to this ARP, H infers (assumes) that X is
currently unused. At this point, H undertakes to steal X, using one of
two methods:
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* H sends packets to remote destinations, and the packets have
source IP address X. Any reply packet will be addressed to X.
When these reply packets arrive at the subnet, the router in front
of the subnet will issue an ARP request for X. H simply responds
to this request, declaring to the subnet that it is reachable at IP
address X.
* Another option is for H to preempt the process above by broad-
casting an ARP reply associating X with H's hardware address.
The local router now believes that H is reachable at IP address
X. At this point, H can place source IP address X in its outbound
packets and receive replies that are sent to X.
Of course, if the router in front of the subnet is properly configured, this
attack is precluded, but not all routers are properly configured.
Stealing from Remote Networks
A host can adopt IP addresses from another network, assuming that the
adversary controls hosts in two networks. The goal of this attack is to have a
high-bandwidth host (say, one that is owned by the attacker) appear to have
many IP addresses (say, that were harvested from bots on low-bandwidth
dial-up connections). The attack works as follows:'
- The high-bandwidth, thieving host, H, sends packets with source IP
address X; this time, X is the IP address of, for example, a bot with
low bandwidth.
- Replies to this packet will go to the bot (these replies, in the case of
TCP traffic, will usually be ACKs of small packet size).
- To complete the attack, the bot sends the ACKs to the high-bandwidth
host, at which point it has become reachable at IP address X.
In fact, H could combine this attack with the previous one, as follows. The
bot could steal X from its subnet, using the previous attack. Then, H and
the bot would execute the attack just described.
1Nick Feamster told me about this attack and is my source for it.
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Appendix
D
Bounding Total Stamp Reuse
Our aim is to show that, with what is essentially certainty, the actual total
stamp use in DQE is close to the expected total stamp use, regardless of
which subset of np nodes fails. To establish this result, we now prove The-
orem 4.2 from §4.4.2:
Theorem 4.2. Let K be the number of stamps that are active in a given day.
IfK > (6n2 + 300n)/6 2, then, with probability at least 1 - e- •10 , there is no
subset of size np whose failure leads to more than (1 + e) times the expected
total use across all stamps.
Proof: To establish the theorem, we will first use a Chernoffbound to show
that, for a given set of np nodes that fail, the probability is very small that
the actual use across all stamps is more than (1 + E) times the expected use
across all stamps. We will then use a union bound to show that, out of all
(n() subsets of size np, the probability is still small that any subset's failure
would result in significant deviation.
For each stamp i E {1, 2,...,K}, let Xi be a random variable equal
to the number of uses of the stamp. Each Xi takes a value in [1, n] (re-
call that the worst case is a stamp being reused at each portal). Also, from
Theorem 4.1 in §4.4.2, each Xi has mean i < 1/(1 - p)2 + p, assuming
r = 1 + log,/, n.
Now, fix a subset of np nodes that have failed. Once this subset is cho-
sen, each of the X, is independent. The reason is that X, depends only on
the assigned nodes for stamp i (see §944.2) and that stamps choose their as-
signed nodes independently (see §4-4.1). The total use across all K stamps is
162
i=1 Xi (which has mean Ky), and this sum is what we are trying to bound.
For each Xi, define a new random variable Yi = Xil/n. Each of the Yi is
independent and take values in [1/n, 1], so we can apply a Chernoffbound
to C-, Yi to show that this sum does not deviate from its mean, Kpa/n, by
more than (1 + E):
Pr Xi > Ky(1 + ) = Pr Yi > (1+ E) (D.1)
i= 1 i=1
< exp (-2 ) . (D.2)
The justification for applying this inequality is, first, a Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound on Bernoulli random variables that is stated in [8]. Second, we can
apply such bounds to random variables with arbitrary distributions over
[0, 1], not just to Bernoulli random variables (see [110o, Problem 4.71).
Now, we consider the probability that any subset of size np deviates as
above. Let T be the event "there exist one or more subsets of size np whose
failure would produce more than (1 + e) times the total expected stamp
use". T is the union of ( n ) different events, one for each subset; each event
has probability bounded as above. Applying the union bound,' we get:
Pr(T) < )exp (-
2
np 3n
< ) exp -~E2 (from Stirling's approximation)
np 3n
= exp (np + npln(1/p) 
- e2 K p)
< exp np np(/p) - 2 (because In x < x forallx)
< exp 2n - 2K (because p < 1 and p > 1).
If we take K > (6n2 + 300n)/E2, then we get:
Pr(T) < exp (-100),
so the probability that no subset deviates is greater than 1 - e- 100, as claimed.
Ol
1The union bound applies the fact that the probability of the union of a group of events is no greater
than the sum of the probabilities of the individual events. In this case, each of the events is of the
form, "the failure of subset 243 causes more than e deviation from the expected stamp use':
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Appendix
E
Calculations for Enforcer
Experiments
This appendix gives the details of two calculations that were mentioned in
the evaluation of the enforcer. In §E. 1, we analyze the "crashed" experiment
of §4.6.2 (see page lo9). In §E.2, we calculate the average number of RPCs
induced by a TEST for the 32-node experiments of §4.6.4 (see page 114).
E.1 EXPECTATION IN "CRASHED" EXPERIMENT
In this section, we derive an exact expression for expected stamp use in
the "crashed" experiment in §4.6.2. (The expression is stated in footnote 8
of §4.6.2, on page lo9.) Recall from that section that n is the number of
nodes in the system, p is the probability a machine is "bad" (i.e., does not
respond to queries), m = n(1 - p) is the number of "up" or "good" ma-
chines, stamps are queried 32 times, and r, the replication factor, is 3.
Claim E.1 The expected uses per stamp in the "crashed" experiment is:
(1 - p) (1) + 3p2(1 - p)a + 3p(1- p)2 + pM ( m 32
m
where and
m ( i-1 m(m- i)
3 m 3
m-1 i-11lE m-i
i=1 3 m(m - 1)
2 )
3
Proof: We consider 4 cases: none of a stamp's 3 assigned nodes is good; 1 is
good; 2 are good; and all 3 are good.
Let U(s) be the number of times a stamp s is used. We calculate the
expected value of U(s) in each of the four cases. The first case is trivial:
if all of the assigned nodes for s are good (which occurs with probability
(1 - p)3), the stamp will be used exactly once.
Next, to determine E[U] for stamp with no good assigned nodes (proba-
bility p3), we recall the facts of the experiment: stamps are queried 32 times
at random portals, and once a stamp has been SET at a portal, no more
reuses of the stamp will occur at that portal. Thus, the expected number
of times that s will be used, if none of its assigned nodes is good, is the ex-
pected number of distinct bins (out of m) that 32 random balls will cover.
Since the probability that a bin isn't covered is (m•)32, the expected value
of U(s) in this case is:
M (m - -) 3
2
We now compute the expected number of stamp uses for stamps with
one or two good assigned nodes. In either case:
E[U] = 1 -Pr (exactly i use) + 2 -Pr (exactly 2 uses) + .-
For stamps with one good assigned node (probability (1 - p)p2) there
are two ways for the stamp to be used exactly once: either, with probability
, the stamp is TEST and then SET at the one good assigned node, or, with
probability (- ) 5, the PUT generated by the SET is sent to the good as-
signed node. (The latter probability is the product of the probabilities that
the TEST and SET are sent to a node other than the good assigned node and
that the resulting PUT is sent to the good assigned node.) Thus,
Pr (exactly 1 use) = + ( )
m m 3
If the stamp is used exactly twice, then the stamp was not stored at its good
assigned node on first use; this occurs with probability (- ) 1. To calculate
the probability that the second use is the last use, we apply the same logic
as in the exactly 1 use case. Either, with probability M_ , the stamp is TEST
and SET at the good assigned node (m - 1 because there has already been
one use, so one of the m nodes already stores the stamp, and thus a TEST at
that node would not have resulted in this second use), or, with probability
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(m-) 1, the PUT generated by the SET is sent to the good assigned node.
Thus,
Pr(exactly2 uses)=(M 1) [ 1 + (m ) ~]
m 3 m 1 m- 1 3
By the same logic, a third use only happens if the first and second uses do
not store the stamp on the good node, and the third use is the last use if it
results in the stamp being stored on its good assigned node:
Pr(exactly3 uses)= l 1) 2 ( - 2) 2 [ + ( ) 1]
m 3 m-1 3 m-2 m-2
A pattern emerges; cancellation of terms yields an expression for the general
case:
Pr(exactly i uses) = - 1 ( + m-i)( i3 m 3
Thus, we have an expression for the expected number of uses for stamps
with one good node:
E l• E[U | one assigned node is good]
C 22)i-1 1 ( m-i)
= i -- 1 + . (E.1)
A similar argument applies to stamps with two good nodes (probability
(1 - p)2p), except we begin with
Pr (exactly 1 use)= _2 (m-2) 2
m m 3
The 2/m term replaces 1/m because a TEST and SET to either of the (now
two) good assigned nodes will result in exactly one use, and 2/3 replaces
1/3 because the SET'S PUT now has a 2/3 chance of reaching a good assigned
node.
To get Pr (exactly 2 uses), we follow similar logic as before. The first use
is not the last with probability (m-2) 1, because the stamp is SET to a non-
assigned node with probability (m - 2)/m and PUT to a bad node with
probability 1/3. Then, the second use is the last with probability -2 +
m-1
Pr (exactly 2uses)= (m-2) 1 -+ (m-3)]m 3 m-1 -1 3
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Continuing,
Pr(exactly3 uses)= (m-2) (m-3) 1[ 2 + (m - ) ]m 3 -1 3 m-2 -2 3
A pattern again emerges, and cancellation gives us
Pr(exactly i uses) = m (2 + (m - i - 1)3 m(m - i) 3
Thus, we have an expression for the expected number of uses for a stamp
that has exactly two good assigned nodes:
E2 f E[U I two assigned nodes are good]
r-(1-1 rn-i 2
1= i (- 1 2 + ~2(m- i- 1) (E.2)
i=1(m - 1) 3
Note that for equations E.1 and E.2, the summation begins with the first use
(i = 1) and ends with the stamp being on as many nodes as possible (i = m
or i = m - 1).
Letting a = El (from equation E.1) and 2 = E  (from equation E.2), we
establish the claim. O
E.2 AVERAGE NUMBER OF RPCS PER TEST
In §4.6.4, on page 114, we rely on a calculation of how many RPCs are in-
duced per TEST in the 32-node enforcer experiments. We now give the de-
tails of that calculation.
Claim E.2 In those experiments, the average number of RPCs per TEST is
9.95.
Proof: Recall from §4.6.4 that the 32-node enforcer is configured with repli-
cation factor r = 5. On receiving a fresh TEST, the portal must contact all
5 assigned nodes for the stamp. With probability 5/32, the portal is an as-
signed node for the stamp, and one of the GETS will be local. Thus, we expect
fresh TEST to generate -54+ L- 5 = 4.84 GET requests and GET responses.
(Note that a request and a response both cause the CPU to do roughly the
same amount of work, and thus an RPC response counts as an RPC in our
calculations.) A fresh TEST will also be followed by a SET that will in turn
cause both a PUT and a PUT response with probability 31/32 = 0.97. (With
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# RPCs from # RPCs from
RPC Type fresh TEST reused TEST Average
TEST 1.0 1.0 1.0
GET 4.84 2.64 3.74
GET resp. 4.84 2.64 3.74
SET 1.0 0 0.5
PUT 0.97 0 0.485
PUT resp. 0.97 0 0.485
Total RPCs/TEST 9.95
TABLE E.1--Number of RPCs of each type generated by fresh and reused TESTS. To cal-
culate the average number of RPCs of each type (last column), we assume that half of the
TESTS are fresh and half are reused.
probability 1/32, the portal is one of the assigned nodes and chooses itself
as the node to PUT to, generating no remote PUT.)
A reused TEST generates no subsequent SET, PUT request, or PUT re-
sponse. In addition, for reused TESTS, the number of induced GETS is less
than in the fresh TEST case: as soon as a portal receives a "found" response,
it will not issue any more GETS. The exact expectation of the number of
GETS caused by a reused TEST, 2.64, is established by Claim E.3, below.
The types and quantities of RPCs generated are summarized in Table E.1;
the average number of RPCs generated per TEST assumes that 50% of TESTS
are fresh and 50% are reused, as in the experiment from §4.6.4. Thus, the
expected number of RPCs generated by a single TEST is:
1 5 271.0+ 1 . 4 + - -5) +2.642 32 32
+ 1 -5 .4+ 7 -5 +2.64
1 31 + 31]
= 9.95.
Claim E.3 A reused TEST generates 2.64 GETS in expectation.
Proof: The number of GETS generated by a TEST for a reused stamp depends
on the circumstances of the stamp's original SET: did the SET occur at an
assigned node, and if so, did it induce a remote PUT? Note that, for any
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Event Pr(Ai) stamp originally SET at...
A1  27/32 ... a non-assigned node
A2  1/32 ... an assigned node, no further PUTS
A3  4/32 ... an assigned node, i additional PUT
TABLE E.2-Possible SET circumstances.
Event stamp queried (TESTed) at...
B1  ... a node storing the stamp
B2  ... an assigned node not storing the stamp
B3  ... a non-assigned node not storing the stamp
TABLE E. 3-Possible reused TEST circumstances.
stamp, 27 of the 32 enforcer nodes will not be assigned nodes. Thus, with
probability L, a SET will be to a non-assigned node, and the stamp will be
stored at both an assigned node and a non-assigned node (event A 1). If the
SET occurs at an assigned node (with probability 5), then 1 of the time the
node will choose itself as the recipient of the PUT (event A 2, with overall
probability 1 - - ), and the stamp will only be stored at that single,probablity5 32 32
assigned node; 4 of the time, the node will choose another assigned node
(event A 3, with overall probability . = ), and the stamp will be stored5 32 32
at two assigned nodes. We summarize the three possible circumstances in
Table E.2. Note that the events Ai partition their sample space.
The number of GETS caused by a TEST for a reused stamp also depends
on the circumstances of the TEST: is the queried node storing the stamp, and
if not, is the node one of the stamp's assigned nodes? There are again three
possible circumstances: the TEST is sent to some node storing the stamp
(event B1); the TEST is sent to an assigned node not storing the stamp (event
B2 ); the TEST is sent to a non-assigned node not storing the stamp (event B3).
These events are summarized in Table E.3; they partition their sample space
as well.
Now, let C(Ai, Bj) count the number of GET RPCs that occur when events
A i and Bj are true. Values of C(Ai, Bj) are easy to determine. First consider
event B1: the TEST is sent to a node already storing the stamp. In this case,
there will be no remote GETS regardless of the original SET's results.
Next, consider event B2 : the TEST is sent to an assigned node not storing
the stamp; now, events A 1 and A 2 both cause a single assigned node to store
the stamp, and thus, in either case, we expect the portal to send 2 (of r - 1 =
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C(Ai, Bj) A1  A 2  A 3
B1  o o 0
B2  2.5 2.5 (1+2/3)
B3  3 3 2
TABLE E.4-Values of C(Ai, Bj), the expected number of RPCs generated by a TEST when
Ai and Bj are true.
Pr(Bj I Ai) Al A2  A3
B1  2/32 1/32 2/32
B2  4/32 4/32 3/32
B3  26/32 27/32 27/32
TABLE E.5--Conditional probabilities Pr(Bj I Ai).
4 possible) GETS. However, event A3 causes the stamp to be stored on two
assigned nodes, and in that case, we expect the portal to send (2) - 1 +
(1 - 1) () -2 + (1 - ) (1 - ) (1) -3 = 1 + GETS.
Finally, consider event B3: the TEST is set to a non-assigned node not
storing the stamp. If the stamp is stored on a single assigned node (events
A1, A2), we expect the portal to send 3 (of 5 possible) GETS; if the stamp is
stored on two assigned nodes (A3), we expect the portal to send (Q) - 1 +
(1- 2) ()-2+(1- ) (1 - ) ().3+(1- 2) (1- 2) (1 - ) (1).4=
2 GETS. We summarize the values of C(Ai, Bj) in Table E.4.
Now we can construct an expression for the expected number of RPCs
generated by a reused TEST, which we call C:
3 3
C = E E C(Ai, B) -Pr(Ai A Bj). (E.3)
j=1 i=1
To calculate this expression, we use Pr(Ai A Bj) = Pr(Bj I Ai) " Pr(Ai). We
already calculated the value of each Pr(Ai) at the beginning of this proof,
so we only need to calculate each Pr(Bj I Ai). We begin by considering
the stamps originally SET at a non-assigned node (event A1), which are
now stored at one assigned node and one non-assigned node. Given event
A,, there are 2 nodes storing the stamp, 4 assigned nodes not storing the
stamp, and 26 non-assigned nodes not storing the stamp. The probabili-
ties of sending a TEST to nodes in these three classes-which correspond to
events B 1, B2, and B3, respectively--are simply 2/32, 4/32, and 26/32. The
same method can be used to find the conditional probabilities given A 2 and
A 3 ; we present these values in Table E.5.
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Combining the values of C(Ai, Bj) with the joint probabilities, we com-
pute, from equation (E.3), C = 2.64. O
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